Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Why energy efficiency still struggles to attract finance in Egypt

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Egypt has reduced energy subsidies and gradually adjusted domestic energy prices toward cost-recovery levels, improving the economic case for energy efficiency investments – but financing has not kept pace. Drawing on structured interviews with banks, developers and public officials, this column traces why energy efficiency projects in the country still struggle to attract capital, and sets out how a ‘financing ladder’ used elsewhere – from revolving funds to risk guarantees to green bonds – could close the gap.

In a nutshell

Financial barriers rank among the most important constraints on energy efficiency projects in Egypt‚ alongside regulatory and enforcement issues; they stem less from a lack of capital than from poorly designed financial products and risk allocation.

Moving from donor-funded projects to revolving funds, risk guarantees and energy service companies models can mobilise private investment; each instrument addresses a distinct constraint, from lender risk to upfront-cost burdens.

Egypt’s next challenge is to build domestic financial institutions that can channel capital to energy efficiency at scale, rather than relying on one-off donor facilities.

Egypt is an energy-intensive economy at a turning point, and the debate over how to grow without cheap energy is no longer academic. Primary energy consumption rose by 5% in 2024 to around 98 million tonnes of oil-equivalent, reversing two years of decline, while fossil fuels still generate more than four-fifths of electricity (Enerdata, 2024; Low Carbon Power, 2025).

Since 2014, Egypt has gradually reformed electricity and fuel pricing under its reform programme supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reducing subsidies that once consumed more than a fifth of the national budget (Climate Action Tracker).

As fiscal pressures, fuel import dependence and environmental costs have increased, energy efficiency has become an economic necessity rather than a technical option. It offers a cost-effective way to reduce energy demand, improve energy security, ease pressure on public finances and lower emissions while supporting economic growth.

Greater energy efficiency also contributes to Egypt’s commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly numbers 7, 9, 12 and 13. Yet financing for energy efficiency projects remains far below the level needed, raising a critical question: why is investment still not flowing?

Barriers to investment: insights from stakeholders

To find out, we interviewed banks, project developers and public officials across the sector. Limited access to finance emerged as one of the most important constraints identified‚ though not the only one. Our study also highlights regulatory and enforcement weaknesses, including the inconsistent application of efficiency standards and weak monitoring and verification, as significant barriers in their own right (Essam et al, 2026).

Even so, the financial problem is less about how much capital exists than how it is structured. Bank lending terms were repeatedly described as too rigid for efficiency projects: long approval processes and high interest rates discourage borrowers already working with thin retrofit margins. High upfront costs make many projects unattractive next to shorter-payback alternatives, even where lifecycle savings are substantial, and costs vary so widely by sector that no single financing approach fits all of them.

A related theme is Egypt’s heavy dependence on donor-funded green finance facilities, while dedicated domestic commercial financing for energy efficiency remains limited. Public sector respondents cited tight annual budgets and no dedicated local funding lines. Banks hesitate to underwrite efficiency projects unless bundled with a larger, more familiar investment, treating efficiency as an add-on rather than a standalone asset class, reinforced by the absence of products built specifically for it and by collateral requirements that keep smaller developers from ever approaching a lender.

Underlying all of this is a structural mismatch: efficiency returns accrue slowly, and current market conditions make that mismatch hard to finance profitably.

Together, these findings describe a financing ecosystem that is thin, donor-dependent and structurally unsuited to an asset class defined by high upfront costs and long, savings-based payback.

Unlocking the energy efficiency markets: lessons from emerging markets

Most emerging markets went through a similar phase, where efficiency financing depended almost entirely on donor capital before commercial mechanisms took hold. The World Bank calls this a financing ladder: public support is used deliberately to build the market, not replace commercial lending permanently (World Bank, 2024).

At the base sit grants, concessional loans and credit lines on-lent through local banks, instruments on which Egypt already draws:

In July 2024, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced a 271 million climate-focused business financing scheme, combining 135 million of EIB global financing, a 30 million European Union grant and co-financing from the French Development Agency‚ to help industrial companies across Egypt cut pollution, improve energy efficiency and scale up renewable energy (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2024).

In December 2023, the German Development Bank KfW signed 76 million in soft loans and grants with the Egyptian government: 53 million for a smart-grid development project and 23 million for energy-efficiency projects and the rehabilitation of hydroelectric stations (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2024).

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) has funded an industrial motors programme with Egypt’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2024).

These suit a market still building a track record, but remain donor-anchored unless structured to recycle capital over time.

