Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Measuring economic destruction in Syria from outer space

1676
How is Syria’s civil conflict affecting the economy? This column analyses data on night-light intensity measured by satellites to assess the extent of the destruction of economic activity across the country. Without a strong programme of economic rebuilding when the conflict finally ends, the return of approximately 5.6 million registered refugees to Syria will not happen any time soon.

In a nutshell

Data on night-light intensity suggest huge destruction in the Syrian economy as a result of the civil conflict.

There is considerable regional variation in the magnitude of destruction, ranging from 18% in Damascus to almost 95% in Idlib.

The destruction has spilled over into neighbouring countries with relatively weak states and institutions, such as Iraq.

The refugee crisis is a growing concern for humanity. According to figures from the United Nations Refugee Agency, one in every 108 people on the planet is ‘displaced’; 20 people were forced to leave their home every minute during 2016, which corresponds to around 29,000 people per day (UNHCR, 2016).

As of today, the total number of displaced people around the world is approximately 70 million. Since the civil conflict began, Syria has been the major country of origin for refugees.

Research on Syrian refugees mostly focuses on the impact of refugee flows on host countries. The main outcomes of interest include employment, wages, consumer prices, housing prices and rents, health status, crime rates, schooling and firm openings in major host countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. (For some examples, see Tumen, 2016; Balkan and Tumen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al, 2017; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Fallah et al, 2018; and Altindag et al, 2018.)

Developed countries are also concerned with a possible movement of refugees – from either Syria or these primary host countries – towards the West. Governments care about the political economy consequences of refugee inflows. As a result, most of the ‘refugee debate’ in economic research is centred on the wellbeing of natives of host countries.

But with a few exceptions, economists seem to have entirely ignored what has happened in Syria itself. Aside from focusing on the reaction of host countries, this negligence is also due to a lack of systematic and healthy data on the state of the Syrian economy since the conflict began.

We are using data provided by the National Geophysical Data Center of the United States to compare the night-light intensity in Syria before and after the conflict began. Economists have recently started to use night-light data measured by satellites (see, for example, Henderson et al, 2012). The data act as a proxy for local economic activity, exhibiting a strong correlation with other major welfare indicators.

Using the Geographic Information System (GIS) methods adopted in related research, we construct indices combining the contrast and dispersion of night-lights. We report the time series evolution of these indices both for the entire country and at a province level.

Figure 1 demonstrates the rise and dramatic decline in the aggregate index based on data covering the period from 1994 to 2016. The figure raises three main points:

  • First, before the civil conflict, Syrian economy grew – as measured by our index – by approximately 4-5% a year.
  • Second, in the post-crisis era (from 2012 to 2016), the magnitude of economic destruction is above 75%.
  • Finally, GDP as of 2016 is more than 30% below its level in 1994.

These numbers suggest huge destruction in the Syrian economy as a result of the civil conflict.

Figure 2 shows the extent of economic destruction in some major Syrian provinces. Clearly, there is considerable regional variation in the magnitude of destruction, ranging from 18% in Damascus to almost 95% in Idlib.

The intensity of violence seems to be an important determinant both in terms of the magnitude of destruction and the volume of refugee outflows. Decline in night-light intensity in provinces such as Idlib, Aleppo and Daraa following the conflict supports this hypothesis. Note that province-level calculations are slightly less reliable than the aggregate figures.

Figure 3 compares the night-light intensity between two years: 2012 and 2016. Pink regions mark the night-lights that existed in 2012 but which had disappeared by 2016. It clearly demonstrates that the crisis has not only severely hit the Syrian economy, but it has also spilled over into Iraq in the form of jihadist terror.

The bottom line is that the civil conflict in Syria has destroyed the economy. The destruction has also spilled over into neighbouring countries with relatively weak states and institutions, such as Iraq.

Current debates about future prospects offer ‘the return of refugees to Syria after the conflict is over’ as a solution to the problems that host countries have been experiencing.

But our calculations suggest that the extent of economic destruction in Syria is so huge that even when the conflict is over, lack of economic opportunity will persist if external assistance to rebuild the country is not provided promptly. Without a strong programme of economic rebuilding, the return of approximately 5.6 million registered refugees to Syria will not happen any time soon.

Further reading

Altindag, O, O Bakis and S Rozo (2018) ‘Blessing or Burden? The Impact of Refugees on Businesses and the Informal Economy’, unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California.

Balkan, B, and S Tumen (2016) ‘Immigration and Prices: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Syrian refugees in Turkey’, Journal of Population Economics 29: 657-86.

Ceritoglu, E, HB Gurcihan-Yunculer, H Torun and S Tumen (2017) ‘The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Natives’ Labor Market Outcomes in Turkey: Evidence from a Quasi-experimental Design’, IZA Journal of Labor Policy 6:5.

Del Carpio, XV, and M Wagner (2015) ‘The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7402.

Fallah, B, C Krafft and J Wahba (2018) ‘The Impact of Refugees on Employment and Wages in Jordan,’ ERF Working Paper No. 1189.

