Trade liberalisation in many developing countries has been pursued selectively, with a general reduction in tariffs counterbalanced by growing reliance on non-tariff measures. This column reports research on the political economy of such selective trade reform in Mubarak-era Egypt. The evidence shows that sectors with a greater concentration of politically connected business ‘cronies’ enjoyed systematically higher levels of non-tariff protection.
Ferdinand EiblKings College London
Ferdinand Eibl is co-convener of the MA degree in Political Economy of the Middle East. He completed his PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. He also holds an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford and a BA in Political Science from the University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and the IEP Rennes. Before joining King’s College, he was a Research Officer at the London School of Economics Middle East Centre.