The grand waiting game: why Lebanon’s elites postpone compromise
What explains the intransigence of Lebanon’s political elites to resolve the country’s long-running financial and economic crisis? This column argues that the determinants for reaching political settlements – a succession of deals among powerful political elites on how to distribute political power and economic resources – have changed over time, making a grand waiting game the best strategy for each party.
Ministerial rotations and effective government in Lebanon
Possible solutions to Lebanon’s multiple crises are well known. But as this column explains, while the necessary technical approaches and expertise are readily available, political elites continue to face incentives to undermine state authority and appropriate institutional capacities for individual gains. New evidence indicates that rotations of ministries among political parties do not make the government any more effective.
Lebanon must learn from the Syrian disaster
Overlapping crises are threatening the political, economic and social stability of Lebanon. As this column explains, the disaster in Syria provides insights into how grievances can accumulate to a point at which single events can trigger conflict.
Recession without impact: why Lebanese elites delay reform
The survival of Lebanon’s political elites is highly dependent on the wellbeing of the economy. Why then do they delay necessary reform to avoid crisis? This column examines the role of politically connected firms in delaying much-needed economic stabilisation policies.