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PRO-WOMEN LEGAL REFORM IN MOROCCO: IS RELIGION AN OBSTACLE?

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Abstract

The question of the role of modern law in triggering social change is of particular importance in societies where customs and norms support the marginalization of some social groups. The conventional view is that the effectiveness of the formal law is constrained by the system of informal rules and values, which support the prevailing customs, and the law therefore appears as a 'dead letter'. Aldashev et al. (2012) mitigate this pessimistic scenario by formally showing that the law has, under certain conditions, the effect of making the custom evolve in the direction of the law. One of the conditions to achieve this effect is the identification of agents with the new law. In this paper, we focus on the adherence of agents to a pro-women legal reform in Morocco and the reform of the Family Code which is religious-inspired legislation. We use a unique database created from a survey we conducted in Morocco in 2008 to provide some evidence about the factors, which drive conservative positions with respect to a progressive legal reform. We observe that women who are benefiting from the reform are not unanimously in favor of it. Conversely, a non-negligible part of the male population strongly supports the new legislation. In order to explain these behaviors, we mainly focus on three specific factors: education, location and religion. Contrary to what naïve beliefs would suggest – rural men with a low level of education and intense religious practice express a lower support for the new Family Code –, we find that there is no straightforward relation between the three aforementioned factors (education, location and religion) and support for the new legislation. Rather paradoxically, conservative positions are observed among educated people, when they are very religious.

ملخص

مسألة دور القانون الحديث في إحداث التغيير الاجتماعي لها أهمية خاصة في المجتمعات حيث العادات والأعراف تدعم تهميش بعض الفئات الاجتماعية. وجهة النظر التقليدية هي أن فعالية القانون الرسمي تكون محدودة من قبل نظام من القواعد والقيم غير الرسمية، التي تدعم العادات السائدة، والقانون لذا يبدو " كحبرا على ورق ". الداشيف وآخرون (2012) يرون هذا السيناريو المتشائم بنظرة مخففة من خلال اظهار رسميا بأن القانون ، في ظل ظروف معينة، لديه من الأثر في جعل العرف يتطور في اتجاه هذا القانون. واحد من الشروط لتحقيق هذا الغرض هو تحديد الوكلاء مع القانون الجديد. في هذه الورقة، نركز على التزام الوكلاء للإصلاحات القانونية الموالية للنساء في المغرب، وإصلاحات قانون الأسرة التي هي مستوحاة من التشريع الديني. نستخدم قاعدة بيانات فريدة من نوعها تم إنشاؤها من دراسة أجريناها في المغرب في عام 2008 لتقديم بعض الأدلة عن العوامل التي تقود مناصب المحافظين فيما يتعلق بإصلاحات قانونية وتقدمية. نلاحظ أن النساء اللاتي تستفيدن من الإصلاح لا تدعمنه بالإجماع. وعلى العكس، جزء لا يستهان به من السكان الذكور يؤيدون بقوة التشريع الجديد. من أجل شرح هذه السلوكيات، نركز بشكل رئيسي على ثلاثة عوامل محددة هي: التعليم، والموقع الجغرافي والدين. وعلى عكس ما قد توحي المعتقدات الساذجة ـ أن الرجال في المناطق الريفية مع انخفاض مستوى التعليم وممارسة الشعائر الدينية المكثفة لا يؤيدون قانون الأسرة الجديد ـ، نجد أنه لا توجد علاقة واضحة بين العوامل الثلاثة المذكورة أعلاه (التعليم، وموقع الجغرافي والدين) وتقديم الدعم للتشريع الجديد. وللمفارقة ، فقد لوحظت مواقف متحفظة جدا بين فئة المتعلمين، عندما تكون متدينة جدا.

1. Introduction

The persistence of inequitable practices that are supported by social norms is an important dimension of social justice. In most developing countries, the social organization is such that some sections of the population are marginalized (women, foreigners, low caste members…) while others benefit from some privileges within their family, their community or in the society as a whole (men, natives, high caste members…). These different groups have antagonistic preferences and the status quo may correspond to a zero-sum game where the marginalized suffer and the dominant party is the beneficiary. The members of the marginalized group are not necessarily able to coordinate their actions and act as a social force in order to trigger a change in the treatment they receive. Moreover, even if the marginalized succeed in coordinating their actions, the dominant party will not be inclined to accept any change. Therefore, a third party intervention is needed. The state has a role to play and public action is justified.

A natural way of acting for a state concerned by equity criteria is the enactment of new laws that protect the marginalized groups and grant them new rights. Aldashev et al. (2012) show that under certain conditions, the law can indeed lead to a change in agents' behavior in the direction intended by the legislator. One important condition for the effectiveness of the law is that the disadvantaged people identify with it and recognize its legitimacy. In order words, they must consider that the law represents their interests, which implies that their preferences are not shaped by the values of the dominant group.

In this paper, we focus on a specific institutional change, the 2004 reform of the Family Law in Morocco and show that the law is not necessarily well received by its beneficiaries. The lack of adherence to the legislation may not be a marginal phenomenon among the targeted social group since the majority rejects some clauses of the law. This observation is quite striking and therefore deserves a careful analysis. The objective of the paper is to identify the key determinants of the support for the law[1] and, in particular, to investigate whether the diffusion of religious conservative ideas plays a critical role. The analysis is based on a unique database created from a survey we conducted in Morocco in 2008, four years after the reform.

The rules that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance and children custody have been changed. The new legislation aims at improving women's status by assigning them a new role in the family (they are now on an equal footing with their husbands in matters of family responsibility) and granting them new rights (such as the right to initiate a divorce without being required to adduce evidence of ill-treatment or to produce witnesses).

From the data we collected, we observe that even if the new law improves women's status in the family as well as in the society, and grants them new rights, women are not unanimously in favor of the law: hardly half of them strongly support the change of the legislation. Conversely, we observe that a non-negligible proportion of men (20%) strongly support the Code. The fact that a significant proportion of women are not in favor of progressive changes in the Family law, which aims at improving their status, is surprising and raises several questions. However, as pointed out by Kabeer (1999: 460), access to new resources (in our case, new rights), may open up new possibilities for women, but the latter are unlikely to realize these possibilities in a uniform way. An empirical analysis is therefore needed in order to explore the characteristics of those women who expressed an opposition to the reform.

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[1] The support does not necessarily imply the appeal to the law but it represents the implicit condition to the appeal. The adherence to the law is, in a way, measuring the upper band level of appeal. Moreover, as the law might have, under certain conditions, an indirect effect by acting on the change of customs (see Aldashev et al., 2012), the adherence to the law is the necessary condition to induce this indirect effect.

The position adopted by men also deserves probing. Even if a woman is in favor of the law, her bargaining strength may not be enhanced if she has poor fallback options and her male relatives are opposed to change. Several studies have tried to explain the emergence of new rights favorable to women by focusing on men's conflicting interests as husbands and fathers (see for instance, Doepke and Tertilt 2008; Fernández 2011). We differ from this literature since our main concern is not to provide an explanation for the emergence of the law. Yet, some arguments in this literature are relevant to our inquiry. For example, we want to verify if married men who have daughters adopt a different position with respect to the law.

Several factors are likely to influence people's behavior with respect to the new legislation. In particular, we examine to what extent differences in support for the law can be explained by three key factors: education, location and religion. We formulate two different scenarios and we try to identify which one is the most plausible. The first one is based on 'naïve beliefs' and the second one on observations made by anthropologists and political scientists. 'Naïve beliefs' would suggest that rural men with a low level of education and intense religious practice express a lower support to the new Family Code. On the other hand, several anthropologists and political scientists argue that, in the case of Morocco, religious puritanical movements are essentially present in urban areas and attract educated people (see, for instance, Geertz 1968; Lapidus, 2002; Tozy, 1999). We may, therefore, suspect the existence of interactions between education and the people's religiosity. There has not been any systematic enquiry about the latter issue, hence the pioneer character of our empirical exploration based on first-hand data.

Concerning education, we expect more educated people to be more in favor of a progressive change in the law. Numerous studies link education to liberal attitudes such as tolerance and support for civil liberties (see Phelan et al., 1995).Education is also seen as promoting individualistic values (Weakliem, 2002), which is a relevant concern to the extent that the reform of the Family Law shifts the focus from collective values to more individualistic ones. As a matter of fact, Cavatorta and Dalmasso (2009) assert that the Code represents a fundamental transformation of the Moroccan society in the sense that it notably integrates the fact that social modernization requires a rebalancing of rights in favor of the individual over the collective (p. 489). Regarding location, a reasonable hypothesis is that urban people are more likely to be in favor of the new legislation. This is supported by observations made by sociologists according to who less populated communities are more conventional and less prone to cultural change (Chou et al., 1982; Fisher, 1978; both cited by Coleman et al., 1989). Fisher (1978) argues that innovations and new opinions emerge first in urban areas and diffuse afterwards to less populated communities. As the process of change is continuous, a gap persists between urban and rural areas in terms of social attitudes. Finally, the impact of religion on the support for the law is not evident. We expect an ambiguous effect since it is not clear that Islam supports unequal rights between men and women. Different positions coexist in the Muslim world as well as within each Muslim society. To our knowledge, there are no studies available about this subject that could guide our intuition. Hence, our preference goes for an agnostic approach.

Our main finding is that for both men and women, there is no straightforward relationship between education, location and religious practice, on the one hand, and support for the law, on the other hand. A key result is thus that the intensity of religious practice is negatively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the Code, but only for educated people. Rather paradoxically, conservative positions are observed among educated people, when they are very religious. We mainly explain this result by the diffusion of conservative ideas through religious movements, which became very active in the education system since the late 80's.This goes against the preconceived idea according to which puritanical movements essentially influence non-educated people who are allegedly prompt to adopt a traditional

interpretation of religious prescriptions. We also find that education per se is positively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the Code, but essentially among men. Finally, location per se is not significantly correlated with the support to the law. However, the negative relationship between the intensity of religious practice for educated people and their support to the Code is stronger (both in intensity and statistical significance) for women residing in rural areas.

The next section of the paper briefly examines the historical process, which led to the emergence of the new Family Code as well as its content. It also positions Morocco in terms of women's rights in the context of the MENA region. Section 3 describes the strategy adopted to conduct the survey. Section 4 discusses our main assumptions. Section 5 presents key variables and some descriptive statistics, while Section 6 describes the methodology used for the analysis of the data. Section 7 discusses the results and Section 8 concludes.

2. Emergence of the New Family Code

2.1 The historical background

After the independence of 1956, the first Family Code was enacted. This Code was founded on a combination of religious values and other rules with their origins in customary norms. It therefore legitimizes practices based on patriarchal values and is inspired by 'Maliki rite', which is one of the four legal schools of thought in Sunni Islam2. The code was created in a context where the nationalists had a scripturalist approach in matters of religion and were fighting against Western values, which endangered national identity (Geertz 1968). This situation allowed conservative nationalists to defend the dominance of patriarchal values in the name of cultural integrity (Dalmasso 2008). Furthermore, by that time, the Monarchy was also well inclined towards the tribes' chiefs and therefore endorsed the adoption of rules rooted in customary practices (Cavatorta and Dalmasso 2009).

Despite some debates in the 1970s and the 1980s, the Family Code has remained virtually identical to that which was enacted after independence. In the early 1990s, the debate concerning the Code began to grow in importance. In 1993, a campaign led by the associative sector managed to collect one million signatures to support the claims of those working towards a change in the law. The Women's Action Union (UAF) founded in 1987 presented an open letter to the House of Representatives including claims based on a triple standard: the objectives of Sharia (under Islamic law), social reality, and universal human rights. This letter was addressed to politicians, not to the king who is the 'Commander of the Faithful'. King Hassan II reacted stating that the issue is based on religious values and declared that its treatment comes under the 'Commander of the Faithful', and not the political world. The king then received a delegation of women. He quoted ijtihad3, stressing that legal prescriptions cannot prohibit what God has not prohibited, and cannot allow what God has not permitted. He promised amendments proposed by a committee composed of ulama (Muslim legal scholars). In 1993, the Family Code was reformed for the first time since Morocco's independence. However, the changes are limited. The steps taken towards establishing a polygamous marriage and obtaining a divorce are more complicated than before. These changes offer women some protection against men's abuses. In addition, woman must now provide her consent to marriage and if she loses her father, she is no longer subject to matrimonial guardianship. Despite minor changes, the reform has helped remove the sacred character from the Code's text (Benradi 2004,40).

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[2]The three others are: the *Hanbali* school, the *Hanafi* school and the *Shafi'i* school.

[3]In Browning et al (2006), *Ijtihad* is defined as follows: *Ijtihad* is used to refer generally to the jurisprudential activity in which scholars engage either to interpret the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, where an interpretation is required, or to reach a ruling involving no clear Quranic pronouncement or prophetic precedent (153-154). The *Sunnah* is the example given by the Prophet through his life. Considered as the ideal Muslim, he offered the best guidance (Al Hibri et al. 2006,153).

In 1998, the new government presented a reform, which sparked a bigger debate. The progressive associative sector protested against the lack of change. The more conservative politicians such as members of the PJD (Justice and Development Party) criticized the resolutions, which they considered inconsistent with Moroccan identity, culture and religion. In 2000, two major demonstrations were organized: a demonstration in favor of the reform (in Rabat), and another in opposition to it (in Casablanca).

In 2003, King Mohamed VI took the matter into his own hands and used a method similar to that used by his father: "I cannot in my capacity as 'Commander of the Faithful' allow what God has prohibited or forbid what the highest body has authorized". The king set up a committee who would develop the new provisions of the Code. This time, the Committee was composed mainly of academics (including three women) and religious representatives, the ulama. The associative sector had also been invited to participate by submitting proposals to the commission. The work of the commission led to the development of a new Code whose main provisions were presented at a royal speech on 10th October 2003. The king used religious references and referred to ijtihad practice in order to grant legitimacy to the new provisions and thus prevent changes from being perceived as an attack on religion. The efforts of ijtihad suggest that the unequal rights among Muslims are more humane than divine (Benradi 2004, 86). It shows that the opposition to a move towards more equality between the sexes is, in some cases, motivated by a commitment to a society based on patriarchal logic and male privileges rather than on an authentic loyalty to a religion (Benradi 2004,86).

