Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Sahel faces poverty and conflict traps: a call for international action

154
Conditions in the so-called G-5 countries of the Sahel – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are grim. This Brookings column from late 2016 summarises a plea for international action. More funding for day-to-day security and for economic development is urgently needed. And the socio-cultural complexity of the region calls for a multidisciplinary approach, bringing together researchers, diplomats, ethnologists, humanitarians, and defence and development experts.

In a nutshell

Insecurity, socio-cultural complexity among the G-5 and the imperative to ‘do no harm’ explain donor inaction in the Sahel.

But the cost of investing in the public good that security and development in the G-5 represents will be far lower than managing the costs of an extended crisis.

Simultaneous progress on security, education and agricultural development are needed to tackle demographic, economic, social, environmental and institutional vulnerabilities.

Conditions in the Sahel are grim – some say emigration is the only recourse as economic, social, demographic and environmental vulnerabilities worsen there. The Sahel – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – often called the ‘G-5’ in recognition of the group set up to deal with their precariousness – are either in, or are about to fall into, poverty and conflict traps (see Figure 1).

These traps emerged following donor-led structural reforms in the 1990s when tough spending choices meant security was sacrificed for investments in education and other sectors. As a result, the G-5 and neighbouring countries have edged toward ‘failed state’ status.

Figure 1:
Economic and aid indicators

Linking security and development – A Plea for the Sahel’, a report by Sylviane Guillaumont, myself and others from the Fondation pour les études et recherches dans le développement international, summarises the insights of 17 actors and observers involved in the Sahel, including military personnel, academics, diplomats, dignitaries and former ministers, and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives.

All 17 respondents recognised that there is no development without security and vice versa. They spoke to the urgency of the situation, making it clear that the window of opportunity for a much-needed ‘big push’ in foreign assistance is closing fast.

The Sahel: breeding ground for violence

Violence in the Sahel is caused by complex factors, including the grievances of nomadic Tuaregs, cocaine trafficking that emerged in 2005 on top of other traditional trafficking, and the flood of thousands of unemployed soldiers and armed men into the region after the fall of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Added to this are family conflicts over land, national grievances and tensions among traffickers.

The situation was compounded when Algeria expelled Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which led bad actors towards the Sahel. Armed banditry spread and day-to-day insecurity grew. Populations in the region, already on the verge of poverty, fell into conflict traps. In the face of such fragmentation, governing became ever more difficult.

Rapid population growth and a youth bulge have contributed to low per capita income growth and widespread vulnerability. Though primary school enrolments are up, time spent in school tends to be brief and the public education system is not equipping graduates for jobs in the agriculture sector. Public sector jobs are disappearing and employment in manufacturing and services are reserved for those with secondary and higher qualifications.

Youth feel excluded and held back by deeply entrenched intergenerational hierarchies. Salafist schools have stepped in to fill voids, especially in the northern Sahel. Many Koranic schools are only preparing their students for entry into a society dominated by religion.

The international response: delayed and imbalanced

Support for the Sahel, starting with the European Union’s (EU) pledge of five billion euros in April 2011, has been slow to materialise. A terrorist attack in Mali in early 2013 prompted a mix of grant aid and military interventions. In November 2015, a detailed plan for spending the promised EU funds was adopted. Funding was increased by one billion euros through an urgency fund, but no one knows when the money will be disbursed.

While the international community continued to focus on development in the Sahel, France has shifted toward military support (see Figure 2). Following a series of military interventions in Mali, parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement in 2015, allowing a lull that is tenuous at best. As one interviewee said, ‘There is no point in building schools or installing water supply points if we’re afraid to go to the market or send our girls to fetch water.’

Figure 2:
Country programmable aid and military expenses in the Sahel by donor (2013-2015) (% of G-5 GDP)

Source: Laville (2016).

Donors have long been reluctant to fund military or police spending, in part because it cannot be counted as official development assistance (ODA). This amounts to a failure to recognise the need to fund African security forces so they can protect civilians. Also, capacity-building for security forces takes time and donors want to have confidence in overall governance before supporting security-building.

The way forward: boost funding and focus on primary education and agriculture

Insecurity, socio-cultural complexity among the G-5 and the imperative to ‘do no harm’ explain donor inaction in the Sahel. In 2014, ODA shares for health were respectable with France at 28%, the United States at 21% and multilateral donors at 9%. By contrast, per capita funds allocated to agriculture and especially to education – the two sectors singled out by respondents in our report – were generally low (see Figure 1).

