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IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES ON CHILD SCHOOLING AND CHILD WORK: THE CASE OF EGYPT

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#### **Abstract**

Egypt has been a major exporter of labor to oil-rich Arab countries. More recently, Egyptian migrants are increasingly heading to Europe. We assess the impact of international migration and remittances on child schooling and child work in Egypt. We use the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS 06). Since migration opportunities tend to be network-dependent, we use the intensity of migration on the village level based on the 2006 Egyptian Census to instrument for migraiton. We find remittances to have a strong positive effect on attendance for university-aged boys. Migration has a positive effect on the likelihood of attending school for young girls 6-11 and a mild effect on school attendance of university-aged girls. With respect to child work, migration and remittances were found to have a very large negative effect on young boys' market work. However, living in a migrant household seems to increase the likelihood of light domestic work for older boys. As for girls' work, remittances reduce long-duration domestic work.

#### ملخص

لقد كانت مصر و لا تزال مصدراً رئيسياً للأيدي العاملة إلي الدول العربية الغنية بالبترول. وفي الفترة الأخيرة، يتجه المهاجرون المصريون بصورة متزايدة نحو أوروبا. ونحن نقوم بتقييم اثر الهجرة الدولية والتحويلات النقية علي تعليم الطفل وعمله في مصر وذلك باستخدام المسح الذي اجري لسوق العمل في مصر في 2006. وحيث أن فرص الهجرة تجنح إلي الاعتماد علي مجموعة من العوامل، فإننا نستخدم كثافة الهجرة علي المستوي القروي علي أساس تعداد السكان المصريين لعام 2006 كأداة للحكم علي الهجرة. ونجد أن التحويلات النقدية لها اثر ايجابي قوي علي حضور الدراسة بالنسبة للذكور في الدراسة الجامعية. وللهجرة تأثير ايجابي علي احتمالية حضور الفتيات للدراسة في الفترة من سن 6 سنوات إلي 11 سنة, كما أن لها تأثيراً طفيفاً علي حضور الفتيات في الدراسة الجامعية. وبالنسبة لعمل الطفل, فقد وجد أن الهجرة و التحويلات النقدية لهما تأثير سلبي كبير جدا علي سوق العمل للصبية والصغار. ومع ذلك, فالعيش في منزل مغترب, علي ما يبدو يزيد من احتمالية الاعمال المنزلية الخفيفة للصبية الاكبر سنا من الذكور. وبالنسبة لعمل الفتيات فان التحويلات النقدية تقلل من الاعمال المنزلية التي يستغرق اداؤاها وقتاً طويلاً.

#### 1. Introduction

In this paper, we examine the impact of international migration and remittances on children's schooling and work in Egypt. Migration and remittances are an essential element of the Egyptian economy. Temporary international migration, especially to oil-rich Arab countries, has been used by many Egyptians as a survival and income-augmentation strategy. The number of Egyptian international migrants is estimated at 4% of the Egyptian population and 1.5% of world migrants (Nassar 2005).

Egypt is among the largest ten remittance-receiving countries in the world (Wahba 2007) and is the third largest receiver of remittances after India and Mexico (Nassar 2005). Remittances account for 4% of GDP (Nassar 2005). In addition, remittances represent the largest source of non-labor income for households (Wahba 2007). Using the same dataset we use, Wahba found that, in 2006, 4% of households received remittances and more than 90% of current migrants that send remittances have migrated to Arab countries (Wahba 2007). Despite the importance of migration and remittances, their impact on Egyptian households is not sufficiently investigated. In addition to providing evidence on the impact in the case of Egypt, the analysis would provide an insight on its effect in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region<sup>1</sup>.

Given the large migratory flows across the world, there is considerable interest among researchers and policy-makers in the relationship between migration and development in sending countries. There are various microeconomic channels through which migration can impact growth. One important channel is human capital investments that are facilitated by remittance income. Therefore, studying the impact of migration on schooling adds to the literature of migration effect on development and growth in sending countries. It also broadens the literature on the effects of migration on human capital, which has been dominated by the negative brain-drain<sup>2</sup> effect resulting from out-migration of skilled population, by including possible positive effects on the human capital of the population leftbehind in sending countries.

