Can North Africa's diasporas help navigate a new age of tariffs?

Can North Africa’s diasporas help navigate a new age of tariffs?

Jason Gagnon
November 03, 2026

Rising US tariffs have put trade costs and market diversification back at the centre of economic policy. This column argues that Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have another potential source of trade resilience that receives much less attention: their large and diverse diasporas. Decades of research suggest that migrant networks can reduce some of the information and transaction costs of international trade, raising the question of whether they can also help exporters adapt to a more fragmented global economy.

In a nutshell

US trade policy shifted again in 2026: Morocco and Egypt now face additional 12.5% tariffs on covered exports to the United States, while Tunisia is excluded – a reminder of how quickly market access can change.

A large body of research shows that migrant networks lower the information, search and trust costs of trade. With roughly 3.6 million Moroccan-born, 715,000 Tunisian-born and 4.8 million Egyptian-born people abroad, North Africa's diasporas are an under-used trade asset.

Export-promotion agencies, chambers of commerce and SME support programmes could map diaspora expertise against priority products and markets, turning these networks into a practical tool for export diversification.

US trade policy has undergone another major shift in 2026, adding new uncertainty for North African exporters. Following the US Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling against the 2025 emergency tariffs and the expiry of a temporary 10% global surcharge, the United States introduced new tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in July 2026, targeting economies whose restrictions on imports of goods produced with forced labour were deemed insufficient (USTR, 2026b). Morocco and Egypt now face additional duties of 12.5% on covered exports to the United States, subject to product exemptions, while Tunisia is excluded. In practice, the additional duties may weaken the competitiveness of affected Moroccan and Egyptian exports in the US market, while Tunisia’s exclusion gives its exporters a relative advantage in comparable products.

For North African economies, direct exposure therefore varies considerably. But the broader challenge is shared. Trade has become more uncertain just as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are seeking to diversify their export markets and deepen commercial relationships within Africa and elsewhere. This has renewed interest in trade agreements, regional integration and export promotion. I argue that another potential source of trade resilience deserves greater attention: diasporas.

An old trade relationship worth revisiting

A substantial body of research finds that migration can increase bilateral trade. Part of this reflects migrants’ demand for products from home. But another mechanism is particularly relevant today: cross-border networks can reduce the information, search and trust costs involved in international trade.

Exporters need to identify customers, understand preferences and regulations, find reliable partners and establish trust. Migrants can possess knowledge and relationships on both sides of a border and thereby reduce these costs. Early empirical research found substantial effects of immigrant networks on bilateral trade (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002).

More recent research has complicated rather than overturned this finding. Effects vary with migrants’ skills, institutions and the products being traded, and can be particularly important where information costs are high. Research also suggests that migration can contribute to knowledge diffusion and the development of new comparative advantages, including between Europe and the MENA region (Egger et al., 2020; Ferragina et al., 2021; Bonadio, 2026).

This older literature takes on new relevance now that formal barriers to trade are rising again.

A diaspora cannot make a tariff disappear. But tariffs are only one component of the cost of reaching a foreign market. If migrant networks reduce information, search and transaction costs, they could become especially valuable when other trade costs rise. When tariffs make an established market less attractive, diaspora networks could help exporters identify alternative destinations, buyers and distribution channels.

North Africa has unusually large networks abroad

The potential scale is considerable, although estimates depend on how diasporas are defined. UN DESA’s International Migrant Stock primarily measures people living outside their country of birth, using citizenship where birthplace data are unavailable. Its 2024 estimates identify approximately 3.6 million migrants originating from Morocco, 715,000 from Tunisia and 4.8 million from Egypt. Broader national figures report more than 6 million Moroccans residing abroad (MICEPP, 2026), 1.8 million Tunisians (OTE, 2026) and around 14 million Egyptians (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emigration and Egyptian Expatriates, 2025). These government estimates use national diaspora categories rather than a harmonised foreign-born definition, and are therefore not directly comparable with UN DESA figures. These communities span Europe, the Gulf and North America, offering different networks and commercial connections.

These are not identical diasporas. Morocco has large multigenerational European communities. Tunisia combines longstanding European migration with newer and more geographically diverse networks. Egypt has a particularly important Gulf labour diaspora alongside established communities farther afield.

That diversity matters. Recent migrants may retain particularly current knowledge and contacts in their countries of origin. Long-established communities may possess deeper professional networks, capital and knowledge of destination markets. Skilled migrants and entrepreneurs may play yet another role.

Yet economic discussions about these communities remain dominated by remittances. Those flows are enormously important. But viewing diasporas primarily as sources of foreign exchange overlooks the information, skills, relationships and trust embodied in people living across markets.

From remittances to trade networks

Existing research does not establish that countries with larger diasporas will necessarily suffer less from the current tariff shock. That is an empirical question worth investigating. But the evidence is strong enough to justify taking the trade function of diaspora networks more seriously.

There are practical steps that can be taken. Export-promotion agencies could map diaspora location and sectoral expertise against priority products and target markets. Chambers of commerce and business associations could create referral networks linking exporters with diaspora entrepreneurs, professionals and potential buyers. SME export-support programmes could incorporate diaspora market knowledge, particularly because smaller firms often face the greatest information and search barriers when entering new markets.

The opportunity also extends beyond preserving existing trade. Olive oil is among Tunisia’s products with the greatest unrealised export potential (ITC, 2026). In Germany, for example, the Tunisian community has grown to around 130,000 people, many of them engineers, doctors and other skilled professionals. Tunisia’s ambassador has described the potential of Tunisian organic olive oil in the German market as largely untapped, and has proposed appointing diaspora members who know that market as commercial representatives for Tunisian food exporters (La Presse, 2026). In Canada, Moroccan diaspora entrepreneurs have already engaged with Morocco’s main business confederation to explore commercial opportunities (CGEM, 2024), while diaspora networks could help agri-food exporters build on recent trade-promotion efforts, including FENAGRI’s 2026 Montréal mission (FENAGRI, 2026). In Kuwait, home to approximately 667,000 Egyptian residents (PACI, 2025), the Egyptian Commercial Service has identified the expatriate community as a source of demand for Egyptian agricultural products, including citrus fruits, mangoes and vegetables (ECS, 2025). Such connections could reduce the costs of reaching new markets.

None of this substitutes for competitive firms, efficient logistics, favourable trade agreements or sound trade policy. Morocco, for example, has had a free trade agreement with the United States since 2006 (USTR, 2026a), yet covered exports now face additional US tariffs. Formal trade institutions remain crucial, but they do not eliminate the importance of informal networks.

The economics of trade has never been only about tariffs. It is also about information, connections and trust. For years, falling tariffs made those less visible trade costs easier to overlook. As governments put formal barriers back up, it may be time to rediscover an older insight: people can be part of a country’s trade infrastructure too.

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