Political participation is often approached primarily through elections and parliamentary representation. This framing is insufficient in many contexts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where formal political channels may be limited in reach, contested in legitimacy or constrained in practice.

In such settings, public influence frequently extends beyond parties and legislatures through civic and non-institutional forms of engagement. Where women face the most significant obstacles precisely in these less institutionalised arenas, gains in formal representation can occur alongside persistent inequalities in political voice and agenda-setting.

The gender gap in political participation is therefore not a peripheral concern. MENA remains the lowest-performing region globally on gender parity and progress towards that goal has been slow. Narrowing participation gaps is not only a question of equal rights: it bears directly on the inclusiveness of governance, the legitimacy of public institutions and the capacity of policy processes to reflect the priorities and lived realities of the full population.

Defining political participation

Political participation can be understood through three distinct forms of engagement:

• Institutional participation refers to voting behaviour and party membership.
• Private activism captures individual actions, such as signing petitions and boycotting products.
• Collective activism covers group-based activities, such as demonstrations and unofficial strikes.

This distinction matters for policy design because the barriers that shape institutional participation differ from those that constrain activism. As a result, initiatives that increase one form of participation may have limited effects on the others if they do not address the specific obstacles relevant to each type.

Evidence from ten MENA countries

Evidence derived from wave 6 of the World Values Survey (2010-14) across Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen indicates that men participate more than women across all three forms of political participation, with higher average participation levels for men in institutional participation, private activism and collective activism.

The most policy-relevant pattern is that the gender gap varies systematically by participation type. After accounting for socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes, the gender gap persists and remains largest for collective activism: men’s odds of being at a higher participation level are approximately 1.3 times higher for institutional participation, 1.4 times higher for private activism and 1.8 times higher for collective activism.

This pattern across participation types should inform policy priorities, because strategies centred mainly on elections or party reforms are likely to address the narrowest gap while leaving the most pronounced inequalities in non-institutional participation, particularly collective activism, largely unchanged.

The persistence of the gender gap

A common policy response is to interpret women’s lower political participation primarily as a reflection of lower education, weaker labour market attachment or lower levels of political interest. But our research findings do not support such a straightforward account (Fakih and Sleiman, 2022).

When socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes are taken into consideration, the estimated gender gap narrows. But it still persists, indicating that these factors do not fully explain the observed differences in participation.

Two implications follow:

• First, a substantial share of the gap is likely to be associated with constraints that are not well captured by standard survey indicators, including unequal time burdens, mobility limitations, safety risks in public spaces, exposure to social sanctions, informal gatekeeping within parties and unions, and unequal access to political networks.
• Second, interventions that focus narrowly on raising awareness or encouraging interest in politics risk targeting symptoms rather than underlying constraints. The central issue is often not willingness in the abstract, but the practical feasibility of participation under everyday social and economic conditions.

Policy options and a sequenced reform package

Policy design should proceed from the recognition that no single instrument is likely to close the gender gap across institutional participation, private activism and collective activism. The observed gap is smallest in institutional participation and largest in collective activism, including after taking account of socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes.

This implies that strategies focused mainly on elections and party rules may address an important dimension of inclusion, but they risk leaving the most pronounced inequalities in non-institutional participation largely intact.

A first approach emphasises representation-first reforms, including quotas, reserved seats and party list rules. Such measures can shift elite recruitment and may help to normalise women’s leadership. They are also relatively straightforward to legislate and monitor.

Their principal limitation is that gains in representation do not necessarily translate into broader participation unless reforms also reduce the practical costs and risks of engagement, particularly those associated with collective activism where the gender gap is largest. If pursued in isolation, representation reforms can become symbolic, especially where party gatekeeping persists and women’s everyday constraints remain unchanged.

A second approach treats economic inclusion as a participation policy, focusing on women’s employment and access to associational life. Socio-economic resources and associational involvement are positively associated with higher participation across forms. Notably, employment is positively and significantly associated with higher non-institutional participation for women but not for men, indicating that labour market inclusion may be an especially important pathway for strengthening women’s civic engagement.

The trade-off is that employment expansion alone can increase burdens if unpaid care responsibilities remain unchanged and low quality or precarious work may limit rather than expand civic capacity. This approach is therefore strongest when paired with measures that improve job quality, safety and time availability.

These limitations point directly to a third approach, which targets the practical and social costs that determine whether participation is feasible in everyday life, particularly those linked to domestic burdens, childcare, safety and access. Reforms that expand childcare provision, improve safe mobility, reduce harassment in public and political spaces, and strengthen women’s participation in unions and professional associations address constraints that are especially relevant for collective activism, where the participation gap is most pronounced.

The main limitation is feasibility: these policies often require cross-ministry coordination, budgetary allocation and, in some contexts, a degree of political tolerance for civic action. If pursued without parallel institutional openings, improvements in civic participation may not translate into policy influence.

A coherent strategy therefore relies on multiple, functionally dependent approaches implemented in sequence. Representation reforms should be maintained or strengthened where feasible, while being tied to participation outcomes through party-level rules that reduce informal gatekeeping and lower barriers to engagement.

Labour market inclusion should be treated as civic infrastructure, with an emphasis on expanding women’s access to formal employment and decent work, given the stronger association between employment and non-institutional participation among women. Investment in care and safety should be prioritised as a foundation for more inclusive collective activism, since this is where the participation gap is most pronounced.

Finally, monitoring frameworks should move beyond parliamentary seat shares and voter turnout by tracking participation across types, particularly private activism and collective activism, so that policy progress is assessed in terms of political voice as well as formal representation.

A further consideration is that although the findings show strong associations between political participation and measurable characteristics – such as education, employment, associational involvement, political interest, political importance, political trust and democratic deficit – these relationships do not imply that any single reform will, on its own, close the gender gap. This strengthens the case for a sequenced reform package with clear pathways and measurable outputs, rather than isolated or purely symbolic initiatives.

Conclusion

Monitoring frameworks should move beyond parliamentary seat shares and voter turnout by tracking participation across types, particularly private activism and collective activism, so that progress is assessed in terms of political voice as well as formal representation.

Although our research reveals strong associations between political participation and measurable characteristics (such as education, employment, associational involvement, political interest, political importance, political trust and democratic deficit), these relationships do not imply that any single reform will, on its own, close the gender gap.

This strengthens the case for a sequenced reform package with clear pathways and measurable outputs, rather than isolated or purely symbolic initiatives.

Further reading

Fakih, A, and Y Sleiman (2022) ‘The gender gap in political participation: Evidence from the MENA region’, Review of Political Economy 36(1): 154-77.