Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Repatriation: scenarios for conflict resolution and reconstruction

2485
What are the prospects for conflict resolution in Syria and other war-torn Arab countries, for reconstruction of their broken economies and societies, and for repatriation of the many refugees that have fled for their lives? This column discusses the notion of inclusive political settlements as a precondition for safe refugee repatriation and reconstruction plans for devastated communities.

In a nutshell

Any political settlement should embed a refugee-focused policy that addresses holistically the main challenges in terms of security and access to justice for the refugee community.

Transitional justice mechanisms are needed to address local grievances, including atrocities committed during the conflicts.

Any political agreement must rest on the principle of refugees’ right to choose, given that in the event of absence of security guarantees, refugees will refrain from moving back and host countries will have to force them if they wish them to be repatriated.

We are witnessing a new outbreak of violence in Syria in the aftermath of the withdrawal of US troops from Northern Syria in October 2019, which has cleared the way for Turkish-backed troops to occupy the region.

For Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sending troops across the border cannot be only considered a matter of repelling the Kurds, whom the Turks view as a threat to their stability. It is also a way to resolve the refugee crisis in his own country by carving out a safe zone with a view to starting to repatriate some of the 3.6 million Syrians who fled to Turkey.

Nevertheless, with the official Syrian troops moving in with the support of Russia very few refugees will voluntarily accept their return. It seems likely that repatriation can only be realised when the restoration of protection and the rebuilding of a social contract are ensured.

This example, along with events in Yemen in recent weeks, signal the importance of the focus of the 2019 Euromed report on the prospects for repatriation of refugees from Arab conflicts (FEMISE-ERF, 2019).

At a time of mounting conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the refugee question has acquired a nuclear role. Assuming that Syria accounts for nearly 23% of the world’s refugees and that resettlement has always been a relatively rare option with only 1% of global refugees, repatriation to their countries of origin or integration within their host communities remain the only viable options.

Against this backdrop, the Euromed report discusses the notion of inclusive political settlements as a precondition for safe refugee repatriation and reconstruction plans for devastated communities. The equation is not so simple nor linear, as sustainable political settlements to end conflicts in countries that are deeply affected by refugee exoduses, as with Syria, will not be possible without a real focus on the challenges of refugee returns.

The complexities of the Syrian war as well as previous international experiences with similar conflicts underscore that ensuring long-term peace requires a more focused attention on the challenges for effective repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, including significant security and protection guarantees. Without the latter, and irrespective of the eventual shape of a political solution, their return may be neither possible nor sustainable, which will have significant repercussions for peace, not only in the country itself but also in neighbouring countries.

The notion of political settlement was not used in development studies until 2007 when it was understood that in the event of conflict resolution, the necessary legitimacy for those who govern over those who are ruled can only come from an agreement that binds together state and society. This is a meaningful question in the context of today’s reality in the MENA region, considering the increasingly widespread waves of political turmoil and conflict.

On the basis of the two examined practical cases – Algeria and Lebanon – political settlements have not always encompassed a combination of horizontal and vertical negotiations among elites and followers; they have not always encompassed a full understanding of the root causes triggering the conflict; nor have they embarked on transitional justice, in contrast with what we have observed elsewhere, for example, in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

The consequences of the absence of fully legitimated political settlements might lead to mounting grievances that erode the prospects for further democratisation. It is no coincidence that during these recent months and even weeks, both countries whose processes of conflict resolution have been examined in the Euromed report – Algeria and Lebanon – have been experiencing severe difficulties in the realm of public governance at very different levels and triggered by various factors. Indeed, they have become the two most unstable countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean if we exclude those that are already trapped in military conflicts.

These cases show how the question of refugees is central to any potential political settlement. In this regard, access to justice has to be provided to refugees as part of any political settlement. Transitional justice mechanisms are needed to address local grievances, including atrocities committed during the conflicts such as massacres, forced disappearances, sieges of towns and population transfers that occurred as elements of local peace deals.

Arguably, whereas repatriation is the favoured option of host states, return of refugees should be voluntary, as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. To that end, any political agreement must rest on the principle of refugees’ right to choose, given that in the event of absence of security guarantees, refugees will refrain from moving back and host countries will have to force them if they wish them to be repatriated.

To sum up, and most importantly, any political settlement should embed a refugee focused policy that addresses holistically the main challenges in terms of security and access to justice for the refugee community.

Last but not least, on the way to reconstruction, the international community can play a very relevant role, particularly if reconstruction is fostered to promote the safe return of refugees, alongside political reform that helps to mitigate potential discrimination against certain groups on the basis of ethnic, political ideology, gender or religion.