The next rung, risk-sharing mechanisms, addresses the exact hesitancy that Egyptian banks describe. Partial risk guarantees, usually backed by a development finance institution, absorb part of the default risk on an efficiency loan, letting banks lend on reasonable terms without the heavy collateral that deters smaller developers, and letting them build real underwriting expertise rather than treating each loan as bespoke.

Service-based financing shifts the repayment burden away from the upfront cost. Energy service companies (ESCOs) finance retrofits and recoup their investment from the savings generated. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global ESCO investment reached approximately $42 billion in 2024, with more than three-quarters concentrated in China and the United States (IEA, 2020).

Revolving funds work similarly at portfolio level: grant capital is lent out, and repayments replenish it for future projects, as India and Thailand have both demonstrated (IEA, 2020, 2024). On-bill and on-tax financing, which attaches repayment to a utility bill or property tax, has proven effective in reaching smaller borrowers who would otherwise fail conventional credit screening (European Commission, 2025).

Each of these instruments answers a different constraint, which is why sequencing matters. Guarantees reduce lender risk that local banks cannot currently price or collateralise. Revolving funds provide the patient, recyclable capital that energy efficiency’s long payback periods require.

ESCOs and energy performance contracts resolve the mismatch between high upfront costs and savings that accrue only over time. Bonds, in turn, become relevant once a sufficiently bankable pipeline of projects exists for capital markets to underwrite. These financing mechanisms will only scale if they are supported by a pipeline of bankable projects, underpinned by credible energy audits, standardised performance contracts, clearly defined savings baselines, and robust measurement and verification.

Energy efficiency financing in Egypt: current status and path forward

At the top of the ladder, advanced commercial options mobilise private capital with minimal public support. Green and sustainability bonds are now a mainstream vehicle, with global annual issuance around $600 billion, of which an estimated 10-20% funds energy efficiency (IEA, 2024).

Egypt has already tapped this market: in November 2024, Arab African International Bank (AAIB) issued Egypt’s first sustainability bond‚ a $500 million issuance, the largest by a private bank in Africa‚ with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) investing $100 million alongside IFC and British International Investment, and 75% of proceeds earmarked for green projects, including industrial energy efficiency (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2024).

Egypt’s financing landscape currently clusters at the base of this ladder. Donor and multilateral capital is active through the EBRD, the EIB, KfW and UNIDO, but it flows through case-by-case facilities rather than durable, recyclable domestic mechanisms (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2024). Interviews confirm this from the demand side: banks remain reluctant to lend on efficiency-specific terms, dedicated products are largely absent, and local budget financing is thin (Essam et al, 2026).

Closing that gap does not require larger sums of donor capital; it requires moving deliberately up the ladder, rung by rung, in step with the constraint each rung is designed to lift. Converting existing donor grants into a revolving fund, rather than one-time disbursements, would let a fixed pool of capital finance far more projects over time.

A modest partial risk guarantee facility could unlock the commercial lending that banks say is currently withheld absent bundling or heavy collateral. And standardising ESCO and energy performance contracts would give banks a repeatable underwriting template, paving the way towards advanced instruments, bonds, leasing, ‘Super ESCO’ structures ‚that Egypt’s early sustainability bond activity shows are already within reach.

Egypt’s fiscal reforms have already substantially reduced the price distortions that made energy efficiency uneconomical for decades. The remaining barrier is not the case for efficiency; it is the plumbing that gets capital, category by category, to the projects that need it.

Further reading

Climate Action Tracker (n.d.) Egypt: Policies and Action.

Egypt Oil & Gas (2024) ‘Policies, Technologies, and Pathways Towards Efficient Energy Use in Egypt’.

Enerdata (2024) Egypt Energy Information.

Essam, EH, O Abdelaziz, M Salaheldin and S Atallah (2026. ‘Energy Efficiency in Egypt’s Private Sector: Barriers and Drivers’, Sustainability 18(14): 7499.

European Commission (2025) Private and Innovative Financing.

IEA (2020) World Energy Investment 2020: Energy Financing and Funding.

IEA (2024) Tracking Energy Efficiency Investment Progress.

Low Carbon Power (2025) Egypt Electricity Generation Mix 2025.

World Bank (2024) Energy Efficiency Financing Models, presentation prepared for the UNEP Ozone Secretariat.

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Why energy efficiency still struggles to attract finance in Egypt

Egypt has reduced energy subsidies and gradually adjusted domestic energy prices toward cost-recovery levels, improving the economic case for energy efficiency investments – but financing has not kept pace. Drawing on structured interviews with banks, developers and public officials, this column traces why energy efficiency projects in the country still struggle to attract capital, and sets out how a ‘financing ladder’ used elsewhere – from revolving funds to risk guarantees to green bonds – could close the gap.