More funding for day-to-day security and for economic development is urgently needed. Everyone we interviewed concurred that the cost of investing in the public good that security and development in the G-5 represents will be far lower than managing the costs of an extended crisis.

All interviewees were also adamant that the socio-cultural complexity in the Sahel calls for a multidisciplinary approach – researchers, diplomats, ethnologists, humanitarians, and defence and development experts – with each group working in its respective area of expertise. Success will also depend on close cooperation between the public and private sectors working with local and international NGOs.

Simultaneous progress on security, education and agricultural development are needed to tackle demographic, economic, social, environmental and institutional vulnerabilities.

Several success stories offer room for hope. The first is in agriculture, where rural development activities in the Agadez and Tahoua regions in Niger as well as an agro-ecology project in Keita, also in Niger, appear to hold promise.

A second relates to the reintegration of fighters in Côte d’Ivoire through a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration project. Recovery requires a big push in assistance to reduce day-to-day insecurity as well as a targeting of ODA toward projects with a quick return.

For example, initiatives to promote the inclusion of professional content into school curricula and mini-projects in rural areas, combined with projects with longer-run returns (for example, improvements in the quality of teaching and of security forces) may offer a good starting point.

This column was originally published by Brookings in December 2016. Read the original article.

Most read

Fair competition is needed to empower women economically in the Arab world

The participation rates of women in the labour market in Arab countries are the lowest in the world. This column argues that remedying the under-representation of women in the labour force is a social and economic imperative for the region. There are three dimensions for action to realise the potential of Arab women: amending laws and regulations; instilling fair competition in markets; and promoting the digital economy.

Recession without impact: why Lebanese elites delay reform

The survival of Lebanon’s political elites is highly dependent on the wellbeing of the economy. Why then do they delay necessary reform to avoid crisis? This column examines the role of politically connected firms in delaying much-needed economic stabilisation policies.

Competition laws: a key role for economic growth in MENA

Competition policy lacks the attention it deserves in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region characterised by monopolies and lack of market contestability. As this column explains, there are many questions about the extent of anti-competitive barriers facing new market entrants in the region. What’s more, MENA’s weak overall performance on competition is likely to be hindering economic growth and the path towards structural transformation.

The future of Egypt’s population: opportunities and challenges

Egypt’s potential labour supply depends on the growth and changing composition of its working-age population. This column reports the latest data on labour supply and fertility rates, concluding that the country has a window of opportunity with reduced demographic pressures to try to address longstanding structural challenges for the labour market.

Formidable challenges facing the Middle East require a sea change in economic policies

Weakening global growth, endemic conflicts and increased tensions within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – as well as emerging challenges such as climate change and rapid demographic shifts – are likely to have an adverse impact on the region’s economic, social and political stability in the coming years. This column outlines the policy responses that are needed to avert disaster.

Domestic demand and competition: a new development paradigm for MENA

A lack of competition in domestic and regional markets is holding back development in the Middle East and North Africa. This column argues that the region and the international community must ensure that barriers to market entry and exit are eliminated, and that independent regulatory bodies at the national and regional levels help to promote domestic demand as the main engine for sustainable and inclusive growth.

Effects of urbanisation on productivity and wages: evidence from Turkey

Are the substantial productivity gains associated with larger cities in developed countries similar for developing countries? This column provides evidence on urbanised economies in the non-Western world by focusing on Turkey, a country that has experienced fast urbanisation and a high rate of growth of the urban population.

Gender discrimination in small business lending: evidence from Turkey

Discrimination in access to financial services can prevent women from exploiting their entrepreneurial potential. This column reports on a ‘lab-in-the-field’ experiment to test for the presence of gender discrimination in small business lending in Turkey.

Labour supply in Egypt: untapped potential

Labour force participation has decreased for both men and women in Egypt. This column reports the latest data, noting that the potential contributions of a large share of the country’s increasingly educated population are untapped. Creating a conducive business environment that can generate good jobs is critically important to engaging all of Egypt’s human potential.

How import dependence could lead to corruption in MENA

Export-led development strategies have had little success in MENA countries; what’s more, instruments of earlier import-substitution strategies – such as state-owned enterprises, high tariffs and subsidies – have survived. As this column explains, these legacies have created crony-capitalist industries that have limited the level of competition in many sectors of the economy and furthered the region’s dependence on imports.