Henderson, JV, A Storeygard and DN Weil (2012) ‘Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space’, American Economic Review 102: 994-1028.

Tumen, S (2016) ‘The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Turkey’, American Economic Review 106: 456-60.

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency (2016) ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016’.

Figure 1:
The Syrian economy 1994-2016, measured by night-light intensity

Source: US National Geophysical Data Center and authors’ calculations.
Note: The index is reported as three-year moving average of the index in natural logarithms. The index measures the intensity of ‘total lights’. 2014 and 2015 data are not publicly available. The vertical line indicates the start of the conflict.

Figure 2:
The extent of economic destruction in major Syrian provinces, measured by night-light intensity

Source: US National Geophysical Data Center and authors’ calculations.
Note: The index is reported as three-year moving average of the index in natural logarithms. The index measures the intensity of ‘total lights’. 2014 and 2015 data are not publicly available.

Figure 3:
Changes in Syria’s night-light intensity between 2012 and 2016

Source: US National Geophysical Data Center and authors’ calculations.
Note: Comparison of the night-light intensity between two years: 2012 and 2016. Pink regions mark the lights that existed in 2012 but which had disappeared by 2016.

Tags: , , , ,

  • Elif Semra Ceylan
    Elif Semra Ceylan
    Senior Consultant at EY, Ankara
  • Semih Tumen
    Semih Tumen
    Director General of the Structural Economic Research Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Most read

Making trade agreements more environmentally friendly in the MENA region

Trade policy can play a significant role in efforts to decarbonise the global economy. But as this column explains, there need to be more environmental provisions in trade agreements in which developing countries participate – and stronger legal enforcement of those provisions at the international level. The MENA region would benefit substantially from such changes.

Jordan: navigating through multiple crises

Jordan’s real GDP per capita is today no higher than it was 40 years ago. While external factors have undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the country’s economic outcomes, weak macroeconomic management and low public spending on investment and the social sectors have also played a substantial role. This column explores what can be done to reduce high public debt, accelerate private sector development and enhance social outcomes.

Iran’s globalisation and Saudi Arabia’s defence budget

How might Saudi Arabia react to Iran's renewed participation in global trade and investment? This column explores whether the expanding economic globalisation of Iran, following the lifting of nuclear sanctions, could yield a peace dividend for Saudi Arabia, consequently dampening the Middle East arms competition. These issues have attracted increased attention in recent times, notably after a pivotal agreement between the two countries in March 2023, marking the resumption of their political ties after a seven-year conflict.

Egypt and Iraq: amenities, environmental quality and taste for revolution

The Middle East and North Africa is a region marked by significant political turbulence. This column explores a novel dimension of these upheavals: the relationship between people’s satisfaction with, on one hand, the amenities to which they have access and the environmental quality they experience, and, on the other hand, their inclination towards revolutionary actions. The data come from the World Value Survey collected in 2018 in Egypt and Iraq.

Global value chains and domestic innovation: evidence from MENA firms

Global interlinkages play a significant role in enhancing innovation by firms in developing countries. In particular, as this column explains, participation in global value chains fosters a variety of innovation activities. Since some countries in the Middle East and North Africa display a downward trend on measures of global innovation, facilitating the GVC participation of firms in the region is a prospective channel for stimulating underperforming innovation.

Labour market effects of robots: evidence from Turkey

Evidence from developed countries on the impact of automation on labour markets suggests that there can be negative effects on manufacturing jobs, but also mechanisms for workers to move into the services sector. But this narrative may not apply in developing economies. This column reports new evidence from Turkey on the effects of robots on labour displacement and job reallocation.

Food insecurity in Tunisia during and after the Covid-19 pandemic

Labour market instability, rising unemployment rates and soaring food prices due to Covid-19 are among the reasons for severe food insecurity across the world. This grim picture is evident in Tunisia, where the government continues to provide financial and food aid to vulnerable households after the pandemic. But as this column explains, the inadequacy of some public policies is another important factors causing food insecurity.

Manufacturing firms in Egypt: trade participation and outcomes for workers

International trade can play a large and positive role in boosting economic growth, reducing poverty and making progress towards gender equality. These effects result in part from the extent to which trade is associated with favourable labour market outcomes. This column presents evidence of the effects of Egyptian manufacturing firms’ participation in exporting and importing on their workers’ productivity and average wages, and on women’s employment share.

Do capital inflows cause industrialisation or de-industrialisation?

There is a clear appeal for emerging and developing economies, including those in MENA, to finance investment in manufacturing industry at home with capital inflows from overseas. But as the evidence reported in this column indicates, this is a potentially risky strategy: rather than promoting industrialisation, capital flows can actually lead to lower manufacturing value added and/or a reallocation of resources towards industries with lower technology intensity.

Sustaining entrepreneurship: lessons from Iran

Does entrepreneurial activity naturally return to long-term average levels after big economic disturbances? This column presents new evidence from Iran on trends in entrepreneurship among various categories of firm size, sector and location – and suggests policies that could be effective in promoting entrepreneurial activities.