Iran is still selling oil. But can it replace tomorrow’s barrels?

Arash Irani
October 20, 2026

Iran’s oil exports have not disappeared, but continued sales may hide a deeper vulnerability. Arash Irani argues that selling barrels already in the logistics system is not the same as generating new export flows, and proposes five indicators to help policymakers judge whether trade under disruption is sustainable or merely running down its stocks.

In a nutshell

Iranian crude and condensate loadings fell from roughly 2 million barrels per day in March to 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August, yet oil sales continued, in part by drawing down barrels already loaded and held in storage.

Continued sales are therefore not proof that export capacity has survived: stock can sustain sales for a time, but only new flow sustains exports.

Policymakers assessing resilience at maritime chokepoints should read trade value, physical volume, new flows, inventories and the replacement capacity of alternative routes together, rather than relying on headline sales or trade values.

Iran’s oil exports have not disappeared. But headline figures can obscure a more important economic question: can Iran still generate, move and replenish new export flows at anything close to its previous capacity? Sales and export capacity are not the same thing. A country can keep selling barrels already in the logistics system even after its ability to load new cargoes has sharply deteriorated.

Trade data show why a single headline figure can mislead. In the first five months of the current Iranian year, imports fell by about 25% in value, from $22.3 billion to $16.8 billion, but by only about 16% in weight, from 14.8 million to 12.5 million tonnes (Tasnim News Agency, 2026). Prices and commodity composition can move trade values without an equivalent change in the goods actually moved.

New loadings have collapsed

Oil provides a clearer test. Reuters reported Iranian crude and condensate loadings of roughly 2 million barrels per day in March, compared with an estimated 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August (Reuters, 2026a). March is a useful pre-blockade reference point: loadings were still around 2 million barrels per day before the US blockade was reinstated in July 2026, although March should not be read as a pre-war baseline. On a like-for-like basis, the March-to-August comparison indicates a decline of approximately 87–89%. Kpler separately estimated August Iranian oil loadings at around 248,000 barrels per day (Kpler, 2026a).

These figures measure the rate at which new cargoes entered the export system. They do not show that sales, export revenues or production capacity fell by the same proportion. The chain runs from production to onshore storage, loading, transit or floating storage, delivery, sale and, finally, payment – often at a discount and with a delay. A fall in loadings therefore reaches revenues only after these lags, and reaches production only once onshore storage fills.

Whether the loss is temporary or lasting depends on what lies behind it. Lower loadings can reflect shipping restrictions, limited access to export routes and tanker availability. If these ease while fields and terminals remain intact, loadings could recover quickly. The risk of lasting capacity loss rises if wells must be shut in for long periods, or if buyers, shipping and payment networks move elsewhere.

Stock can sustain sales; flow sustains exports

Why, then, could Iran continue selling oil? Oil loaded earlier can remain on tankers, in floating storage or elsewhere in the export chain, and can still be sold and delivered after new loading has fallen. This creates a temporary buffer between disruption to new flows and its effect on sales and revenues.

Iran-specific data are consistent with such a drawdown. Reuters reported that Iranian crude held in floating storage outside the blockade zone fell from about 105 million barrels before the US blockade was reinstated on 13 July 2026 to roughly 80 million barrels by 21 August 2026 (Reuters, 2026b). This does not mean that every barrel sold came from old inventory, but it shows that sales continued while the supporting stock was being run down.

Regional figures need to be read separately. The 60-day window under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran began on 17 June 2026. Kpler reported that roughly 374 million barrels of crude cleared the wider Gulf shipping system during this period. Here, Kpler defines “clearance” as non-Iranian Strait of Hormuz transits plus net exports from the Gulf of Oman, a measure designed to avoid double counting. The figure is therefore a regional shipping measure, not a measure of Iranian exports. Kpler also reported that regional floating storage fell from about 61 million to 16 million barrels within three weeks (Kpler, 2026b). The clearing of a regional backlog does not establish that Iran’s own export flows have recovered.

Rerouting is not replacement

Iran has rerouted some trade through alternative ports, land borders and other corridors. That is meaningful resilience, but rerouting is not necessarily replacement. A maritime system moving large volumes of bulk commodities cannot always be substituted one-for-one by trucks, smaller ports or longer routes. The relevant questions are how much additional throughput an alternative route can sustain, how quickly it can expand, what it costs at the margin, and whether it can handle the same goods.

Five indicators of trade resilience

I would assess trade resilience through five indicators:

Trade value: shows monetary scale, but is affected by prices and commodity composition.
Physical volume: separates price changes from changes in the goods moved.
New flow, such as oil terminal loadings: shows whether export capacity is functioning.
Existing inventory: indicates how long stocks can cushion a disruption.
Replacement capacity: measures how much lost throughput alternative routes can realistically replace, and at what cost.

These indicators are most useful when read together, over consistent periods. Comparing new loadings with subsequent deliveries and inventory changes shows whether current trade is being replenished or merely run down. A simple test is inventory cover: dividing available stocks by the gap between current sales and new loadings gives a rough estimate of how long sales can continue before they must fall toward the lower loading rate.

Lessons beyond Iran

Two lessons apply more widely. First, governments assessing disruption at a maritime chokepoint should monitor new flows alongside inventory drawdowns: stocks can make trade appear resilient even when replenishment is becoming harder. Second, contingency planning should measure the throughput and marginal cost of alternative routes before assuming they can replace a disrupted corridor. The Red Sea disruptions since late 2023 have shown the same pattern: rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope preserved trade, but at higher cost and with longer transit times (UNCTAD, 2024).

The evidence does not justify describing Iran’s foreign trade as having collapsed by 80 or 90%. Iran has continued to trade and has shown adaptive capacity. But continued sales do not prove that its earlier export capacity remains intact. The key question is not whether Iran can sell today’s barrels, but whether it can replace tomorrow’s. In a prolonged maritime disruption, that difference determines whether an inventory buffer supports sustainable trade or merely delays the consequences of lost capacity.

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