Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Egypt and Iraq: amenities, environmental quality and taste for revolution

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The Middle East and North Africa is a region marked by significant political turbulence. This column explores a novel dimension of these upheavals: the relationship between people’s satisfaction with, on one hand, the amenities to which they have access and the environmental quality they experience, and, on the other hand, their inclination towards revolutionary actions. The data come from the World Value Survey collected in 2018 in Egypt and Iraq.

In a nutshell

Several studies have explored what provokes uprisings in Arab countries; but until now, none have investigated whether people’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with public services, environmental factors and housing affects their inclination to engage in revolutionary actions.

New research indicates that there is a negative and significant association between, on one hand, satisfaction with amenities and environmental conditions, and on the other hand, individuals’ inclination to support revolutionary actions in both Egypt and Iraq.

Egyptians with higher levels of satisfaction with public transport systems, roads and highways, air quality and housing quality have a lower tendency towards revolutionary action; the taste for revolt is higher among those with lower incomes, university education and less religiosity.

Throughout the past century, Egypt and Iraq have witnessed numerous social uprisings and revolutions. They include the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the Egyptian ‘bread riots’ of 1977, the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the 1920 Iraqi Revolt, the 1935-36 Iraqi Shia revolts, and the 1958 Iraqi coup d’état. The latest major upheaval was the Arab Spring, a series of events experienced by multiple Arab countries in 2011 (Ferrero, 2018).

Many studies have examined the role of socio-economic and institutional factors in explaining internal conflicts and protests, such as the role of the youth bulge, corruption, economic growth, income inequality, oil shocks, the informal economy, health crises and the responses of government, among several other macro drivers (for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Farzanegan, 2017; Farzanegan and Witthuhn, 2017; Ishak and Farzanegan, 2022; Farzanegan and Gholipour, 2023a).

Other studies have looked at individual socio-economic characteristics (such as gender, age, income, marital status, education and religiosity) and their impact on support for radical change (for example, MacCulloch, 2003, 2004, 2005).

What has received less scrutiny, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), is the association between individuals’ satisfaction with amenities and environmental quality, and their attitudes towards revolution as a way to address their country’s problems (at the expense of gradual reforms).

In our recent study (Farzanegan and Gholipour, 2023b), we investigate whether individuals’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction with public services, environmental conditions and housing quality influences their inclination to support or engage in revolutionary activities. Using the latest individual-level survey data from the World Value Survey Wave 7 (WVS7) collected in 2018 in Egypt and Iraq, this research examining the connection between these factors and preferences for revolutionary action. Gaining insight into the inclination of citizens towards revolt is essential for forecasting potential uprisings in two key MENA economies.

MacCulloch and Pezzini (2010) demonstrate a correlation between an individual’s propensity for revolt and the occurrence of various forms of violence across different countries. Nevertheless, the revolutionary attitudes of individuals can be influenced by a multitude of factors. Therefore, it is crucial, from an empirical standpoint, to account for these factors. Only then can we get reliable evidence on the impact of individuals’ satisfaction with amenities and the environment on their inclination towards revolt.

Hypothesis, data and methodology

The hypothesis of our study is as follows: ‘Individuals at higher levels of dissatisfaction with amenities and environmental quality indicators tend to support more radical change in societies, ceteris paribus’. To assess this hypothesis, we use survey data from 1,200 Egyptians and 1,200 Iraqis.

Within the ‘Social Values, Attitudes; Stereotypes’ section of the WVS7, respondents encounter a question about their perspectives on the society in which they reside. Specifically, participants are presented with the following inquiry:

‘Among these options representing different attitudes towards our society, please select the one that best aligns with your own viewpoint. (Please select only one response from the following list):

(1) The entire structure of our society requires radical transformation through revolutionary means.

(2) Our society should be progressively enhanced through reforms.

(3) Our existing society needs to be bravely defended against any subversive influences.’

Building on the work of MacCulloch (2004), the dependent variable in our study is a binary element. The variable is assigned a value of 1 if the respondent concurs with the statement that ‘The entire structure of our society requires radical transformation through revolutionary action’; otherwise, it receives a value of 0.

As our key explanatory variable, there is a question about individuals’ contentment with amenities and environmental conditions. This inquiry prompts respondents with the question: ‘Regarding the city or area where you reside, how do you assess the quality of the following?’