From this point of view, the Euromed report assesses the role that global and regional powers can play in this process, concluding that in the case of Syria, only Western powers can offer significant support to promote political reform and protect the rights of refugee population. Looking at the current US policy of retreat in the region, the EU is the only real power placed to facilitate such process, not only targeting Syria but also Jordan and Lebanon, as has been the case so far.

 

Further reading

FEMISE-ERF (2019) ‘Repatriation of Refugees from Arab Conflicts: Conditions, Costs and Scenarios for Reconstruction’, Euromed report.

Most read

Financing Lebanon’s Reconstruction: A Compact for Finance, Governance, and Accountability

As Lebanon embarks on another round of reconstruction, the key question is not how much financing can be mobilised, but whether each commitment is linked to a verified need, involves a transparent procurement process, is linked to clearly defined executing and operating institutions, and is based on a liability that is in line with the state’s ability to repay. This column proposes an operational mechanism for establishing that connection: a Reconstruction Finance and Accountability Compact.

Sanctions and conflict: why corruption changes the equation

Why do sanctions produce such different political outcomes across the countries that have been targeted? This column reports research examining the role of pre-existing corruption in shaping the relationship between sanctions and subsequent conflict or political instability. The evidence indicates that trade sanctions are associated with higher conflict-related deaths where pre-existing corruption is high.

The weak bread chain: cereal supply risks in six MENA economies

The Middle East and North Africa is one of the most food-import-dependent regions of the world, particularly for staple cereals such as barley, maize and wheat, and particularly in six countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. As this column reports, diversifying import sources has become an essential strategy for strengthening food security and improving resilience to geopolitical and climate-related disruptions.

The risks of a two-speed AI economy in MENA

Much of the debate about artificial intelligence in the Middle East and North Africa focuses on how many jobs it will replace. As this column explains, the more important challenge is that the new technology is likely to create a two-speed labour market, where countries with the capacity to invest in digital infrastructure and skills move rapidly ahead while others struggle to keep pace. Unless governments combine credible national reforms with targeted regional cooperation, AI could widen, not reduce, the economic divides across MENA.

Why energy efficiency still struggles to attract finance in Egypt

Egypt has reduced energy subsidies and gradually adjusted domestic energy prices toward cost-recovery levels, improving the economic case for energy efficiency investments – but financing has not kept pace. Drawing on structured interviews with banks, developers and public officials, this column traces why energy efficiency projects in the country still struggle to attract capital, and sets out how a ‘financing ladder’ used elsewhere – from revolving funds to risk guarantees to green bonds – could close the gap.

From mega-investment to mega-productivity: closing MENA’s conversion gap

Across the Middle East and North Africa, governments are investing heavily in infrastructure, technology, diversification and new industries. Yet capital accumulation alone does not guarantee productivity growth. As this column argues, the region’s deeper challenge is its ‘investment-to-productivity conversion gap’: ensuring that large-scale investment translates consistently into stronger firms, technological diffusion, skills and better jobs. A different metric of success is required: not how much capital is deployed, but how much productive capability that capital leaves behind.

Iran is still selling oil. But can it replace tomorrow’s barrels?

Iran’s oil exports have not disappeared, but continued sales may hide a deeper vulnerability. Arash Irani argues that selling barrels already in the logistics system is not the same as generating new export flows, and proposes five indicators to help policymakers judge whether trade under disruption is sustainable or merely running down its stocks.

The political economy of turning AI adoption into firm productivity in MENA

Generative AI can make individual tasks faster without making firms more productive. This column argues that across the Middle East and North Africa, turning AI adoption into better performance depends on organisational capabilities and on agreements within firms over authority, workloads and rewards. Public support can help by financing those capabilities through transparent selection, milestone-based assistance and independent evaluation.

Uneven growth, shallow integration: the case for deeper MENA cooperation

The war-related shock of 2026 has pushed economies across the Middle East and North Africa onto sharply different growth paths. This column argues that these short-term differences say little about long-term income convergence, but that they expose a more durable weakness: shallow regional integration. It proposes three measures to make MENA cooperation deliver tangible economic benefits.

Losing comparative advantage: the erosion of Lebanon’s export base

Lebanon's competitive exports were worth about $3 billion in both 2018 and 2022, but the steady total hides a narrower base. Mohamad Abou Haidar and Ali Fakih show that more than a third of that value rests on precious metals and scrap. They argue that export policy should start by establishing how much of Lebanon's export value reflects domestic production, and should support products on the basis of evidence on value added and viability rather than on trade rankings alone.