The voting on the text of the new Family Code in the parliament happened in a particular context, a few months after the Casablanca bombings (May 16, 2003). These attacks resulted in a witch-hunt to find the radical groups and it was a sign for movements with religious connotations to keep a low profile. Not only was it necessary to avoid being associated with a radical group but also it was necessary to participate in a national union to show modern and progressive Morocco. In Morocco, there are essentially two main religious movements: a political party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) and an organization, the Justice and Charity movement (Jamiat Al Adl wal Ihsan) which is illegal but tolerated by the authorities. The Justice and Development Party (PJD), which presents itself as a party with moderate views, approved the text of the Family Code with the other parties represented in parliament. Yet, it was opposed to the first government initiative of 1999. Actually, the party defends a quite conservative line on social issues as the place of women in society (see Willis, 2007). The Justice and Charity movement (Jamiat Al Adl wal Ihsan) presents itself as an association promoting the idea of political change - they are asking for a change of the constitution – rather than an association with radical religious views. However, they do not defend a model of equal rights and responsibilities between men and women. The movement presents itself as a non-violent association despite some fiery speeches of its founder, Abdesslam Yassin. Both religious groups include a feminist branch. INSAF, the feminist organization linked to the Jamiat Al Adl wal Ihsan, accepts the rejection of polygamy in certain cases, and favors the model of the nuclear family including the belief that woman can have an activity outside the house. The members of this association militate for a feminist interpretation of the religious texts. On the contrary, ORCOFE, the women association linked to the PJD party, considers that the privileged family structure is the one defended by the old Family Code: they are favorable to polygamy, the guardianship of the father and marriage for women from the age of 15 (Ramírez 2006; Dalmasso 2008).According to Clifford Geertz, mass fundamentalism was held in check in Morocco since there are no mass party, public organization or famous personalities that openly defend a hard line (Geertz1968, 7; the introduction was written in 1991). Even if the religious-inspired movements express some disagreements with the content of the new legislation, their reactions were brought under control.

2.2 Positioning Morocco in the MENA region

By implementing the reform of the Family Code, Morocco became the most progressive in terms of Family Law matters in the MENA region after Tunisia[4]. This is reflected in the SIGI index which looks at gender inequalities embedded in social institutions, i.e. essentially inequalities *de jure* but it also looks at some facts (for example, excision prevalence). The higher the values of the index the more unequal are social institutions. The SIGI index classifies Morocco as the 43rd country out of 102 developing countries but as the second within the MENA region after Tunisia (see Branisa, Klasen and Ziegler, 2009). The SIGI index is composed of 5 sub-indices, each of them measures a different dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality: Family Code, civil liberties, physical integrity, son preference and ownership rights. For the first sub-index, Morocco occupies the 48th position in the ranking but once again the second across the MENA countries. A complementary source of information for the relative position of Morocco in terms of women's rights is the Women Social Rights Index of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. This index measures whether women have a series of social rights under law and whether these rights are enforced. The emphasis is therefore not only on rights *de jure* but also *de facto*. The index is measured between 0 and 3, the higher the value of the index the more favorable is the environment for women. Before the reform of the Family Code, the value of the index was 0 for Morocco; it rose to 2 the year of the reform (2004) and decreased to 1 three years after (2007). As a matter of fact, several women's and human rights associations denounce the lack of enforcement of the law (i.e. LDDF annual reports) and this is probably the reason why Morocco experienced a fall in its score. Among the MENA countries for which the index is computed, Morocco appears to have the best score (even Tunisia has a zero value index)[5], and this is indicative of how bad the region is doing in women's social rights.

2.3 The content of the new Family Code

The Code regulates family relations. A legal framework is established for all matters relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, parentage, children's rights and inheritance. The creation of family courts is organized by the Code and appealing to these courts should treat any dispute regarding the Code. The most revolutionary changes concern the status and rights of women. Moreover, the powers of the judges specialized in family matters have been reinforced. Foblets and Carlier (2005) believe that the new Code has somehow deepened the roots of family life in the judicial system. They believe that this 'legalization' of family law is at the expense of the prerogatives of the adouls[6] and the cadi[7], which are considerably reduced since the new Code came into force (Foblets and Carlier 2005, 9-10). A final feature of the Code which we wish to stress is that, unlike the Tunisian Code of Personal Status, the Moudawana allows people to make choices (the law is not completely rigid) with respect to (i) matrimonial guardianship, (ii) the monogamous or polygamous nature of the marriage contract, (iii) the drafting (or not) of a contract to regulate all dealings involving the goods and properties of the couple.

The main changes of the Family Code can be summed up into eleven points:

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[4]Tunisia appears as an exception in the Arab world. The President Bourguiba implemented a very progressive Code of Personal Status just after the independence of his country in 1956.

[5]The most recent index computed for these countries goes back to 2007.

[6]The new Code sustains *adouls* (Muslim notaries) intervention in terms of marriage and divorce, but their involvement is however subject to prior approval of the court.

[7]Foblets and Carlier (2005, 136) provide the following definition: The term *cadi* refers to the family judge in charge of marriage who gives permission for its conclusion. It also applies to the judge who certifies the notary acts of marriage or acts relating to all forms of repudiation, prepared by the *adouls* (Muslim notaries). Finally, it refers to the judge who enforces the rights of minors or disabled people and the management of their inheritance. The same judge may sometimes combine all these functions.

1. The family is placed under the joint responsibility of both spouses. The Code indicates that the "wife is responsible, jointly with her husband, for managing home affairs and the protection of children" (Article 51, 3). Husband and wife must work together when a decision is being made concerning the family. Women no longer have to obey the husband in terms of home duties. Yet, the provision does not extend to relieving the husband's duty of supporting his wife (Foblets and Carlier 2005, 44-45).

2. The new Code gives women the right to express their own interests, options and choices regarding matrimonial guardianship: 'A woman can have her own marriage contract or delegate, to that effect, her father or one of her kin'' (Article 25, Foblets and Carlier 2005, 27).

3. The new Code establishes equality between men and women when it comes to the age of getting married: 18 years old. The judge has the right to reduce this age in justified cases (it should be exceptional): if the marriage of a minor does not represent a danger to health or a disturbance in their life (article 20). In these specific cases, the text does not include a minimum age for marriage. Nevertheless, the conditions required for an authorization are that the beneficiary must have the maturity and physical ability for marriage and discretion of consent to get married (Foblets and Carlier 2005,25). For this to happen, the judge must consult the minor, and he must also consult the parents for their approval[8]. In addition, the judge may need to carry out a medical and social survey.

4. Polygamy is subject to severe restrictions: it is no longer a right and permission must be granted subject to the authorization of the judge. First, a non-mandatory clause in the marriage contract gives the wife the right to require that the marriage is monogamous. In this case, the remarriage of the spouse is prohibited. Second, if this clause does not exist, polygamy is still subject to conditions: in addition to financial requirements, the judge must ensure fair treatment of the two wives and their children and the spouse must provide an 'objective and exceptional' reason to justify his desire to become a polygamist. Third, the woman may seek divorce on the grounds of a prejudice following the remarriage of her husband (her compensation is then provided by the spouse and the amount is fixed by the court) (Foblets and Carlier 2005,32-36).

5. The Code allows Moroccans living abroad to marry according to the procedure prevailing in the host country provided that two Muslim witnesses are present and the marriage is registered with the consular services.

6. Divorce is a right exercised by husband and wife, according to legal conditions, which are specific to each of the parties and under judicial supervision. Divorce requires the prior approval of the court, thereby preventing, among other things, any abusive use of divorcing by the man (repudiation). The Code provides strengthened mechanisms for reconciliation and mediation. Before granting the divorce, the judge must ensure that the divorced wife benefits from all the rights granted to her (the same applies for the rights of the children).

7. The Code strengthens the rights of women to seek judicial divorce if the husband breaches one of the conditions stipulated in the marriage contract, for example, if he inflicts injury on his wife (poor maintenance, neglect of marital home, violence or other abuse). Furthermore, the Code introduces divorce by mutual consent under judicial supervision: the judge controls that divorce is not imposed by one party and pays special attention to the interests of the children.

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[8]The mother is also consulted. This effort is consistent with the joint responsibility attached to the family introduced by the new Code.

8. The Code aims to better protect the rights of the children. Concerning custody of the children, the interests of the child must be taken into account. From the age of 15, children can choose which parent they want to live with. Ensuring adequate accommodation of the child becomes an obligation, which is separate from general maintenance.

9. The Code protects the right of the child to be recognized by his father whether marriage has been formalized by an act, or not.

10. Children have the right of inheritance from their maternal grandfather (the only change in terms of inheritance).

11. The two spouses can agree on how to manage their property in a separate document added to their marriage contract. In case of a disagreement, the judge will base his decision on evidence provided by both spouses.

3. Methodology of Data Collection

Data was collected in 2008 in three of the 16 administrative regions of Morocco: Tangier-Tetouan, Casablanca and Souss-Massa-Draa, and 542 people were interviewed. The regions were not randomly selected but were chosen on the basis of characteristics relevant for our study. The Tetouan region was chosen for its conservatism, which was repeatedly stressed in studies about the new Code. The conservatism of the region is commonly reflected in the behavior of the population and of the judges who have to enforce the legislation (Elharras and Serhane 2006). It was also pointed out in various discussions we held with Moroccan jurists. Casablanca was chosen because of the importance of immigration in the region. Its population is heterogeneous, composed of individuals with diverse backgrounds who have learnt to live together. Inhabitants are therefore confronted with traditions and values of other social groups. Finally, the Ouarzazate region was chosen because the majority of its population is rural and a significant part is Berber. The Berber population is known for being attached to tradition and the ancestral customary law[9]. This choice should allow us to include in our study populations, which have been subject to different influences in the course of their history and control for unobserved differences, by including regional dummies in our analysis. Furthermore, within each region, we conducted a survey in both rural and urban areas.

We worked with the Office of National Statistics based in Rabat in order to construct a sample of 180 individuals in each region. Apart from the size of the samples, several criteria have been established: the choice of provinces, cities, rural municipalities and districts (in the city Casablanca), the allocation of the samples throughout the provinces and between urban and rural areas, and some selection criteria used at an individual level. Our framework is the sample of the National Survey on employment, which is conducted quarterly. Annually, 60,000 households are surveyed (40,000 urban and 20,000 rural). In each province, the samples of this survey are representative of the population of the province.

The choice of provinces, towns and rural municipalities was made with a view to reducing geographical distances to cover during the survey. The allocation between the provinces in the same region was made according to the demographic weight of each entity within the region, while the allocation between urban and rural areas was based on the demographic weight of each group within the province[10]. In the rural communities, villages were randomly chosen. In villages and towns, individuals were selected randomly using marital status as a

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[9]The Berbers continue to apply rules derived from the customary law. For example, the principle of "cad wa siava'' consecrated by the custom in the region of Souss, recognizes that the wife shares the property acquired during marriage in addition to what she could receive as heir upon the death of her husband.

[10]Except for the region of Casablanca where the weight of the rural area is artificially inflated since the region is largely urban.

stratification criterion. Other criteria that have been taken into account included gender, level of education, age, and the living environment (only for Casablanca). However, these criteria have been used only to ensure that sufficient variance exists for each of them. Concerning marital status, we imposed a strict rule using the information provided by the Office of National Statistics about the proportions of each marital status in each province of interest and in each environment. Since the proportion of divorced people in the population is very low and we are very much interested in capturing a sufficient number of them, we did not reproduce the proportions of the population in the samples: we have multiplied the percentage of divorced people by 5. The proportions of the other marital status categories (single, married and widow) were correspondingly reduced. We allocated the sample on the basis of these new proportions. By doing so, we artificially increased the number of divorced people. Finally, within each marital category, we chose people randomly, checking that we have sufficient variance for the other criteria. The details concerning the sample creation in each region are presented in Appendix 1.

In each family visited, the questionnaire was administered to a randomly chosen individual on the condition that he (she) is over 18 years old. The first part of the questionnaire concerns the whole nuclear family to which the person interviewed belongs as well as people who are not part of the nuclear family but live under the same roof (possibly members of the extended family). The second part focuses specifically on the interviewed individual. The questionnaire is relatively long and contains parts that need lengthy explanations, especially the part concerning the Family Code. This part is central to our investigation and we have taken many precautions to make sure that the questionnaire was well understood. The author herself oversaw the entire investigation process. She accompanied the teams carrying out the surveys in each village and participated in a large number of interviews, either partially or for the whole interview. She was thus involved in all the rural and urban surveys. The interviews were conducted either in colloquial Moroccan Arabic or in Berber (for the villages of the Ouarzazate province).

To sum up, our sample is distributed across three different regions: the *grand Casablanca* for which we use the name CASA, the region of *Tangier-Tetouan* whose denomination in the paper is TETOUAN and the region of *Souss-Massa-Drââ* which we name OUARZAZATE, and across two residential environments: urban vs. rural. The distribution across regions and residential environments is given in Table 1. It appears that the sample is quasi equally distributed across urban (274 individuals) and rural (268 individuals) areas.

Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample according to gender and marital status (our stratification criteria). Married people represent more than half of the sample, singles quasi a third and divorced 9%. There are more women than men in the sample; this is also reflected in the official national statistics.

4. Main Assumptions

From a theoretical point of view, at least three obstacles to the identification of women with the law can be thought of. First, some women have already internalized the values of the dominant party, the men, and follow the right way to behave as defined by a patriarchal society. In this case, they might even defend patriarchal values with more enthusiasm than men. Kabeer (1999) indicates that the internalization by women of their social status as persons of lesser value has been largely emphasized in the literature on gender and wellbeing. Kabeer (1999, 440) also points out the fact that such behavior can have adverse implications for their own wellbeing as well as for the wellbeing of other female family members (see, for instance, Shaffer, 1998, in the case of Republic of Guinea). According to Axelrod (1986), the internalization of norms and values means that violating an established norm is psychologically painful even if the direct material benefits are positive. Second, the fear of

conflicts in the sphere of informal relations, i.e. relations within the family, will make some women refuse to appeal to the new law. Third, some women have a different understanding of what is good for them. In fact, some women consider that they are better protected by the tradition. Indeed, some women we met on the field explained that they prefer to marry with the consent of their father (their official guardian as long as they are single[11]). They think that, thanks to his consent, they will be respected in their husband's family and will enjoy a stronger bargaining power within their nuclear family. Notice that the first and the third obstacles are closely linked to each other but the logic behind each of them is not the same. When there is an internalization of patriarchal values, no alternative to the tradition is conceivable. Yet, new legislation opens a window of possibilities for women. As pointed out by Kabeer (1999. 442), "we have to ask ourselves whether other choices were not only materially possible but whether they were conceived to be within the realms of possibility". Furthermore, Posner (1997) adds that when a norm is fully internalized, there is no personal choice; relatives, peers, etc. make the choice. In the case of the third obstacle, women are, in a sense, are choosing their second best option.

On the other hand, in a patriarchal society, men attached to their privileges are likely to oppose a reform that induces more equality in rights between men and women. They might perceive the new rights given to women as a threat to their privileged position in the family. This threat is serious since the new Family Code calls into question the identity of the family.