As has been noted in the literature, the effect of migration and remittances on schooling is a priori ambiguous. On one hand, remittances can relax budget constraints that would otherwise limit spending on schooling particularly for girls and older children. On the other hand, a parent's (or adult household member's) absence due to migration can have a damaging effect on the family thereby affecting children's schooling negatively. Moreover, migration can affect schooling through its effect on the effective returns to education. If there is a large migration prospect for unskilled labor, returns to education become lower thereby potentially reducing school attainment. Alternatively, if there is a large migration prospect for highly-skilled labor, school attainment would be affected positively.

Similarly, the final direction of the relationship between migration and child work is not clear. The income effect from remittances can reduce the need for the income generated from child work. Income from remittances can also raise the reservation wage of left-behind household members including children and possibly reduce their labor supply. In contrast, the need for children to work in a family business may increase to replace absent migrant household member(s). Migration can generate remittance money that can be used to start a family business or buy a farm which may result in a need for household members, including

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Despite the large migratory flows in MENA (for example, based on the Human Development Report (UNDP 2004), four out of ten countries with the largest share of migrant population are in MENA. Also, MENA has a high ratio of remittances to GDP at 2.2%, even higher than Latin America at 1.6% (United Nations 2004)), migration impacts were not rigorously examined.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Nassar (2005) has a discussion of brain-drain in Egypt.

children, to work. If children are not needed to do market work themselves, they may be needed to do more household chores to replace migrant adults or adults that work on the family business as a result of migration.

In addition to the mechanisms above, migration can affect child work through wages. If migration is occurring at a large-scale, this may increase wages due to the reduction in labor supply because of out-migration, thereby making child work more rewarding. Based on the above discussion, the effect of migration and remittances on children schooling is country-specific (or even province-specific) and can vary according to each country's peculiarities.

The main estimation issue we face is the possible endogeneity of migration. First, migration and child schooling decisions can be made simultaneously. Reverse causality may arise if households that need more income to afford schooling are more likely to resort to migration of one of its members to secure the needed income. Second, individuals may be self-selecting into migration based on unobserved characteristics such as ambition and the level of risk-taking thereby biasing the estimate of the migration effect. We resolve the potential selection bias and endogeneity of the migration decision by instrumenting for migration. The instrument we employ is the percentage of households with migrants at the Shiakha/viallge level based on the Egyptian Census of 2006. This measure of the intensity of migration is meant to capture the extent of migration networks based on the notion that migration is network-dependent. Similar instruments have been used in the literature (Sasin & McKenzie 2007).

We examine the effects of migration, remittance-receipt, and remittances level on a multitude of education and child work indicators for boys and girls. We mainly focus on school-aged children 6-17. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. We review the literature on migration effect on child schooling and work in Section 2. We describe the data sources and discuss the estimation strategy we employ in Section 3. Results are presented in Section 4 and concluding remarks are provided in the last section.

#### 2. Literature Review

The literature on the effect of migration and remittances on schooling has been primarily covering Latin American countries and was initially focused on Mexico and El Selvador. Outside Latin America, some attention has been given to countries with large out-migration such as the Philippines. Only recent work, on which we focus in this section, employed estimation strategies that allow for the endogeneity of migration and remittances. Hanson and Woodruff (2003), using the interaction of household characteristics with historical state migration rates in Mexico as an instrument, found a positive association between having a migrant household member and child attainment, as measured by completed years of schooling. Lopez-Cordova (2005), using data on all Mexican municipalities, found that municipalities with higher proportions of remittance-receiving households have better education outcomes, such as lower illiteracy, and more generally better developmental outcomes. Cordova uses the interaction of the distance of the municipality to the USA border with historical migration rates as an instrument variable.

Writing on El Salvador, Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) found that children from remittance-receiving households have lower school dropout hazard rates. They do not address possible endogeneity concerns. Acosta (2006), on the other hand, uses propensity score matching as well as instrument variable approach. He uses migration networks as instrument for remittance receipt in El Salvador. He provides some evidence that children in remittance-receiving households are more likely to be enrolled in school. Acosta, Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007) provide a regional perspective of the effect of remittances by examining 11 countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. They focus on the accumulated years of

schooling of children aged 10-15 and they follow a specification close to that used by Hanson and Woodruff (2003). They found that remittances are significantly correlated with higher educational attainment in 6 out of the 11 countries examined.

In the Philippines, Yang (2008) exploits the dramatic depreciation of the currency as a result of the Asian economic crisis to capture variation in remittances: the exogenous exchange-rate shock resulted in a reduction in the relative price of consumption in the Philippines and hence encouraged remitting. He found that remittances increase the fraction of children aged 17-21 that are attending school. It also increases educational spending on children.