The listed items encompass public transport systems, roads and highways, schools, air quality, water quality, healthcare standards, housing conditions, architectural aesthetics and natural surroundings. Respondents are instructed to select from the options of (1) very satisfied, (2) fairly satisfied, (3) fairly dissatisfied, and (4) very dissatisfied. For ease of interpretation, scores have been reversed (1: very dissatisfied… 4: very satisfied).

We include a diverse set of control variables in our analysis, such as respondents’ self-reported age, gender, income scale, marital status, tertiary education, employment status, number of children, religiosity, political action, subjective freedom and preference for income equality.

Findings

The results show that Egyptian respondents with higher levels of satisfaction with public transport systems, roads and highways, air quality, and housing quality have a lower tendency towards revolutionary action.

For example, the results show that satisfaction with air quality has the largest effect. A one-unit increase in this aspect of satisfaction reduces the support for revolutionary actions by 3.1 percentage points, controlling for other factors. The decreasing effect in other statistically significant satisfaction dimensions are also close to 3 percentage points. Also, a one-unit increase in average of amenities and environmental quality indicators is associated with a reduction of 3.9 percentage points in demand for revolutionary actions. Thus, a move from very dissatisfied (a score of 1) to very satisfied (a score of 4) is associated with about a 12 percentage points decline in predicted probability of supporting revolutionary actions in Egypt.

The analysis also shows that the preference for revolutionary action is higher among Egyptian respondents with lower incomes, university education and less religiosity. Moreover, our findings indicate that individuals who prioritise income equality tend to exhibit a heightened tendency towards revolution. Finally, insights drawn from the Egypt sample suggest that individuals that perceive greater personal freedom in their lives demonstrate a reduced likelihood of supporting revolutionary actions.

In the complete Iraq sample, mirroring the outcomes in Egypt, we note a negative and statistically significant correlation between the coefficient of the average amenities and environmental quality indicators and the endorsement of revolutionary action. A one-unit increase in this index is associated with a decline of 4 percentage points in the taste for revolution among Iraqis, which is comparable to the results for Egypt. This result is particularly evident in urban areas, especially in large cities, compared with rural areas and small cities in both countries.

Conclusion

In Egypt, dissatisfaction with public transport systems, roads and highways, air quality and housing quality are positively and significantly associated with individuals’ preference for revolution. In Iraq, individuals dissatisfied with roads and highways, water quality, school quality and the physical setting of cities tend to prefer revolutionary actions.

Our results provide valuable insights for policy-makers seeking to decrease the likelihood of revolutionary actions among their citizens.

Further reading

Collier, P, and A Hoeffler (1998) ‘On economic causes of civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 50: 563-73.

Farzanegan, MR (2017) ‘Can we predict political uprisings?’, The Conversation.

Farzanegan, MR, and HF Gholipour (2023a) ‘COVID-19 fatalities and internal conflict: Does government economic support matter?’, European Journal of Political Economy 78: 102368.

Farzanegan, MR, and HF Gholipour (2023b) ‘Does satisfaction with amenities and environment influence the taste for revolt in the Middle East?, Constitutional Political Economy.

Farzanegan, MR, and S Witthuhn (2017) ‘Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter?’, European Journal of Political Economy 49: 47-70.

Fearon JD, and DD Laitin (2003) ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 97: 75-90.

Ferrero, M (2018) ‘Why the Arab Spring turned Islamic: The political economy of Islam’, Constitutional Political Economy 29: 230-51

Ishak, PW, and MR Farzanegan (2022) ‘Oil price shocks, protest, and the shadow economy: Is there a mitigation effect?’, Economics and Politics 34: 298-321.

MacCulloch, R (2003) ‘The taste for revolt’, Economics Letters 79(1): 7-13.

MacCulloch, R. (2004) ‘The impact of income on the taste for revolt’, American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 830-48.

MacCulloch, R (2005) ‘Income inequality and the taste for revolution’, Journal of Law and Economics 48(1): 93-123.

MacCulloch, R, and S Pezzini (2010) ‘The roles of freedom, growth, and religion in the taste for revolution’, Journal of Law and Economics 53(2): 329-58.

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