The three aforementioned obstacles to the identification of women with the law can be caused by several factors. We will essentially focus on three of them: education, location (urban vs. rural) and religion. These same factors could also influence the position adopted by men with respect to the law.

First, education calls dominant values and traditional ways of doing things into question. Numerous studies link education to liberal attitudes (see Phelan et al.,1995) and to the promotion of individualist values (Weakliem 2002). Regarding this last point, Cavatorta and Dalmasso (2009) explain that the Code represents a fundamental transformation of the Moroccan society in the sense that it notably integrates the fact that social modernization requires a rebalancing of rights in favor of the individual over the collective (p. 489). Insofar as educated people are open-minded and progressive, they are likely to support the effort of the lawmaker in adapting the law to the evolution of society. Also, because educated women have better outside options, they are more able to assert their rights in the event of a family conflict .

Second, the place where people live may affect their perceptions and, as a consequence, their position with respect to the law. In urban areas, people are exposed to new values and experiences that might impact on their behavior, whereas, in rural areas, people are deemed to be more respectful of traditional values. As a matter of fact, observations made by sociologists support the idea that less populated communities are more conventional and less prone to cultural change (Chou et al. 1982; Fisher 1978; both cited by Coleman et al. 1989). Fisher (1978) argues that innovations and new opinions emerge first in urban areas and diffuse afterwards to less populated communities. As the process of change is continuous, a gap persists between the two kinds of areas in terms of social attitudes. In the case of Morocco, Bourqia (2005) explains that social changes since the independence in 1956 have caused the emergence of new, more individualistic values[12]. The evolution of values is likely

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[11]Following Al-Hibri et al. (2005, 204), to protect inexperienced, previously unmarried women from entering into unsuitable (hence potentially unsuccessful) marriages, Islamic jurists have either required or recommended that a woman seeks the approval of her *wali* – her guardian – in marriage.

[12]However, Bourqia (2005) stresses the fact that traditional values also persist. She highlights the existence of a hybrid basket of values where the agents choose the more appropriate ones depending on their personal interests.

to be more rapid in urban areas given that they are more connected to the external world. As a rule, urban people are expected to be more 'progressive'.

Third, concerning religion, it is not clear whether Islam supports unequal rights between men and women as a widespread view as the Western world tends to proclaim. This is a question of interpretation of the *Quran*, the *Hadith* (statements of the Prophet) and all other religious sources. Actually, there exist four major sources of Islamic jurisprudence (*Quran*, *Sunnah* including *Hadith*, *Ijtihad* and *Ijma* (consensus)), the primary one being the *Quran* (Al-Hibri et al. 2006,152). There is no unique interpretation of religious prescriptions and four schools of thought coexist (*Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i*, and *Hanbali* schools) in Sunnite Islam[13]. The reform of the Code has largely been justified by a reinterpretation of the *Quran* (*Ijtihad*), in reference not only to the *Maliki* School - the dominant school in Morocco – but also to the other schools of Sunnite Islam. Moreover, religious practices are the result of the interaction between religious prescriptions on one hand, and dominant local customs and traditions preexisting to the introduction of Islam, on the other hand. This explains why there are custom-based legal differences among Muslim countries (Al-Hibri et al. 2006, 156; see also Platteau, 2008). In addition, some conservative movements such as Wahhabism or Salafism, which defend a puritanical interpretation of Islam, are trying to extend their influence in regions characterized by more progressive schools of thought.

The multiplicity of movements creates antagonisms in an important part of Muslim societies. On one side, some interpretations are more favorable to women than traditions[14]. In this case, the approach supports the idea that the interpretation must be adapted to the evolution of society. Al-Hibri et al. refer to the juristic principle that 'laws change with the change of time and place'. This principle does not encompass basic Islamic principles that are unchangeable, but derivative ones that are capable of adaptation (Al-Hibri et al. 2006, 156). Some Muslim jurists have also embarked on a gender-sensitive reading of the *Quran*, which is more favorable to women (Al-Hibri et al. 2006, 156). On the other side, an interpretation exists based on patriarchal values. Al-Hibri et al. (2006, 155) point out the fact that patriarchal thinking found expression within Islamic jurisprudence at various levels, including interpretation of the *Quran*, validation and interpretation of *Hadith*, and selective adoption of cultural customs. Consequently, religion can precisely determine the obstacles to the identification of women with the law, thus undermining the law, if its current interpretation favors the dominant party, i.e. the men. If puritanical religious traditions predominate, they might thus inhibit the success of reforms.

The interpretation of religious prescriptions is also a central issue for individual perception building about the duties of a 'good Muslim'. Traditionally, the Islamic law is divided into two general categories: *ibadat* or matters of worship (between a person and God), and *mu'amalat*, or transactions (among people). These two categories represent the duties by which Muslims have to abide. The first category includes matters of faith, such as prayer, fasting, and tithing. The second category includes matters such as contract law, property law, and constitutional law. Both categories are proper subjects of Islamic jurisprudence and are governed by the *Quran* and *Sunnah* (Al-Hibri, In Witte & Ellison 2005, 188). At present, in Morocco, positive law governs the mu'amalat. The rules are not based on religious principles and they apply to everybody[15]. The *ibadat*, that encompass religious personal practices, are

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[13]Two other schools dominate the shi'as: the *Imami* or *Ithna 'Ashari* in Iran, Irak and Lebanon, and the *Zaydi* in the Yemen (Mir-Hosseini 2000, 6).

[14]The approach adopted in this case is inspired by the revolution sparked by the prophet Muhammed when, among other things, he limited polygamy and allowed women to inherit.

[15]The Family Code, which is the only religious inspired legislation, is part of the *ibadat*. There are, actually, several family legislations, which apply to people depending on their religion (the *Mudawana* for the Muslims, the Hebraic Code for the Jews).

for believers a way to signal their degree of religiosity. One may expect that more conservative believers practice more. At the same time, a believer who practices intensely is not necessarily a conservative person. Since there is no consensus concerning religious prescriptions about women's rights, we might observe a variety of attitudes towards the Code. One may suspect the existence of an ambiguous relationship between the intensity of religious practice and the support for the law, and this justifies an empirical analysis.

Several anthropologists and political scientists argued that, in the case of Morocco, religious puritanical movements are essentially present in urban areas and attract educated people (see, for instance, Geertz 1968; Lapidus 2002; Tozy 1999). We therefore suspect the existence of complex interactions between education and agents' religiosity. Consequently, we want to test for the following assumption: the intensity of the religious practice has an ambiguous effect on the support of the law, depending on the agent's level of education.

5. Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we define the key variables used in our analysis: support of the law, intensity of religious practice and education; and we present the relevant descriptive statistics. The questionnaire is very long and complex. For the purpose of our analysis, we constructed several variables using raw data. The construction of each of these variables is explained in the following sub-sections.

5.1 Support of the law

The main part of the questionnaire is dedicated to the new Family Code. In this section, we identify how much information is held by the respondents concerning the new legislation, their position with respect to eight particular clauses of the new Code, and their opinion vis-à-vis hypothetical situations that may occur in family life (for instance: "If your daughter marries without involving her guardian, i.e. without notifying his consent in the marriage contract, will you accept her choice?").

The questions about the clauses of the Code allow us to measure the degree of the respondents' adherence to the new legislation. The clauses that were chosen are the most sensitive in the sense that they have triggered a lot of debates and controversies. They are generally the ones that have changed significantly. These clauses have been explained in Section 1.2, as they are part of the eleven aforementioned main changes of the legislation. They concern (1) the joint responsibility of the family, i.e. the family is under the responsibility of both spouses, (2) the husband's duty of supporting his wife, (3) the removal of one of the wife's duties: the obedience to her husband, (4) the marriage of women without the consent of their guardian, (5) the marriage of minors in age, (6) polygamy, (7) divorce, and (8) the contract which states how to manage property in the case of divorce. For each of these clauses, we ask the respondent to notify the information she/he has concerning the clause, whether she/he is supporting the change, and whether she/he considers that the new clause is in accordance with religious principles of Islam, and in accordance with local customs. In the case where the respondent is not correctly informed about the clauses, we explain the content of the law to him/her before asking other questions.

For each clause, we know if the respondent is favorable or not, and hence we know how many clauses out of eight she/he supports. We can, therefore, construct a variable indicating whether the respondent is strongly supporting the Code or not. Toward that purpose, we have to fix a threshold above which we will consider that the support is effectively strong. By looking at the data, we observe that for three clauses, the support is very high (above 87% of the respondents)[16]. Consequently, we argue that supporting less than four clauses indicates

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[16]These clauses are the ones concerning the joint responsibility of the family (89% are favorable), the husband's duty of supporting his wife (91% are favourable), and the marriage of the minors in age (87% are favorable).

that the respondent is not really a fervent defender of the new law. For three others clauses, the support is quite high (75%, 79% and 81% of the respondents)[17]. Lastly, two clauses exist which are supported by less than one third of the respondents: the one concerning the removal of the wife's duty to obey her husband and the one concerning the marriage of women without the official consent of their guardian. We therefore define as a strong support of the new legislation a respondent's attitude that is favorable to seven or eight clauses of the Code. Indeed, this means that they support at least one of the most debatable clauses and at the same time, are favorable to a large number of clauses. The variable called STRONG_SUPPORT is equal to one if the respondent supports more than six clauses, and to zero otherwise. This variable is the dependent variable used in our analysis[18].

From the data, we observe that 96% of those supporting the two debated clauses appear as strongly supporting the Code (STRONG_SUPPORT=1). 83% support all the dispositions and 13% support seven dispositions out of eight. 80% of those supporting the disposition concerning the end of the wife's obedience to her husband strongly support the Code while 67% of those supporting the disposition concerning the marriage of women without the official consent of their guardian strongly support the Code.

A second approach that we follow in the paper uses the information concerning the support for the law at a disaggregated level (see Section 7.4 and Appendix 6). Instead of using as a dependent variable a dummy indicating if the support for the law is strong or not, we use the information we received about the support for each of the eight clauses. We estimate a system of equations composed of eight equations, one equation per clause. Each dependent variable is a dummy whose value is one if the respondent supports the clause. We also estimate a biprobit model in which we focus on clauses 3 and4, the two clauses that are the least supported. This approach allows us to look at the sensibility of our main factors to the different elements of the law.

A third approach would be the use of a continuous dependent variable corresponding to the number of clauses supported by each individual. However, there are at least two reasons for not opting for this approach. First, by using a continuous variable, we might consider individuals as being identical while they are deeply different in the sense that they took a different position on the Code. In fact, two individuals supporting the same number of clauses might actually support different clauses. For instance, in the case where two individuals support each one four clauses, the first may support clauses 1 to 4 and the second, clauses 5 to 8. If it is the case, one cannot consider that these two individuals support the law in the same way. By choosing a high threshold for the construction of our variable STRONG_SUPPORT, we considerably limit this problem. Second, the use of a continuous dependent variable is not adequate given our purpose: the identification of people who strongly support the change of the legislation. The research question will be different and will not correspond to the study of the adherence to the law as a whole. We will look at the correlation between some key factors and the number of clauses supported rather than the relationship between some key factors and the probability of strongly supporting the new law.

A corollary to the third approach would be the use of an ordered variable constructed on the basis of the proportions of respondents who support a specific number of clauses. For the whole sample and for both subsamples of women and men, we can identify threshold numbers of clauses at which we observe jumps in the proportion of adherents. For the whole sample, three groups can be identified: those who support less than 6 clauses (34%), those who support 6 clauses (32%) and those who support more than 6 clauses (34%). For women,

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[17]These clauses concern respectively polygamy, the contract of property management after divorce and divorce.

[18]In order to produce some robustness checks, we also construct the variable SOFT_SUPPORT whose value is one if the respondent supports more than five clauses out of eight. These robustness check results are presented in Appendix 5.

three groups are identified using the same threshold values: those who support less than 6 clauses (16%), those who support 6 clauses (37%) and those who support more than 6 clauses (47%). For men, we also identify 3 groups but the threshold values are slightly different: those who support less than 5 clauses (40%), those who support 5 or 6 clauses (41%) and those who support more than 6 clauses (19%)[19].

The proportions of individuals strongly supporting the law in the above-defined sense are presented in Table 3, for the whole sample and for all the categories comprising our key variables. Only one result is according to expectation: women are much more likely to support the Code. The other results are rather surprising.

First, the proportion of individuals strongly supporting the Code is not significantly different between urban and rural areas. Second, educated people (baccalauréat[20] or university degree) are slightly more in favor of the new legislation but the difference is not significant. Third, people with a moderate religious practice are proportionally more favorable to the new law[21]. However, the difference with respect to the two other groups (people with a low practice and a high practice) is not significant.

5.2 The intensity of religious practice

One of the sections of the questionnaire is dedicated to religious practices. Each respondent was asked whether she/he obeys a series of practices. In the affirmative, she/he was asked about the frequency of her/his practice. The combination of the responses to these two kinds of questions allowed us to construct several discrete variables: for each practice, the higher the value of the variable, and the higher the intensity of the practice. We then used these variables to construct an aggregate index measuring the intensity of religious practice by applying the Multiple Correspondence Analysis methodology[22]. The questions that were used to construct this index concern the obligatory prayers (five per day), the prayer at dawn (fjar), the prayer during the night (qyam layl), the non-obligatory prayers (nawafil), the supplementary prayers of the Ramadan (tarawih), the fasting beyond the Ramadan, the tithing duty called zakat, whether the respondent owns the Quran, whether the respondent owns the Hadith, whether the respondent owns books about the Islamic thought, whether the respondent looks at religious programs on TV, and whether the respondent shares her/his knowledge of religious principles with her/his circle of kin, friends and neighbors[23]. We decided not to keep questions about readings, as they will bias the 'score' of the respondents who cannot read. We also decided to remove the question concerning visits to the mosque since this question will bias the 'scores' in favor of men. We believe that it is essential to have a multidimensional measure of the religious practice because the importance that a respondent attaches to each practice is subjective. Consequently, by arbitrarily choosing one specific practice as a proxy for the respondent's religiosity, we are likely to obtain different rankings across individuals depending on the choice of the practice. Moreover, the use of a multidimensional index takes into account the accumulation of various practices. As for the Multiple Correspondence Analysis, it allows for the existence of proximities between individuals and 'correlations' between variables. We constructed the variable REL1, as we

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[19]The results of this approach are not presented in the paper but note that the main results of the paper are confirmed by the estimation of an ordered probit model.

[20]In the French education system, the *baccalauréat* is the degree obtained by students who achieved successfully the secondary school.

[21]The sample has been divided in three groups using the 33th and the 66th percentiles of the distribution of the variable REL1 (see Section 5.2).

[22]The multiple correspondence analyses are a factorial technique, which can be seen as a generalization of the principal component analysis when the variables to be analyzed are categorical variables.