A key result in the literature is that the impact of migration and remittances is often restricted to groups with particular demographics. Specifically, the positive impact on education outcomes tends to be larger for girls, younger children, and children whose parents' (particularly mothers') schooling is low. This is not surprising given that the marginal value of the remittance income would be higher for such groups and hence its effect on budget constraint alleviation and education spending would be stronger. Acosta et al. (2007) found the positive effect on attainment to be stronger for girls in some Latin American countries. Acosta (2006) found the effect of remittances on enrollment to hold for girls and not for boys.

With respect to age groups, Lopez-Cordova (2005) found that Mexican municipalities with a higher incidence of remittance receipt have lower school attendance for those aged 15-17 and higher school attendance for those aged 6-14. Consistently, McKenzie and Rapoport (2005), who use historic migration as an instrument, found that Mexican children aged 16 to 18 in migrant households have lower levels of educational attainment especially for children whose mothers have higher levels of schooling. Among the explanations they offer is that children at that age may start migration and hence quit school. In addition, migration may create a disincentive to remaining in school as the returns to education in Mexico is higher than in the USA leading to lower education aspirations for those planning to migrate.

With regard to children with low parental education, Hanson & Woodruff (2003) found that, in rural Mexico, living in a migrant household resulted in girls aged 10-15 significantly completing more years of schooling in the case where the mother had a low level of education. Similarly, Acosta et al. (2007) found that the positive effect of remittances on attainment was larger when the mother's education was low in rural Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala and Honduras.

Only few papers examined the impact of migration and remittances on child work. Among them are Acosta (2006) and Yang (2008). Acosta (2006) found that remittances have a negative effect on children's work for wage. Yang (2008) found remittances to reduce the labor supply of children aged 10-17. The outcome he uses is the change in total hours worked and changes in hours worked in different types of employment. He found that the exchange rate shock (proxying for remittances) has a negative effect on total child work hours. Looking by employment type, hours worked in the category of self-employed or an employer or as a paid family farm worker, increased with the shock.

In Egypt and in the MENA region, no careful examination of the effects of migration on children schooling and work, in particular, was undertaken. One relevant remark in Brink (1991) is that wives expressed that it is difficult to discipline their children and help them with their schoolwork in the absence of their husbands. Similarly, Saeed (2001) notes that in the Sudan, out-migration has a negative effect on schooling and the psychology of children and the relationship with the mother who will be faced with increased workload and double burden as a result of trying to carry out the father's role also. Nassar (2005) found that 62% of remittance-receiving households spend on educational services while only 58% of non-remittance receiving households spend on educational services. According to Eurostat (2000),

while 74% of remittance-receiving households spend the remittance income on daily household expenses, 7.3% use it for house purchase and renovation and 3.9% use it on education.

The migration impacts that were examined in Egypt include concurrent work by Roushdy et al. (2008) and Binzel and Assaad (2008) which examine the effects on poverty and labor supply, respectively. Wahba (2004) examines the impact of return migrants in terms of their entrepreneurial contributions. Adams (1991) examines household spending and found that migrant households are more likely to invest as opposed to consume compared to non-migrant households, particularly in housing and land purchase. Nassar (2005) also has a discussion on effect of migration on investment and saving. The work above includes some descriptive analysis of migration patterns and migrant household characteristics. Other work that has analyzed patterns, trends, and historical development of migration include Wahba (2007), Zohry and Bond (2003) and Nassar (2005).

#### 3. Data and Methodology

#### 3.1. Data

We will use the nationally-representative Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey ELMPS 06. It is a longitudinal survey that tracks and re-interviews households in the Egypt Labor Market Survey ELMS 98 households<sup>3</sup>. ELMPS 06 contains information on international migration history as well as a module on current migrants and remittances. Particularly, it has information on whether the household receives remittances from household members living abroad as well as the amount and type of these remittances, and which household member receives remittances. In the paper, our definition of a migrant household is a household that has member(s) who migrated in the last five years whether or not they returned. Our analysis excludes migrants taking their families with them (since they could not be interviewed) and hence excludes effects on their children.

ELMPS 06 is rich in education variables and enables us to examine the impact of migration and remittances on several education indicators: school attendance, staying in school, school attendance for university-aged individuals and taking and spending on private tutoring. It also has detailed information on child work activities. Our data has the advantage of having information on weekly hours of domestic work for boys and girls, in addition to hours of subsistence and market work. Therefore, ELMPS 06 enables us to capture girls' work which is often in the form of household chores.