[23] The use of an alternative index, which does not take into account the information provided by these last 5 questions, does not alter our main results.

define it, and it is the first dimension in the Multiple Correspondence Analysis. It is therefore continuous: the higher the value of the variable, the more intense the religious practice.

The use of a factorial technique could be criticized for at least two reasons. First, the technique aggregates information from several variables that sometimes represent quite different aspects that are difficult to combine so that we do not know what the aggregate information represents. In our case, we aggregate information by using a series of categorical variables that all measure the same thing, the intensity of a specific religious practice, and all practices are measured in the same way: the higher the value the more intense the practice. Consequently, we do not think that it is problematic to combine the information provided by these categorical variables. Second, even if an index is easy to interpret (in our case, the higher its value the more intense the religious practice) a precise interpretation of the results obtained in an econometric analysis is difficult. In fact, if we observe that an increase of 'a' in the index leads to an increase of 'b' in the dependent variable, we cannot concretely indicate what an increase of 'a' represents. However, we can get a sense of the importance of this increase by comparing it for instance to the standard deviation of the index. In order to test the validity of our measure and the robustness of our main results, we construct an alternative index using the same categorical variables. We create the variable REL2 by adding up all the categorical variables that compose REL1. We find that the correlation between REL1 and REL2 is very high: 0.96. Table 4 presents the main descriptive statistics for both variables when considering the full sample and several subsamples.

We observe from Table 4 that individuals living in urban areas practice more but the difference with individuals from rural areas is not significant. Moreover, the variance of the practice is slightly higher in cities. Women practice significantly more than men, and among men, the variance of the practice is higher[24].

5.3 Education

Concerning education, we asked the respondent whether she/he has ever been to school. In the affirmative, we asked her/him which is the highest level of education she/he completed. In the case she/he is still at school, we asked for her/his actual level. We used the responses to these questions to construct categories composed of individuals with different levels of education. We constructed several binaries, each of them representing one specific level: NO_EDUC for people who have never been at school or people who just followed lectures in a mosque; PRIMARY for people who achieved a primary school education; SECONDARY for people who achieved the collège education (the first four years of the secondary school) and for people who went to the *lycée* (the three last years of the secondary school) without obtaining the *baccalauréat*; HIGH_EDUC for individuals who completed the *baccalauréat* or a university degree (or an equivalent one). We also constructed a dummy variable EDUC whose value is one for the respondents who achieved the collège education, the respondents characterized by a *lycée* level (with or without the *baccalauréat*) and those who obtained a university degree (or an equivalent degree). This variable is thus a combination of the variables SECONDARY and HIGH_EDUC. Table 5 presents the distribution of the respondents across the different levels of education.

A large part of the sample is composed of people who have not taken part in the education system (43.44%). This is very much in line with the reality of Morocco. In fact, Morocco is characterized by a high illiteracy rate (55.6% of the adult population[25]).

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[24]In order to make sure that our main results are not influenced by a difference in terms of variance between men and women, when working on the whole sample we rescale our measure of religiosity by gender. Prior to the estimation of our model, we divide the measure of religiosity of each respondent by the standard deviation characterizing her/his subsample.

[25]This figure is given by the *Haut Commissariat au Plan* of Morocco for the adult population above 25 years old.

6. Empirical Methodology

Our purpose is to identify the key determinants of support for the law. In our analysis, we use as our main dependent variable a dummy whose value is 1 when the respondent strongly supports the law. The support for the law is conditional, among other things, on the perceived legitimacy of the law, which is, in turn, influenced by a series of factors. In this study, we look at the impact of essentially three variables of interest: education, religion and location. First, we estimate a reduced form model and add successively explanatory variables, and we finally allow for interaction between education and the intensity of religious practice. Whether the effect of the intensity of religious practice on the support for the law varies with the level of education is the effect that we want to test through the interaction term.

Our main dependent variable is a dummy. In this case two kinds of models can be estimated: a linear probability model and a non-linear model (Probit or Logit). The linear probability model considers that the probability of success or failure is a linear function of the independent variables. Consequently, in this model, the marginal effect of each independent variable is constant. Whatever the initial value of the explanatory variable, a unit variation of this variable will always imply the same variation of the probability of success. This is one of the drawbacks of this method. Two more problems can arise. First, the expected probability of success or failure may lie out of the interval [0,1]. Second, one should expect a problem of heteroskedasticity. If it is the case, the estimated coefficients are unbiased but the standard errors are no longer valid for constructing confidence intervals and t statistics (Wooldridge 2002, 248). In the Probit and Logit models, the expected probability is an increasing non-linear function of the explanatory variables. Consequently, the marginal effect induced by a one-unit variation of the explanatory variables is not constant. Moreover, the probability of success is strictly between 0 and 1.

However, the use of an interaction term in non-linear models is slightly more complex than in linear models. In fact, we need to test for the sign and the significance of the interaction term by using the methodology proposed by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). The results concerning the interaction term are not straightforward. We need to base the test about the statistical significance on the estimated cross-partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. For a simple interaction, the test is quite easy. However, we will occasionally use models with a double interaction term. In this case, the test proposed by Norton and al. cannot be directly implemented. Consequently, by using a non-linear model we cannot interpret the coefficient of the interaction terms. A doubt will persist concerning their sign and their significance. In those cases, we will therefore use a linear probability model. Following Wooldridge (2002, 455), "if the main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of x_j on the response probability, averaged across the distribution of x, then the fact that some predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important. The linear probability model need not provide very good estimates of partial effects at extreme values of x"[26]. Moreover, in practice, OLS estimation provides a good guide to which variables are statistically significant (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 495). Finally, a big part of our explanatory variables are discrete variables (most of them are dummies). In this case, the linear probability model is completely general in the sense that we need not worry about fitted probabilities less than zero or greater than one (Wooldridge 2002, 456-457). Our results are corrected for heteroskedasticicity. We provide the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

In models with simple interaction term, we use a probit model. The conditional expected value of the dependent variable is given by the following expression:

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[26] x_j represents the explanatory variable and x the vector of all explanatory variables of the model.

$$E[y|Rel,Educ,Z]=\Phi\left(\beta_R Rel+\beta_E Educ+\beta_{RE} Rel*Educ+Z\varphi\right)=\Phi(u)$$

Where Φ corresponds to a standardized normal cumulative distribution function; *Rel* represents the variable RELIGION which measures the intensity of religious practice; *Educ* corresponds either to the dummy variable HIGH_EDUC, or to the variable EDUC; *Z* is a vector of the characteristics of the individual and the household to which she/he belongs.

We use a linear probability model whenever a double interaction term is introduced. In this case, the model we estimate is characterized by the following specification:

$$y_i=a+\beta_1 Rel_i+\beta_2 Educ_i+\beta_3 X_i+\beta_4 Rel*Educ_i+\beta_5 Rel_i*X_i+\beta_6 Educ_i*X_i+\beta_7 Rel_i*Educ_i*X_i+Z\varphi+\varepsilon_i$$

Where y_i corresponds to the dummy variable STRONG_SUPPORT whose value is 1 if the individual i expressed a strong support to the Code; Rel_i represents the intensity of religious practice; $Educ_i$ corresponds either to the dummy variable HIGH_EDUC, or to the variable EDUC; X_i corresponds successively to several dummy variables whose value is one for some specific social groups for which we want to test if a differential effect exists; Z is a vector of individual i's characteristics and characteristics of his household ; and ε_i is the error term.

First, we estimate our models using the whole sample. In a second step, we create two subsamples according to the gender of the respondents. Finally, we work separately on the sample of single individuals and married people. This allows us to introduce characteristics of parents for the single individuals and characteristics of spouses for the subsample of married people. This last approach allows us to adopt a matching perspective in the analysis of the position adopted by married people.

An alternative approach that we present in Section 7.4 uses the information concerning the support for the law at a disaggregated level. Instead of using as a dependent variable a dummy indicating if the support for the law is strong or not, we use the information we received about the support for each of the eight clauses. We estimate a system of equations composed of eight equations, one equation per clause. Each dependent variable is a dummy whose value is one if the respondent supports the clause. The independent variables are the same in all the equations. We estimate both a SURE model and a multivariate probit. We also estimate a probit model by focusing on the two most debatable clauses of the new Family Code, clauses 3 and 4. The results of this approach are presented in Section 7.4 and Appendix 6.

7. Results

First, this section presents some basic evidence consistent with observations made by anthropologist and political scientists: conservative religious movements attract educated people. We then provide some descriptive statistics to identify the characteristics of men who are ready to accept more equality in rights between men and women. In Section 7.2, we present the main results concerning the identification of the key factors playing a role in the support for the law. The results are presented successfully for the whole sample, the samples of men and women. Section 7.3 presents the results for the samples of single individuals and married people[27]. This last approach allows us to adopt a matching perspective. In Section 7.4, we provide a discussion about alternative approaches for analyzing the support for the law that are based on disaggregated information.

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[27] As robustness checks, we also estimate all the models by using OLS. However, we do not directly report the results in the paper. It is important to note that our results are not sensitive to the estimation technique.

7.1 Introductory evidence

The main hypothesis we want to test is whether the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the likelihood of supporting the Code varies with the level of education. This hypothesis is derived from observations made by anthropologists and political scientists according to whom conservative religious movements attract essentially educated people in urban areas. From our data, it appears that among educated people the mean level of religiosity of those supporting the code is significantly (at 5% level) lower than for those who do not strongly support the Code. For non-educated and poorly educated individuals, we observe the opposite: the mean level of religiosity of those supporting the code is significantly (at 1% level) higher than for those who do not strongly support the Code. The box plots in Graph 1 presents the dispersion of the index measuring the intensity of religious practice for different levels of education (EDUC=1 and EDUC=0) and by making a distinction between those who support the new legislation (STRONG_SUPPORT=1) and those who do not (STRONG_SUPPORT=0). We can perceive the difference in means between people who strongly support the law and those who are not supportive. In the regression analysis we will verify whether these relations persist when controlling for other relevant characteristics of the respondents.

From our data, it clearly appears that women are more supportive than men (see Table 3). However, there is a non-negligible part of men who are in favor of the law (about 20%).In Tables 6 and 7, we provide some insights about the characteristics of those men who are favorable to more equality informal rights between men and women. We separately consider single men and married men in order to introduce information about parents and partners.

It appears that single men who strongly support the law are more educated; they have parents with higher levels of education; they are more likely to have a mother who exercises an income generating activity; they are less likely to have a father coming from rural areas; they are less conservative in terms of religious matters[28]; and they are less in favor of the traditional practice of endogamy. They also appear to be less religious, more urban and of higher socio-economic status but these last differences are not significant.

From Table 7, we observe that married men who strongly support the law are more educated; they match better in terms of education and age with their wives; their wives were older at the time of marriage; they have fewer children; they are less conservative in terms of religious matters; and they are less favorable to the existence of a central authority in the family. They are also less religious, more urban and of higher socio-economic status but these last differences are not significant.

7.2 Main results

Whole sample

Table 8 presents the results obtained by using the full sample. The dependent variable is the dummy STRONG_SUPPORT whose value is one for the respondents strongly supporting the Code. The variable RURAL is a dummy variable whose value is one when the respondent is living in a village. The variable AGE is a continuous variable indicating the age of the respondent. The variable NR_ROOM gives the number of rooms per person living under the same roof as the respondent[29]. This variable is a proxy for the level of wealth of the

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[28]We constructed an index measuring conservative attitudes in terms of religious matters on the basis of several questions: Would you be happy to see your daughters wearing a *niqab*? Would you accept that your daughters do not wear the *hijab*? Do you think that it is acceptable that a man and a woman who are not married and who are not from the same family converse together without the presence of anybody else? In your family, do women wear the *hijab* in the presence of male members of their family other than their husband, sons and brothers? We constructed the index REL_CONSERV by using the Multiple Correspondence Analysis. The higher the value of the index is, the more conservative the individual.

[29]We exclude the toilets, the kitchen and the bathroom.

respondent's family. The variable EDUC is one if the respondent achieved at least the *collège* level of education. PRIMARY and NO_EDUC represent the other levels of education. NO_EDUC has not been introduced in the regression in order to avoid a problem of multicollinearity; it acts as the reference category.

First, we estimate a very simple model in which we want to verify if location per se has an influence on the position of the respondents with respect to the new legislation. In the first regression (regression (1)), we control for the gender of the respondent, her/his age and the socio-economic status. In regression (2), we add the level of education. In regression (3), an index measuring the intensity of religious practice REL1_STV is introduced as an explanatory variable[30]. In the last regression of Table 8 (regression (4)) the variables REL1_STV and EDUC have been interacted. We also introduce regional dummies in order to control any regional unobserved characteristics that may affect the results. These dummies capture, among other things, differences in local customary rules and social norms. For the interaction term, we verify the sign and significance of the coefficient by following the approach proposed by Norton et al. (2004). The results of this test are found in the last two rows of each table.

From Table 8, we observe that one very critical factor is gender; women are more likely to be in favor of the new legislation. This result is quite intuitive given that they appear as the first beneficiaries of the change in the legislation. In fact, the new law improves their status and strengthens their rights. It appears that the better the socio-economic status is, the higher the probability that an individual supports the new Family Code. Location per se does not seem to have any decisive influence on the support of the law. Education beyond a certain threshold level (*collège* degree) leads to a higher probability of supporting the new legislation. A priori, religiosity does not appear as a key determinant of the support for the Code (regression (3)). However, when interacted with the variable EDUC, religiosity seems to matter and distinct effects are revealed depending on the level of education. The intensity of religious practice is positively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the law among non-educated and poorly educated people. For educated people, we observe an additional negative and significant effect (at 1% level). By computing a Wald test, we find that a negative and significant (at 1% level) correlation exists between the intensity of religious practice and the probability of supporting the new legislation among educated people. We thus observe that the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law is different across individuals and depends on their level of education. Another reading of these results is that the positive effect of education is lower when the religious practice is more intense.

These results establish the existence of interaction effects between religion and education. Moreover, in order to achieve an education beyond primary level, rural residents have to move to urbanized areas. Rural people who have received post-primary education have thus been exposed to a new universe and set of experiences. Our results suggest that people who have participated in the urban education system (from urban or rural areas) and are characterized by a high level of religiosity are less likely to support a progressive legal reform. To understand this result, it is essential to focus on the recent evolution of the Moroccan society with a special attention to the education system.

In Morocco, we observe that puritanical movements are essentially present in urban areas where they mainly attract educated people. They have been present in universities since the 80's. These groups exert an important influence on university life: with regard to cultural

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[30]This variable is equivalent to the REL1 index that we describe in Section 5.2 except that we divided the initial index of men and women by respectively the standard deviation of the index for the sample of men and for the sample of women. We rescaled the index as explained in Section 5.2.

activities, the content of the courses and students' daily life, they impose a conservative Islamic view of society, encouraged by the permissiveness of the professors who are de-motivated given their low salaries and the absence of a hierarchy (Dalle, 2004: 706). They also control associations and student unionism (Dalle 2004, 708; Tozy 1999, 181). In the same vein, Clifford Geertz indicates that, in Morocco, fundamentalism is above all present in universities and some outlying regions (Geertz 1968, 7; introduction rewritten in 1991). The influence of conservative movements is also detected at lower levels of education. The decline in the quality of public education leads to the creation of private schools, some of them being linked to religious movements, on the one hand, and to the supply of extracurricular activities by teachers linked to religious groups, on the other hand. They offer, for instance, free extra classes for students who need to catch up and have collective revision sessions. They also work as teachers or members of the administrative staff in public schools31. Moreover, they are active in centers, which train future teachers (Tozy 1999, 180-84). There are essentially two main movements active in the Moroccan society: Al Adl wal Ihsane and the PJD. Even if the two movements are not equally conservative in terms of family matters and women's rights, Willis (2007) points out the fact that many of the members and supporters of the two main religious movements have views that are substantively more radical than the ones expressed by their leadership.

The existence of radical positions among the intellectuals is not new. During the protectorate and at the time of the independence, the return to a scripturalist tradition was initiated by intellectuals in Arabized cities (Geertz, 1968)[32]. Intellectual nationalists of the most important towns of the country joined the scripturalist Allal el-Fassi in order to launch the National Movement, the first mass movement for independence (Geertz, 1968, 95). By referring to the Berber Dahir of 1930, which allowed the Berber mountain tribes to use the customary law in civil disputes while placing them under the French criminal code, Clifford Geertz points out the following fact: Coinciding with the rise of the intense Islamic puritanism of the Egyptian and Afghan-Parisian reformers Abduh and Al-Afghani among the notables of the Arabized towns, and particularly those around the ancient Qarawiyin University at Fez, the Berber Policy and its implied threat to Islam stimulated the growth of nationalism under the banner of defending the faith against European-sponsored secularization and Christianization (Geertz, 1975, 299). Furthermore, Lapidus stresses the fact that Moroccan reformers, inspired by Muhammed Abduh, began an educational movement in Fez, Rabat, Salé, and other towns, founding schools to teach Arabic grammar, ethics, logic, Islamic history, and arithmetic, but not modern sciences. The Salafiya stressed the purification of Islam, opposing to saint worship, and defense against Western cultural encroachment (Lapidus, 2002, 609).

On the one hand, the movement for independence opposed to the occupying forces was based on religion: this is the Islam of the Opposition as referred to by Clifford Geertz. On the other hand, the scripturalist doctrine was not exclusively oriented against the western values but also against traditional practices such as Maraboutism (Geertz 1968, 81, Lapidus2002, 609). As for the Monarchy, it refuses to bring its position into line with the salafi nationalism defended by the Istiqlal movement and allows religious pluralism (Tozy 1999, 168). In rural communities, the practice of saint worship and the existence of brotherhood persist. In cities, the indigenous population is eager to distinguish itself from the customary version of Islam (inspired by Sufism) as adopted by rural populations. Rural-urban migrants, in order to be accepted into the urban society adopt puritanical attitudes inspired by the scripturalist strand

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[31]Tozy highlights the fact that in a high school of Casablanca, teachers and administrative members linked to religious movements were able to create classrooms composed by students abiding their ideas and receiving favourable treatment. Thus, they create an elite whose school success is linked to their religious investment (Tozy 1999, 183).

[32]Geertz considers, however, that the battle between scripturalism and maraboutism was initiated around 1900. Since 1870, a Berber student coming from a rural area and having studied in Egypt defended (at the Qarawiyine University of Fez) a literal interpretation of religious texts. The *Salafi* ideas began their influence (Geertz 1968, 87).

of Islam. Thus, the socialization of those coming from rural areas went through the adoption of a puritanical behavior (Tozy 1999, 168).

To sum up our argument, it seems that two different mechanisms are likely to explain our results. First, educated people are living in cities or have been in contact with urban populations for a long period, and cities are dominated by a scripturalist religious tradition. Second, the education system is the object of cultural activism of radical movements. In universities, they are controlling student organizations. Even if real activists represent a small minority of the students, their ideas may spread to other students sensitive to their positions (Tozy 1999, 170-74).

Finally, we constructed two more variables: MARRIAGE_MINOR whose value is one if the respondent's mother or one of his/her sisters married before 18 years old, and POLYGAMY whose value is one if the respondent has at least one polygamist in his/her family. These variables measure the degree of conservatism of the family. By adding these variables as controls in our model, the results concerning the interaction term is robust. The results are presented in Appendix 4. In this appendix, we also present the results concerning the family structure: the variable SISTER_PROP gives the proportion of sisters among all respondent's brothers and sisters. Two contradictory expectations could be formulated concerning the family structure. The first one is based on the idea that the more women you have within your family the more you will be open to an improvement in women's rights because you become more sensitive to their status in the family and in society. On the contrary, if boys represent the minority, they may benefit from a privileged position in the family and play the role of traditional guardians who monitor their sisters. Consequently, the effect is not clear. From Table 17 (in Appendix 4), we observe that family structure does not actually play a significant role. Moreover, the interaction term still appears with a negative sign and it is significant at 1% level.

The analysis of the whole sample concludes to the existence of a robust negative correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the probability of strongly supporting the Code among educated people, even after controlling for various covariates and including regional dummies.

Men

For the sample of men, we also follow a stepwise procedure. We first estimate a basic model containing as explanatory variables RURAL and some additional controls. We then introduce sequentially the other variables of interest concerning education, religiosity and the interaction between the two. For the sample composed of men, the index measuring the intensity of religious practice takes into account an additional practice that essentially characterizes men: mosque attendance. The index is REL1_MALE.

Regarding the variables measuring education, we initially took those who have no education as the reference group (NO_EDUC = 1). This is done in regression (6) where the coefficient of HIGH_EDUC appears with a positive sign and it is significant at 1% level. SECONDARY coefficient is positive and significant at 5% level. PRIMARY coefficient is not significant. We then change the reference group in regression (7) which now corresponds to those who have completed the *collège* degree or who have reached the *lycée* without having obtained the *baccalauréat* (SECONDARY = 1). In regression (7), the effect of HIGH_EDUC is not significant. On the other hand, PRIMARY coefficient is significant at 5% level and appears with a negative sign. Education is positively and significantly correlated with the support of the Code only above a certain level (at least the *collège* level). We therefore decided for regression (8), to use the variable EDUC (which is equal to 1 for individuals who achieved at

least the *collège* level of education) for the construction of the interaction term with the variable REL1_MALE.

For men, it appears that education plays a significant role in supporting the law: men who have at least achieved the collège level of education present a higher probability of supporting the new legislation . Furthermore, the coefficient of our variable of interest, the interaction between the intensity of religious practice and the fact of having reached a certain level of education appears with a negative sign. Moreover, a Wald test confirms that the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the likelihood of supporting the Code is negative and significant at 1% level. The existence of a distinct effect of the intensification of religious practice is thus confirmed: a more intense religious practice when the individual has reached a certain level of education is negatively correlated with the probability of supporting the law.

Women

In the models estimated on the subsample of women, we introduced an additional variable ACT_REV. The variable ACT_REV is a dummy variable whose value is 1 when the respondent earns money by exercising a professional activity (formal or informal). Through this variable, we want to verify whether being financially more independent or having an economic value gives more confidence to women to assert their rights. The results for women are presented in Table 10.

For women, the decisive factors appear to be the socio-economic status and the fact of exercising an income generating activity. In fact, the respondent's socio-economic status, approximated by the number of rooms per person, is significantly and positively correlated with the probability of supporting the law. For women, it therefore appears that the socio-economic status is a more decisive influence than the level of education. The fact that women are engaged in producing an income is also associated positively and significantly with women's likelihood of supporting the law. The latter result is rather intuitive since a woman who acquires a minimum of financial independence will be encouraged to claim rights that protect her status within the family.

The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at 5% level. For educated women, the intensification of religious practice leads to a negative additional effect with respect to the non-educated or poorly educated individuals. However, among the educated women the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the likelihood of supporting the Code is not significant. Among non-educated or poorly educated people, this correlation is positive and significant at 10% level.

The sample of women needs a more in-depth analysis. The first additional hypothesis we want to test is the following: is the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support for the law different for educated women from rural areas with respect to those living in cities? In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate a linear probability model where we use a double interaction term composed of the variables RELIGION, EDUC and RURAL. The results are presented in regression (15) of Table 10.

It appears that a negative correlation exists between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law for educated women but this correlation is significant (at 5% level) only for women coming from rural areas. Moreover, educated women from rural areas are more likely to support the Code (the correlation is significant at 5% level). An increase of about 1 unity of the index measuring the intensity of religious practice compensates the positive effect of education. Such an increase corresponds to 1.23 standard deviation of the index; that gives an idea of the importance of the increase that is needed to cancel the positive effect of education. Bearing in mind the influential effect of religious movements in the education

system, one may suspect that those women coming from rural areas are more sensitive to new external influences. In fact, they are exposed to a new universe and set of experiences, which may make them disoriented, and the religious movements may offer them a comforting refuge[33]. On the other hand, by pursuing their education beyond the primary level, they get in touch with a more conservative environment in what concerns religious matters that characterizes cities. They might adapt their positions for socialization purposes. Despite the fact that the living environment is not significantly correlated with the probability of supporting the new legislation, we find some interesting results concerning the living environment when we interact the variable RURAL with the variables RELIGION and EDUC.

We estimate the same model for the sub-sample of men. A negative correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law is observed for educated men from both rural (at 10%) and urban (at 5%) areas. One may wonder whether the result concerning urban men is essentially due to men from rural areas who migrated to cities. However, if we look at the data, it appears that 85% of the urban men were born in the city where they live, 12% were born in another city and only 3% of them were born in a village. Nevertheless, we do not have information about the entire life cycle of the individuals and do not know if being born in a city means being raised in a city. Moreover, we find a positive effect of education in both areas. In urban areas, an increase of about 1.51 of the index measuring the intensity of religious practice is needed to entirely compensate the positive effect of education. In rural areas, the increase is of 0.85. The standard deviation of the index REL1_MALE is 1.002; that gives an idea of the importance of the increase that is needed to cancel the positive effect of education.

A second additional hypothesis we want to test for women is whether the negative correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law characterizes essentially educated women coming from low socio-economic background. We want to test the idea expressed by Naciri (1998) according to which the recourse to religion represents a strategy of resistance for educated women from modest social background who have higher aspirations. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate a linear probability model where we use a double interaction term composed of the variables RELIGION, EDUC and NR_ROOM a socio-economic proxy. Actually, in order to take into account the socio-economic background, we constructed several dummy variables taking the value 1 if the respondent is above the mean, the median (the median is lower than the mean) and the first quartile of the distribution of the variable NR_ROOM. We used these dummy variables in interaction with the variables RELIGION and EDUC. The results we obtained are not convincing in the sense that it does not seem that the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the probability of strongly supporting the code among educated women depends on their socio-economic background[34].

From regression (14), we also observe that the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law among people with little or no education is positive and significant (at 10% level). By comparing educated women (those who at least achieved the *collège* level of education) and non-educated or poorly educated women (achieving primary level education), we thus have an opposite relationship between the intensity of the religious practice and the likelihood of supporting the Code. To understand this result, we have to highlight two facts. First, the majority of educated women are urban (86%) while the majority

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[33]We do not believe that there is a selection bias due to the fact that among educated women from rural areas the most conservative stay living in villages and the most progressive in cities. In fact, in our sample, among urban women, only 12% were born in villages and only a few of them are educated beyond the *collège* level of education. Actually, they represent 1.37% of urban women and 3.2% of educated urban women.

[34]We do not report these results in the paper.

of non-educated or poorly educated women live in rural areas (61.3%). The understanding of Islam is different across the residential environments: Sufi and 'Maraboutic' Islam in rural areas and puritan scripturalist Islam in cities. Given this difference, an intensification of the religious practice is likely to have distinct meanings depending on where you are living. Moreover, in regression (15), we observe that the positive and significant correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law is essentially true for non-educated or poorly educated women living in rural areas (significant at 1% level). Second, during the interviews, we realized that less educated people tend to mistake tradition for religion. We therefore suspect that when poorly educated people do not practice religion intensely, they are likely to be badly informed about religious prescriptions. They therefore oppose the law because they think that it is not in accordance with religious prescriptions even though it is. If they practice more intensely, they are more likely to be informed about religious prescriptions and they can therefore understand that the law is essentially deviating from the custom. Moreover, Lawrence Rosen (1995), an anthropologist who did a lot of work on Morocco explains that customs that are not clearly prohibited by Islam are considered as being themselves part of Islamic law. He argues that "North Africans commonly believe that local practices that are not forbidden by Islam do not stand apart from the formal religion but are, in the strictest sense of the term, themselves Islamic". According to him, this could be explained by an inclusive approach during the spread of Islam among divergent local traditions. Moreover, Rosen (1995) argues that the historical power of this amalgamative mentality goes beyond the missionizing appeal of Islam. He adds: "In the 1930's, when the French tried to divide Moroccans by placing Arabs under Islamic law and Berbers under customary Berber law, the Berbers were deeply offended: they insisted that since their practices were permissible within Islamic law they were Islamic law, a viewpoint that contributed markedly to the Berber's involvement in efforts to achieve national independence from the French" (p. 207). In the same vein, Platteau (2011) describes the cultural hybridization of Islam as a process through which Islamic law has been shaped by local customs, on the one hand, and customary rules have been implicitly endorsed by religion unless they are expressly rejected, on the other hand (p 53).

As a final result, it appears that, women who have one of their sisters or a mother who married very young are more likely to strongly support the new Code (significant at 5% level). These results are presented in Appendix 4.

7.3 Secondary results

Single individuals

In this section, the analysis is focused on single individuals. This allows us to control the characteristics of the parents as we suspect that the family environment may play a role in the adoption of liberal or conservative attitudes by children[35]. Regression (16) presents the results for our baseline model characterized by an interaction term between education and the index measuring the intensity of religious practice. We then introduce sequentially additional explanatory variables. FATHER_EDUC and MOTHER_EDUC represent respectively the level of education of the father and the mother. These variables vary between 1 and 4: 1 for people without any formal education; 2 for parents who achieved the primary level of education; 3 for those who received a *collège* degree and/or attended the *lycée* without receiving the *baccalauréat*; and 4 for parents who received the *baccalauréat* or a university degree. MOTHER_BIRTH_RURAL and FATHER_BIRTH_RURAL are dummy variables whose value is one when respectively the mother and the father are born in a village. MOTHER_ACT_REV and FATHER_ACT_REV are dummy variables, which take the value 1 if the mother and the father respectively exercise an income generating activity.

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[35] Almost all single individuals of our sample are still living with their parents (96.3%).

We observe from Table 11 that education is a key factor and even a basic level of education plays a significant role. In fact, the primary level of education appears with a positive and significant coefficient. Gender is also decisive; women are more likely to strongly support the Code. The sign of the correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the probability of supporting the new legislation depends on the level of education achieved by the individual. We find that a positive correlation exists for non-educated or poorly educated individuals[36]. An additional negative and significant effect exists for educated people (people who at least achieved the *collège* level of education). Furthermore, Wald tests confirm that, among educated people, a negative and significant (at 5% level) correlation exists between the intensity of religious practice and the likelihood of strongly supporting the law. This correlation is robust to changes in the specification of the model.

We additionally observe that the higher the education level of the parents, the higher the probability of strongly supporting the law (regressions (17) and (18)). It is not clear that parents with rural origin have a more distinct influence on their children than urban parents. We find that having a father born in a village is associated with a lower probability of supporting the Code when controlling for the place of birth of the mother. However, this relation is only significant at 10% level. Finally, we find that individuals who have a mother exercising an income generating activity are more likely to support the new legislation. The father's activity does not seem to play a role.

Married individuals

In models estimated for married people, we introduce characteristics of spouses in order to follow a matching perspective. In particular, we verify whether spouses who match in terms of education and age differ in their position with respect to the new Family Code. The variable MATCH is a dummy variable whose value is one if the spouses have achieved the same level of education; and DIST_AGE gives the difference in age between the husband and his wife. It thus takes positive values when the husband is older than his wife. The results of this approach are presented in Table 12.

First, we estimate our baseline model comprising an interaction term between education and the index measuring the intensity of religious practice (regression (21)). We then introduce our 'matching variables', MATCH and DIST_AGE (regression (22) to (24)). We finally focus on the effect of matching in terms of education and verify if the 'matching effect' depends on the level of education achieved by the spouses (regression (25)). We test this by introducing an interaction term between education and the variable MATCH.

Women are more likely to support the new legislation. The higher the socio-economic status is the higher the probability of strongly supporting the law. Education above a certain threshold, the *collège* degree, is positively associated with the probability of supporting the Code; and this is only verified for individuals who match with their partner in terms of education. An alternative way of reading this last result is that matching in terms of education is positively associated with the support of the law only if the spouses have reached a certain threshold level of education.

From regression (21), we observe that among non-educated and poorly educated individuals, no significant correlation exists between the probability of supporting the Code and the intensity of religious practice. Concerning this correlation, an additional negative effect characterizes educated people. We can equivalently assert that an intensification of the religious practice reduces the positive effect of education. Nevertheless, among educated people, no significant negative correlation exists between the intensity of religious practice

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[36]By estimating a model where education and the index measuring the intensity of religious practice are interacted with the variable RURAL, we observe that this positive correlation characterizes people living in rural areas. We thus find the same kind of results as for the sample of women. These last results are not presented in the paper.

and the likelihood of supporting the law (p-value = 0.13). These results hold when we control for the distance in age between the spouses and for the fact that spouses match or not in terms of education.

By looking carefully at additional descriptive statistics for married people, it seems that there are inter-group differences between educated people who match in terms of education with their partner and those who do not match. In fact, it appears that among educated people those who do not match with their partner in terms of education are both more religious and less likely to support the new legislation (see Table 13). Furthermore, for educated people who do not match, we observe from descriptive statistics that an intra-group negative correlation also exists between the intensity of religious practice and the probability of supporting the law: the more religious they are, the less supportive of the Code they are. However, the samples are too small to show significant correlation through regression analysis.

The distance in terms of education could be interpreted as a proxy for the bargaining power of each spouse. Among educated people, if women are as educated as their husband, they are more likely to assert their rights and less likely to adopt a traditional gender role within the household37. For educated men who are married to educated women, the net benefit of abandoning a traditional attitude is likely to be positive. Concerning this last point, Amato and Booth (1995) explain that when husbands adopt less traditional attitudes, their perceived marital quality increases.

There is probably also an auto-selection process, educated women with less traditional attitudes would prefer to marry men with more liberalized ideas and those are more likely to be among educated people. These men are less likely to oppose changes claimed by women, and therefore spouses are less likely to get into conflict. The same idea applies to progressive educated men.

Husbands with more traditional attitudes may be willing to avoid women who are assertive and may feel threatened by educated women who are more likely to endorse a career. Consequently, they would prefer to marry a woman with a lower level of education. Finally, educated women who marry men who are less educated are probably initially less assertive and less opposed to a traditional way of organizing family life.

Finally, we observe that educated people who do not match with their partner in terms of education are more conservative in terms of religious matters. The difference in mean of the index REL_CONSERV between the two groups is significant at 1% level.

As a final result, it does not appear that married men with daughters adopt a more favorable position with respect to the law. Actually, the fact of having daughters is not related to the support of law neither for fathers nor mothers. Lastly it appears that women who married at an older age are more likely to support the law[38].

Single vs. married individuals

Concerning our main result, it appears that the negative and significant correlation between the intensity of religious practice and the support of the law among educated people characterizes essentially single individuals. This result is consistent with one of the arguments we developed to explain our main findings. In fact, we suspect that the implication of religious movements in the education system may at least partly explain why educated people, when they are very religious, are the most reactionary. These religious movements became very active in the education system at the end of the 80's. For instance, a movement

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[37]Non-traditional behavior implies shared responsibilities and egalitarianism.

[38]These last results are not reported in Table 12.

like *Al Adl wal Ihsan* has gained influence since the 80's among university students and students' unions. It is largely recognized that the association's recruitment activities are particularly concentrated in the educational sector, targeting teachers and students (Bekkaoui and Larémont 2011, 45). The PJD is also active in universities through its student branch *Al Wahda wa Tawasul* (Bekkaoui and Larémont 2011). Consequently, only the youngest individuals of our sample are likely to have been in touch with these movements through the education system[39]; and single individuals are on average significantly younger than married people[40].

7.4 Sensitivity tests

System of equations

An alternative approach in the study of support for the law is the use of information at a disaggregated level. In this approach, we use the information we obtained about the support for each of the eight clauses. We estimate a system of equations composed of eight equations, one equation per clause. Table 14 summarizes the information concerning the support to each clause.

Each dependent variable (SUPPORT) is a dummy whose value is one if the respondent supports the clause. The independent variables are the same in all the equations. We estimate a SURE model on the entire sample by controlling for several covariates[41]. This disaggregated approach allows us to test for the sensibility of our main result and the results concerning various covariates. The results of the SURE model are presented in Table 19 in Appendix 6.

The coefficient of the interaction term appears with a negative sign and it is significant at 5% level for the 3rd, the 4th and the 7th clause. Moreover, Wald tests confirm that a negative and significant (at 5% level) correlation between the likelihood of supporting the law and the intensity of religious practice exists for clauses 3, 4 and 6. This correlation is significant at 10% level for clause 5. By looking at Table 14, one can observe that the effect is significant for the most debatable clauses (those for which the adherence is lower). These clauses are also considered by a high proportion of respondents as not being in accordance with religious principles of Islam (61% for clause 3; 56% for clause 4; 22% for clause 6; 11% for cause 7 against less than 10% for the other clauses).

It also appears that women are systematically more likely to support the law except for clause 4 concerning guardianship[42]. Education (bac or university degree) is positively related to the probability of supporting the law for the clauses concerning family responsibilities (clauses 1), the obedience of women to their husband (clause 3), divorce (clause 7) and the sharing of property after divorce (clause 8). Primary education is also related positively with the support of the law for clauses 7 and 8 but also for the most debatable clauses 3 and 4. Secondary education plays a positive role for clauses 3, 7 and 8. People from rural areas are less likely to support the law for clauses 1 and 5. These are the clauses about the joint responsibility of spouses, and the conditions imposed on the marriage of minors in age. The higher the socio-economic status is, the higher the probability of supporting clause 3 which put an end to the obedience of women to their husband. There is a generational effect for clauses 4, 5 and 7, in

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[39]We estimated our model for respondents who are less than 40 years old and those who are more than 40. The negative correlation between the probability of supporting the law and the intensity of religious practice among educated people is only verified for those who are less than 40. Regarding educated people, it seems that a generational effect is at play.

[40]The mean age of single individuals is 25, and the mean age of married people is 44.

[41]We also estimate a multivariate probit to verify the robustness of our results. These results are presented in Appendix 6.

[42]From fieldwork, we got the feeling that there form, which allows women to marry without the official consent of their guardian, is perceived as being too radical (even if the marriage without a guardian is not imposed, it is just a choice that could be made by women). The respect of parents was mentioned; and some women explain that guardianship provides them a protection in the relation with their in-laws and their husbands.

the sense that the older an individual the less supportive he is. Those clauses concern guardianship, conditions imposed on the marriage of minor in age and divorce.

In sum, by looking at different elements of the law, we observe that the key factors are not the same from one clause to another, except gender, which appears to be a critical factor. However, we observe that our main result is confirmed for the most disputable clauses.

Biprobit

A last approach we want to discuss is an approach in which we focus our analysis on the two most debatable clauses: clause 3 concerning the end of the obedience of women to their husband and clause 4 which gives women the right to marry without the official consent of their guardian. The results are presented in Table 21 in Appendix 6.

Our main results are confirmed in the sense that the interaction term appears with a negative sign and it is significant at 5% level for both clauses. Wald tests confirm the existence of a negative and significant (at 5% level for clause 3 and 10% level for clause 4) correlation between the probability of supporting the law and the intensity of religious practice among educated people. Socio-economic status and education only play a role for clause 3. However, primary education is positively related to the likelihood of supporting clause 4. Some other results confirm what we found in the system of equations: the probability of supporting clause 4 is not higher for women, and older people are less likely to support it.

8. Conclusion

The question of the role of modern law in triggering social change is particularly important in developing countries. One of the conditions that may allow social change is the identification of the agents, particularly those who are favored by new legislation, with the law. When a law, which favors some sections of the population, is implemented, it is expected that the population targeted by the law will abide by the new legislation. Conversely, the groups whose privileges are reduced or lost are likely to oppose the reform. In reality, we observe that it is not necessarily the case. We therefore think that this surprising fact deserves an empirical analysis in order to produce some evidence about the underlying determinants of support (or the lack of support) for the law.

In this paper, we focus our analysis on the reform of the Family Code in Morocco. The new Family Code aims at improving women's status by assigning her a new role in the family and granting her new rights. The legislation is religious-inspired and the reform of the Code has largely been justified by a reinterpretation of the *Quran*, in reference not only to the *Maliki* School - the dominant school in Morocco – but also to the other schools of Sunnite Islam.

We emphasize two alternative scenarios. The first one is the naïve one according to which rural men with a low level of education and intense religious practice express a lower support for the new Family Code. The second one is based on observations made by anthropologists and political scientists: religious puritanical movements are essentially present in urban areas and attract educated people. We use a unique database created from a survey we conducted in three regions of Morocco in 2008 to provide some evidence about the factors, which drive conservative positions with respect to a progressive legal reform. Our results sustain the existence of interactions between religion, education and in some extent location. We found that the relationship between these factors and the support of the law is much more subtle than what naïve beliefs would state.

We show that the intensity of the religious practice is negatively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the Code, but only for educated people. Two potential explanations can be thought of. First, educated people are living in cities or have been in touch with urban populations for a long period, and cities are dominated by a scripturalist religious tradition. The socialization of those coming from rural areas went through the adoption of a puritanical

behavior (Tozy 1999). Second, the education system is the object of cultural activism of radical movements. In universities, they control student organizations. Even if real activists represent a small minority of the students, other students may take their ideas into consideration sensitive to their positions.

Additionally, it appears that the reactionary behavior among the educated individuals characterizes more clearly single people than those who are married. This actually reflects a generational difference among educated people. We argue that this observation is consistent with the idea that religious movements active in the education system since the late 80's promote conservative attitudes.

Moreover, we show that education per se is positively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the Code but essentially for men. For women, it appears that the socio-economic status is a more decisive factor than the level of education. The fact that women are engaged in producing an income is also significantly related to a higher likelihood of supporting the law.

Location per se is not significantly correlated with the support of the law. However, among educated women, the negative relationship between the intensity of religious practice and the support for the Code is stronger (both in intensity and statistical significance) for women residing in rural areas.

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Figure 1: Support of the Law, Religiosity and Education

EDUC=1 (80% of them are urban)   EDUC=0 (66% of them are rural)

Table 1: Distribution of the Sample across Regions and Residential Environments

	Urban	Rural	Total
CASA	123	55	178
	(69.10%)	(30.90%)	
TETOUAN	91	94	185
	(49.19%)	(50.81%)	
OUARZAZATE	60	119	179
	(33.52%)	(66.48%)	
Total	274	268	542
	(50.55%)	(49.45%)	

Table 2: Distribution across Gender and Marital Status

	Single	Married	Divorced	Separated	Widow	TOTAL
Men	97	145	6	1	3	252
	(38.49%)	(57.54%)	(2.38%)	(0.40%)	(1.19%)	(46.58%)
Women	72	148	43	6	20	289
	(24.91%)	(51.21%)	(14.88%)	(2.08%)	(6.92%)	(53.42%)
	169	293	49	7	23	541
Total	(31.24%)	(54.16%)	(9.06%)	(1.29%)	(4.25%)	

Table 3: Proportion of Respondents Strongly Supporting the Code

Categories	Nr. Obs.	STRONG_SUPPORT (%)	P-value
Whole sample	541	33.83	
Women	289	46.71	0.000
Men	251	19.05	
Rural	267	32.96	0.674
Urban	274	34.67	
Without education	235	33.62	0.928
Primary	110	32.73	0.785
Secondary	115	33.04	0.842
Bac or university degree	81	37.04	0.508
Low religiosity	178	32.02	0.535
Moderate religiosity	179	37.99	0.150
High religiosity	184	31.52	0.416

Table 4: Indices Measuring the Intensity of Religious Practice

Categories	Nr. Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
			Religion			
REL1						
Full sample	541	-0,0017	1,0016	0,1625	-2,2762	1,9162
Rural	267	-0,0315	0,9348	0,1239	-2,2762	1,7869
Urban	274	0,0274	1,0635	0,2129	-2,2044	1,9162
P-value = 0.494						
Women	289	0,2036	0,8112	0,2895	-2,2762	1,9162
Men	252	-0,2371	1,1397	-0,0736	-2,2762	1,8195
P-value = 0.000						
REL2						
Full sample	541	18.3993	8.8942	19	1	43
Rural	267	18.1798	8.1340	19	1	41
Urban	274	18.6131	9.5873	19	2	43
P-value =0.572						
Women	289	20.0830	7.7100	20	1	43
Men	252	16.4683	9.7455	16	1	41
P-value = 0.000						

Table 5: Distribution of the Respondents by Level of Education

	No education	Koranic school	Primary	*Collège*	*Lycée* (without *Bac*)	*Lycée* (with *Bac*)	University	Total
Men	51	27	50	41	26	35	22	252
	(20.24%)	(10.71%)	(19.84%)	(16.27%)	(10.32%)	(13.89%)	(8.72%)	
Women	151	6	60	36	12	10	14	289
	(52.25%)	(2.08%)	(20.76%)	(12.46%)	(4.15%)	(3.46%)	(4.84%)	
Total	202	33	110	77	38	45	36	541
	(37.34%)	(6.10%)	(20.33%)	(14.23%)	(7.02%)	(8.32%)	(6.66%)	

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Single Men

	NOT SUPPORTIVE	SUPPORTIVE	P-value
REL1	-0.5921	-0.8922	0.1443
PRIMARY	15.58%	0%	0.059*
EDUC	66.23%	100%	0.002***
RURAL	46.75%	30.00%	0.178
NB_ROOM	0.8412	0.9938	0.2112
MOTHER_EDUC	1.3425	2.15	0.0005***
FATHER_EDUC	1.6866	2.8333	0.0000***
MOTHER_AGE_MAR	18.5333	19.4167	0.2281
FATHER_AGE_MAR	25.25	24.727	0.4078
MOTHER_ACT_REV	8.33%	44.44%	0.000***
FATHER_ACT_REV	81.25%	100%	0.060*
MOTHER_BIRTH_RURAL	38.96%	20%	0.113
FATHER_BIRTH_RURAL	37.66%	15%	0.055*
REL_CONSERV	0.1558	-0.2701	0.0461**
ENDOG_MAR	70%	95%	0.022**
FAM_AUTORITY	14.67%	20%	0.561

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Married Men

	NOT SUPPORTIVE	SUPPORTIVE	P-value
REL1	0.0827	-0.1991	0.1301
PRIMARY	27.3%	18.18%	0.385
EDUC	30.63%	50.00%	0.079*
RURAL	55.86%	45.45%	0.371
NB_ROOM	0.9125	1.0009	0.2403
DIST_AGE	7.4182	5.5909	0.0545*
DIST_EDUC	0.4324	0.0909	0.0184**
WIFE_AGE_MAR	19.7615	22.3182	0.0178**
HUSB_AGE_MAR	27.0991	27.9091	0.2795
WIFE_ACT_REV	10.91%	4.55%	0.360
HUSB_ACT_REV	90.09%	81.82	0.262
NR_CHILD	3.5766	2.5455	0.0304**
DAUGHTER	72.97%	68.18%	0.647
REL_CONSERV	-0.0939	-0.4831	0.0695*
ENDOG_MAR	62.63%	78.95	0.171
FAM_AUTORITY	15.32%	33.33%	0.050**

Table 8: The Whole Sample[43]

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT				
	(1) Whole sample	(2) Whole sample	(3) Whole sample	(4) Whole sample	Average Marginal Effects
FEMALE	0.768***	0.885***	0.897***	0.952***	0.3106
	(0.119)	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.136)	
AGE	-0.00618	-0.00248	-0.00201	-0.00257	-0.0008
	(0.00380)	(0.00408)	(0.00432)	(0.00440)	
NR_ROOM	0.184**	0.174**	0.174**	0.176**	0.0565
	(0.0761)	(0.0747)	(0.0745)	(0.0755)	
RURAL	-0.112	0.0493	0.0469	0.102	0.0328
	(0.124)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.145)	
PRIMARY		0.101	0.0989	0.175	0.0572
		(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.168)	
REL1_STV			-0.0217	0.177**	0.0568
			(0.0642)	(0.0830)	
EDUC		0.404**	0.406**	0.476***	0.1528
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.177)	
REL1_STV_EDUC				-0.460***	-0.1475
				(0.125)	
CONSTANT	-0.903***	-1.400***	-1.426***	-1.570***	
	(0.206)	(0.294)	(0.305)	(0.309)	
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Nr. Observations	540	540	540	540	
Pseudo-R^2	0.0851	0.0933	0.0934	0.1141	
Sign of the IT[a]				Neg.	
Significance of the IT[a]				***	

Notes: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses.; a: IT = interaction term

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[43]Appendices 2 and 3 provide robustness checks using respectively REL2 as an alternative measure of religiosity and HIGH_EDUC as an alternative education threshold.

Table 9: The Sample Composed by Men

	(5) Men sample	(6) Men sample	(7) Men sample	(8) Men sample	(9) Men sample	(10) Men sample	Average Marginal Effects
	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT						
RURAL	-0.298	0.0502	0.0502	0.0505	0.0934	0.0523	0.0126
	(0.198)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.231)	(0.238)	
AGE	-0.00547	0.00387	0.00387	0.00407	0.00853	0.00608	0.0015
	(0.00613)	(0.00669)	(0.00669)	(0.00668)	(0.00719)	(0.00751)	
NR_ROOM	0.156	0.115	0.115	0.118	0.120	0.127	0.0307
	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.115)	
PRIMARY		0.0570	-0.721**	0.0593	0.0796	0.100	0.0246
		(0.325)	(0.313)	(0.325)	(0.334)	(0.331)	
SECONDARY		0.778**					
		(0.324)					
HIGH_EDUC		0.859***	0.0804				
		(0.310)	(0.244)				
NO_EDUCATION			-0.778**				
			(0.324)				
EDUC				0.821***	0.890***	0.852***	0.2103
				(0.293)	(0.303)	(0.308)	
REL1_MALE					-0.185*	0.181	0.0435
					(0.103)	(0.169)	
REL1_MALE_EDUC						-0.559***	-0.1477
						(0.203)	
CONSTANT	-0.774***	-1.809***	-1.030***	-1.828***	-2.120***	-2.062***	
	(0.281)	(0.456)	(0.294)	(0.454)	(0.493)	(0.490)	
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Nr. Observations	251	251	251	251	251	251	251
Pseudo-R^2	0.0333	0.0752	0.0752	0.0747	0.0873	0.1151	
Sign of the IT[a]						Neg.	
Significance of the IT[a]						***	

Notes: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Table 10: The Sample Composed by Women

	(11) Women sample	(12) Women sample	(13) Women sample	(14) Women sample	Average Marginal Effects	(15) Women sample (OLS)
			DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT			
RURAL	0.0208	0.108	0.140	0.172	0.0649	-0.0300
	(0.160)	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.189)		(0.0839)
AGE	-0.00544	-0.00348	-0.00513	-0.00542	-0.0020	-0.00249
	(0.00492)	(0.00529)	(0.00555)	(0.00560)		(0.00214)
NR_ROOM	0.207**	0.199**	0.199**	0.201**	0.0757	0.0693**
	(0.0978)	(0.0986)	(0.0993)	(0.101)		(0.0333)
PRIMARY		0.167	0.191	0.172	0.0859	0.0512
		(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.189)		(0.0846)
EDUC		0.105	0.106	0.209	0.0786	-0.0436
		(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.228)		(0.102)
REL1			0.114	0.218*	0.0823	-0.0326
			(0.102)	(0.124)		(0.0687)
REL1_EDUC				-0.356*	-0.1335	0.0244
				(0.208)		(0.0945)
ACT_REV		0.359**	0.369**	0.376**	0.1436	0.146**
		(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.175)		(0.0658)
REL1_RURAL						0.189**
						(0.0855)
RURAL_EDUC						0.319**
						(0.152)
REL1_EDUC_RURAL						-0.465***
						(0.151)
CONSTANT	-0.277	-0.532	-0.511	-0.566		0.392***
	(0.262)	(0.345)	(0.347)	(0.350)		(0.140)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Nr. Observations	289	289	289	289	289	289
Pseudo-R^2	0.0243	0.0370	0.0401	0.0468		
Sign of the IT[a]				Neg.		
Significance of the IT[a]				**		
R-squared						0.0892

Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Table 11: Single Individuals

	(16) Single individuals	Average Marginal Effects	(17) Single individuals	(18) Single individuals	(19) Single individuals	(20) Single individuals
	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT
FEMALE	1.208***	0.3638	1.328***	1.285***	1.296***	1.242***
	(0.248)		(0.287)	(0.260)	(0.261)	(0.300)
RURAL	0.0794	0.0220	0.312	0.249	0.289	0.0965
	(0.298)		(0.366)	(0.328)	(0.399)	(0.353)
AGE	-0.0222	-0.0061	-0.0499*	-0.0244	-0.0239	-0.0389
	(0.0201)		(0.0287)	(0.0220)	(0.0197)	(0.0326)
NR_ROOM	0.194	0.0536	0.190	0.150	0.172	0.203
	(0.131)		(0.139)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.256)
PRIMARY	1.053***	0.3061	1.145***	1.034***	1.128***	1.143**
	(0.373)		(0.420)	(0.385)	(0.380)	(0.449)
EDUC	1.090***	0.2545	1.094**	0.937**	1.183***	1.137**
	(0.374)		(0.448)	(0.392)	(0.378)	(0.470)
REL1_STV	0.524**	0.1450	0.491*	0.480**	0.491**	0.513**
	(0.211)		(0.259)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.244)
REL1_STV_EDUC	-0.867***	-0.1880	-0.975***	-0.816***	-0.835***	-0.918***
	(0.248)		(0.294)	(0.256)	(0.252)	(0.284)
FATHER_EDUC			0.392***			
			(0.140)			
MOTHER_EDUC				0.346***		
				(0.134)		
MOTHER_BIRTH_RURAL					0.426	
					(0.361)	
FATHER_BIRTH_RURAL					-0.702*	
					(0.389)	
MOTHER_ACT_REV						0.685**
						(0.322)
FATHER_ACT_REV						0.0571
						(0.348)
CONSTANT	-1.982***		-2.515***	-2.417***	-2.028***	-1.895*
	(0.689)		(0.967)	(0.818)	(0.677)	(1.066)
Regional dummies	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	168	168	142	160	168	130
Pseudo-R²	0.2371		0.3036	0.2635	0.2503	0.2738
Sign of the ITᵃ	Neg.		Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Significance of the ITᵃ	***		***	***	***	***

Notes: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Table 12: Married Individuals

	(21) Married individuals	Average Marginal Effects	(22) Married individuals	(23) Married individuals	(24) Married individuals	(25) Married individuals
	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT					
FEMALE	0.887***	0.2772	0.908***	0.920***	0.953***	0.882***
	(0.211)		(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.209)
RURAL	0.0961	0.0295	0.104	0.126	0.140	0.177
	(0.201)		(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.211)
AGE	0.00389	0.0012	0.00357	0.00405	0.00353	0.00384
	(0.00753)		(0.00757)	(0.00820)	(0.00828)	(0.00820)
NR_ROOM	0.349**	0.1074	0.347**	0.373***	0.369**	0.324**
	(0.141)		(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.142)
PRIMARY	-0.161	-0.0486	-0.102	-0.201	-0.120	-0.286
	(0.240)		(0.251)	(0.241)	(0.252)	(0.258)
EDUC	0.428*	0.1355	0.461*	0.435*	0.483*	-0.347
	(0.261)		(0.268)	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.391)
REL1_STV	0.151	0.0464	0.154	0.173	0.179	0.0507
	(0.109)		(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.0959)
REL1_STV_EDUC	-0.419**	-0.1337	-0.415**	-0.430**	-0.426**	
	(0.207)		(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.209)	
MATCH			0.133		0.188	-0.165
			(0.191)		(0.194)	(0.245)
EDUC_MATCH						1.179***
						(0.444)
DIST_AGE				-0.0250*	-0.0263*	-0.0234
				(0.0149)	(0.0150)	(0.0151)
CONSTANT	-1.829***		-1.932***	-1.728***	-1.866***	-1.490**
	(0.537)		(0.550)	(0.568)	(0.574)	(0.586)
Regional dummies	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	273	273	273	270	270	270
Pseudo-R^2	0.1123		0.1138	0.1230	0.1258	0.1379
Sign of the IT[a]	Neg.		Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Pos.
Significance of the IT[a]	**		**	**	**	***

Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Table 13: Support of the Law and Religiosity of Educated Married People

	STRONG_SUPPORT (%)	REL1_SVT (mean)
MATCH=1	50%	0.0492
MATCH=0	14.7%	0.5304
P-value	0.002	0.0198

Table 14: Support for the Clauses of The New Code

Clauses	Favorable (%)
1. The joint responsibility of the family	88.93
2. The husband's duty of supporting his wife	91.14
3. The end of the wife's duty to obey her husband	**32.59**
4. The marriage of women without the consent of their guardian	**31.61**
5. The marriage of minors in age	87.22
6. Polygamy	**75.56**
7. Divorce	**81.37**
8. The contract which states how to manage property in the case of divorce	79.63

Appendix 1:
Sample creation for each of the regions where the survey took place

In the region of Casablanca, one third of the sample of 180 people is comprised of rural people and the remaining two thirds of urban people from Casablanca city. Two provinces were chosen: the city of Casablanca for the urban survey and the province of Nouacer for the rural one (Nouacer is the second province of the region in terms of population). There are 16 districts in the city of Casablanca but in order to avoid geographic dispersion, we have decided to keep only 8 of them[44]. For the socio-economic background, the type of housing was used as a proxy. In order to establish the list of districts from where to select our sample units, we have produced a table showing the number of primary units (geographical areas that include about 300 households) for each type of housing in each of the districts of Casablanca. The different categories of housing are: deluxe (stratum 1), modern (stratum 2), old medina (stratum 3), economic and social (stratum 4), and slums (stratum 5). The medina is found in only two districts (El Maarif and Sidi Belyout), and we chose to keep both of them to include the residents of this urban environment in the sample. These are typically individuals who settled in Casablanca for several generations and whose socio-economic level is relatively low. Some districts, Hay Mohammadi and Sidi Moument, have been select for the preponderance of middle, lower middle, and lower classes.

Other districts have been chosen for their diverse population: Mers Sultan, Hay Hassani and Ain Chock. A striking feature of the latter districts is the proximity of villas and slums, which are sometimes adjacent to each other. Finally, the districts of Anfa and El Maarif have been selected because of the concentration of their populations in the first two categories of housing.

For the region of Tanger-Tétouan, two provinces have been chosen: the Tetouan province and Chefchaouen. The sample of 180 people was split between the two provinces based on the demographic weight of the target group of people aged more than 18 years. Within each province, the division between urban and rural areas was made according to the importance of each type of residential environment within the province. In each province, three communes with primary rural units[45] have been selected following discussions with people from the region in order to take account of the accessibility of the villages and to avoid geographical dispersion. In the province of Chefchaouen, the communes which were selected are: Bab Taza, Derdara and Talambote, and in the Tetouan province: Azla, Ain Lahsen and Zaytoune.

For the region of Souss-Massa-Draa, we have opted for a single province: the province of Ouarzazate. The 180 people were divided between urban and rural areas according to the importance of each type of residence within the province. For the urban area, Ouarzazate was the only city considered. For the rural areas, we drew a circle of 80km around the city of Ouarzazate, and decided to restrict our attention to the communes that lie entirely within this circle. The criteria of accessibility and geographical spread again motivated our choice of municipalities. A member of the High Commission for the region was consulted in order to help us. The municipalities selected are: Ait Zineb, Ighrem N'Ougdal, Ouisselsate, Skoura and Toundoute.

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[44]We do not think it was necessary to survey 180 people in 16 districts since the important criteria was that our choice provided sufficient variation in terms of socio-economic status.
[45]A primary unit is a geographical area, which is composed of 300 households.

Appendix 2:
Robustness check: alternative religious variable REL2

In the following estimated models, we use REL2, an alternative religious index presented in Section 5.2. REL2_SVT corresponds to the index rescaled by gender.

Table 15: Robustness check 1

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT			
	(1) Whole sample	(2) Whole sample	(3) Whole sample	(4) Whole sample
FEMALE	0.937***	0.924***	0.925***	0.973***
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.148)
AGE	-0.00159	-0.00151	-0.00210	-0.00144
	(0.00438)	(0.00439)	(0.00440)	(0.00448)
NR_ROOM	0.168**	0.174**	0.180**	0.176**
	(0.0749)	(0.0744)	(0.0748)	(0.0749)
RURAL	0.0454	0.0437	0.0523	0.103
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.145)
PRIMARY	0.0895	0.0912	0.120	0.195
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.171)
SECONDARY	0.333*		0.382**	
	(0.191)		(0.194)	
HIGH_EDUC	0.496**		1.274***	
	(0.209)		(0.394)	
EDUC		0.401**		1.388***
		(0.171)		(0.331)
REL2_STV	-0.0460	-0.0411	0.0215	0.128
	(0.0655)	(0.0656)	(0.0695)	(0.0803)
REL2_STV_HIGH_EDUC			-0.370**	
			(0.165)	
REL2_STV_EDUC				-0.429***
				(0.122)
CONSTANT	-1.346***	-1.367***	-1.524***	-1.921***
	(0.295)	(0.296)	(0.306)	(0.340)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	540	540	540	540
Pseudo-R^2	0.948	0.939	0.1035	0.1135
Sign of the IT[a]			Neg.	Neg.
Significance of the IT[a]			**	***

Note: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Appendix 3:
Robustness check with HIGH_EDUC as education threshold

A Wald test indicates that among the most educated (*baccalauréat* or university degree) a negative and significant (at 5% level) correlation exists between the probability of supporting the law and the intensity of religious practice.

Table 16: Robustness check 2

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT					
	(1) Whole sample	(2) Whole sample	(3) Whole sample	(4) Whole sample	Average Marginal Effects
FEMALE	0.768***	0.893***	0.908***	0.909***	0.3014
	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.133)	
AGE	-0.00618	-0.00265	-0.00208	-0.00276	-0.0009
	(0.00380)	(0.00407)	(0.00430)	(0.00432)	
NB_ROOM	0.184**	0.168**	0.168**	0.180**	0.0585
	(0.0761)	(0.0752)	(0.0749)	(0.0752)	
RURAL	-0.112	0.0515	0.0486	0.0538	0.0175
	(0.124)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.144)	
PRIMARY		0.100	0.0978	0.119	0.0392
		(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	
SECONDARY		0.341*	0.341*	0.378*	0.1254
		(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.194)	
REL1_STV			-0.0272	0.0538	0.0175
			(0.0645)	(0.0697)	
HIGH_EDUCATION		0.491**	0.500**	0.538**	.1817
		(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.211)	
REL_STV_HIGH_EDUC				-0.405**	-0.1379
				(0.159)	
CONSTANT	-0.903***	-1.385***	-1.416***	-1.441***	
	(0.206)	(0.293)	(0.304)	(0.305)	
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Nr. Observations	540	540	540	540	
Pseudo-R^2	0.0851	0.0941	0.0943	0.1046	
Sign of the IT[a]				Neg.	
Significance of the IT[a]				Not sig.	

Notes: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Appendix 4:
The role of family conservatism and family structure

Table 17: The Role of Family Conservatism and Family Structure

	(1) Whole sample	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Whole sample	(5) Women	(6) Men
	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STRONG_SUPPORT					
REL1_STV	0.180**	0.167*	0.225	0.164*	0.164	0.155
	(0.0828)	(0.101)	(0.170)	(0.0838)	(0.101)	(0.177)
EDUC	0.509***	0.286	0.759**	0.548***	0.295	0.803**
	(0.178)	(0.229)	(0.317)	(0.181)	(0.239)	(0.317)
REL1_STV_EDUC	-0.471***	-0.286*	-0.593***	-0.479***	-0.297*	-0.548***
	(0.125)	(0.173)	(0.204)	(0.127)	(0.175)	(0.212)
FEMALE	0.930***			1.023***		
	(0.137)			(0.140)		
AGE	-0.00232	-0.00529	0.00585	0.00134	0.000269	0.00649
	(0.00442)	(0.00561)	(0.00747)	(0.00466)	(0.00600)	(0.00803)
NR_ROOM	0.177**	0.199*	0.130	0.197**	0.212**	0.174
	(0.0766)	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.0782)	(0.105)	(0.120)
RURAL	0.106	0.139	0.0698	0.106	0.163	0.0167
	(0.146)	(0.187)	(0.241)	(0.148)	(0.191)	(0.239)
PRIMARY	0.195	0.275	0.101	0.219	0.283	0.179
	(0.169)	(0.216)	(0.335)	(0.171)	(0.220)	(0.340)
MINOR_AGE	0.0956	0.137*	-0.0303			
	(0.0649)	(0.0791)	(0.149)			
POLYGAME	0.146	0.133	0.281			
	(0.153)	(0.190)	(0.258)			
SISTER_PROP				0.121	0.288	-0.107
				(0.226)	(0.294)	(0.362)
CONSTANT	-1.654***	-0.609*	-2.059***	-1.870***	-0.856**	-2.088***
	(0.314)	(0.352)	(0.516)	(0.349)	(0.407)	(0.560)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	540	289	251	520	277	243
Pseudo-R^2	0.1188	0.0443	0.1167	0.1237	0.0362	0.1272
Sign of the IT[a]	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Significance of the IT[a]	***	*	***	***	*	***

Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Appendix 5:
Robustness checks: Estimations with SOFT_SUPPORT as a dependent variable

In order to produce some robustness checks, we also construct the variable SOFT_SUPPORT whose value is one if the respondent supports at least six out of the eight clauses. For all regressions in Table 18, a Wald test confirms that a significant (at 5 %) negative correlation exits between the intensity of religious practice and the likelihood of supporting the law among educated individuals.

Table 18: SOFT_SUPPORT as Dependent Variable

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SOFT_SUPPORT		
	(1) Whole sample	(2) Whole sample	(3) Whole sample
REL1_STV	0.169**	0.179**	0.158*
	(0.0835)	(0.0832)	(0.0853)
EDUC	0.190	0.206	0.319
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.200)
REL1_STV_EDUC	-0.366***	-0.384***	-0.395***
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.130)
FEMALE	1.158***	1.148***	1.255***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.146)
AGE	-0.0104**	-0.0103**	-0.00809
	(0.00474)	(0.00473)	(0.00496)
NR_ROOM	0.136	0.135	0.157
	(0.0887)	(0.0883)	(0.0963)
RURAL	0.0322	0.0344	0.0466
	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.150)
PRIMARY	0.182	0.194	0.286
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.181)
MINOR_AGE		0.0386	
		(0.0686)	
POLYGAME		0.177	
		(0.165)	
SISTER_PROP			0.0981
			(0.239)
CONSTANT	-0.146	-0.200	-0.397
	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.374)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	540	540	520
Pseudo-R^2	0.1669	0.1692	0.1840
Sign of the IT[a]	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Significance of the IT[a]	***	***	***

Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term

Appendix 6:
System of Equations and Biprobit Model

Table 19: SURE Model

	(1) CLAUSE 1	(2) CLAUSE 2	(3) CLAUSE 3	(4) CLAUSE 4	(5) CLAUSE 5	(6) CLAUSE 6	(7) CLAUSE 7	(8) CLAUSE 8
FEMALE	0.202***	0.0973***	0.323***	-0.0648	0.197***	0.365***	0.297***	0.251***
	(0.0308)	(0.0298)	(0.0478)	(0.0498)	(0.0344)	(0.0430)	(0.0388)	(0.0412)
AGE	0.000104	-0.000695	0.00188	-0.00263*	-0.00213**	-0.000839	-0.00235**	0.00152
	(0.000901)	(0.000871)	(0.00140)	(0.00146)	(0.00101)	(0.00126)	(0.00113)	(0.00120)
NR_ROOM	-0.0102	-0.0140	0.0688***	0.0312	0.00945	0.00681	0.0160	0.00611
	(0.0171)	(0.0165)	(0.0265)	(0.0276)	(0.0191)	(0.0238)	(0.0215)	(0.0228)
RURAL	-0.0522*	-0.0347	-0.0250	0.0370	-0.0621*	0.00368	-0.00360	0.0757*
	(0.0294)	(0.0284)	(0.0456)	(0.0475)	(0.0328)	(0.0410)	(0.0370)	(0.0392)
PRIMARY	0.0216	0.0461	0.0988*	0.117**	0.0274	-0.0203	0.0805*	0.123***
	(0.0346)	(0.0334)	(0.0536)	(0.0559)	(0.0386)	(0.0483)	(0.0435)	(0.0462)
SECONDARY	0.0371	-0.0517	0.139**	0.0377	-0.00927	0.0556	0.127**	0.127**
	(0.0405)	(0.0392)	(0.0629)	(0.0655)	(0.0453)	(0.0566)	(0.0510)	(0.0542)
HIGH_EDUC	0.145***	-0.0162	0.278***	0.0192	0.0750	0.0951	0.198***	0.147**
	(0.0442)	(0.0427)	(0.0686)	(0.0714)	(0.0494)	(0.0617)	(0.0556)	(0.0591)
REL1	-0.00704	0.0237	-0.00187	0.0170	-0.0221	-0.0144	0.0231	-0.00630
	(0.0153)	(0.0148)	(0.0238)	(0.0247)	(0.0171)	(0.0214)	(0.0193)	(0.0205)
REL_HIGH_ED UC	-0.0222	0.0143	-0.0988**	-0.110**	-0.0297	-0.0663	-0.0773**	-0.0235
	(0.0312)	(0.0302)	(0.0484)	(0.0505)	(0.0349)	(0.0436)	(0.0393)	(0.0417)
ACT_REV	-0.0549*	0.0103	0.0472	-0.0141	0.00442	-0.000209	-0.00240	-0.0221
	(0.0283)	(0.0274)	(0.0439)	(0.0458)	(0.0316)	(0.0396)	(0.0357)	(0.0378)
CONSTANT	0.864***	0.961***	-0.178*	0.308***	0.906***	0.550***	0.663***	0.464***
	(0.0684)	(0.0661)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.0765)	(0.0956)	(0.0861)	(0.0915)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	540	540	540	540	540	540	540	540
R-squared	0.194	0.079	0.141	0.054	0.132	0.176	0.177	0.137

Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 20: Multivariate Probit

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT							
	CLAUSE 1	CLAUSE 2	CLAUSE 3	CLAUSE 4	CLAUSE 5	CLAUSE 6	CLAUSE 7	CLAUSE 8
RELIGION	-.0721	.0764	.0730	.0335	-.1365	-.0423	.0671	.0628
	(.0865)	(.0912)	(.0647)	(.0664)	(.0861)	(.0723)	(.0768)	(.0751)
HIGH_EDUC	1.3586***	.4538*	.1432	-.0612	.9359***	.3401*	.9582***	.3166
	(.3243)	(.2479)	(.1783)	(.1803)	(.2545)	(.1902)	(.2521)	(.2061)
REL_HIGH_EDUC	-.2497	-.0128	-.2404*	-.2522*	-.3178	-.1915	-.3395*	-.1411
	(.2872)	(.1906)	(.1432)	(.1484)	(.2116)	(.1592)	(.1931)	(.1541)
RURAL	-.0693	.1478	-.4410***	.0518	-.0656	.0873	.0766	.3305**
	(.1773)	(.1611)	(.1228)	(.1170)	(.1475)	(.1271)	(.1463)	(.1402)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Nr. Obs.	540	540	540	540	540	540	540	540
Sign of the IT[a]	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Significance of the IT[a]	/	/	(sig. at 12 %)	(sig. at 12 %)	/	/	(sig. at 12 %)	/

Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a: IT = interaction term; Controls: PRIMARY, SECONDARY, NR_ROOMS, AGE, ACT_REV, and FEMALE.

For the multivariate probit model, the coefficient of the interaction term appears with a negative sign and it is significant at 10% level for the 3rd, the 4th and the 7th clauses[46].

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[46]We tested for the sign and the significance of the interaction term by using the methodology proposed by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) and the three coefficients appear to be significantly different from zero at 12%.

Table 21: Biprobit Model

	WHOLE SAMPLE	
	(1) CLAUSE 3	(2) CLAUSE 4
FEMALE	0.983***	-0.187
	(0.160)	(0.144)
RURAL	-0.0537	0.112
	(0.147)	(0.138)
NR_ROOM	0.203***	0.0878
	(0.0769)	(0.0796)
AGE	0.00556	-0.00870**
	(0.00438)	(0.00434)
SECONDARY	0.430**	0.100
	(0.204)	(0.194)
PRIMARY	0.305*	0.318**
	(0.168)	(0.161)
REL1_STV	0.00978	0.0790
	(0.0688)	(0.0711)
HIGH_EDUC	0.866***	0.0493
	(0.213)	(0.212)
REL1_STV_HIGH_EDUC	-0.296**	-0.345**
	(0.151)	(0.157)
ACT_REV	0.0932	-0.0241
	(0.141)	(0.134)
CONSTANT	-2.023***	-0.486
	(0.341)	(0.323)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes
Nr. Observations	540	540

Notes: * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level; Robust standard errors are in parentheses.