#### 3.2. Methodology

3.2.1. Endogeneity of Migration and Remittances

As already mentioned, the main estimation problem we need to overcome is the endogeneity of the migration and remittance decisions. Sasin and McKenzie (2007) outline the methodological difficulties that may be encountered when estimating migration effects: there may be reverse causality, self-selection into migration and an omitted variable problem. Reverse causality takes place if the outcome studied influences migration and remittances and not only migration and remittances influencing the outcome. In the schooling outcome case,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The ELMPS 06 sample contains 8,351 households. 3,685 of these households are original ELMS 98 survey households. 2,168 households split from original ELMS 98 households (for example, due to marrying and forming a separate household). In addition, 2,498 new households were added to the sample to form a refresher sample. For more information on ELMS 98 and ELMPS 06, please refer to Assaad (2002a, b), Assaad (forthcoming) and Barsoum (2006). 72% of individuals interviewed in 1998 were successfully re-interviewed in 2006, forming a panel that can be used for longitudinal analysis. A detailed analysis of sources of attrition was undertaken in Assaad and Roushdy (Forthcoming). They show that attrition was mainly caused by the random loss of identifying records rather than by a systematic attrition process. They found no significant association between the probability of attrition and household and individual characteristics in 1998. Weights based on the probability of non-response were used to correct for attrition.

it may be that households that value schooling or who are income-constrained and need to raise the needed income for education spending are the ones that decide to send a member abroad in order that he/she remits the needed funds. Similarly, in the case of child work, it may be households that do not want to expose their children to work, that resort to migration in order to avoid depending on income from child work. Attributes such as concern for children's education and child work aversion are hard to measure and are unobservable to the researcher resulting in an overestimate of a potentially positive effect of migration on schooling and potentially negative effect of migration on child work.

Self-selection into migration and remitting occurs as migrants/migrant households may not randomly sort themselves into migration. This becomes an issue when sorting is based on characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher such as the propensity to take risk and the level of motivation and ambition. Self-selection in such cases is essentially an omitted variable problem that can result in finding a correlation between migration and schooling outcomes that is not causal in nature.

Roushdy et al. (2008), using ELMPS 06, provides descriptive evidence that households in Egypt are not randomly selected into migration and receipt of remittances. Comparing migrant to non-migrant households and remittance- recipient to non-remittance-recipient households show that they differ along several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. This confirms that, in order to get reliable estimates, factors determining migration and receipt of remittances need to be controlled for.

#### 3.2.2. Model

To get around the endogeneity issue, we employ the approach that is used most often in the literature: the instrumental variable approach. This entails finding a variable that affects migration and remittance behavior but that does not directly affect the outcome studied (except through its effect on migration and remittances). Migration history and networks have been used repeatedly as shown in the literature review. This choice is based on the hypothesis that networks affect migration prospects but not outcomes of left-behind household members. Social networks of friends and relatives who already migrated facilitate the migration of more individuals belonging to the same social network, as emphasized by sociologists (McKenzie 2005).

In line with the literature, we use the percentage of households with migrants in the locality (Shiakha/village level). We acquired this data from the Egyptian statistical agency which they collected as part of Census 2006. This instrument was also used in concurrent migration impact work (Roushdy et al. 2008 and Binzel and Assaad 2008). This measure is expected to capture the strength of social migration networks and is appropriate in the case of Egypt since a lot of temporary migrants are low-skilled labor and as noted by Hoodfar (1997) their migration is highly affected by the social support they find in host countries as reflected in the network of relatives and people from the same community.

The instrumental variable model used is as follows:

$$Y = f(X_1\beta_1, Z\beta_2, \varepsilon)$$
 (Structural equation) (1)

$$Z = f(X_2 \gamma_1, IV \gamma_2, \delta)$$
 (Reduced-form for Z) (2)

Equation (1) relates Y, the vector of child outcomes (dependent variables) to the vector of explanatory variables consisting of  $X_1$ , a vector of child and household characteristics and Z, the potentially endogenous vector of migration indicators as well as to  $\varepsilon$ , the vector of error terms. We refer to equation (1) as the outcome equation and equation (2) as the migration equation. Details on Y,  $X_1$ , Z,  $X_2$  are provided below.

Endogeneity is reflected in the potential correlation of Z and  $\varepsilon$ . To overcome endogeneity, equation (2) is used where IV is the instrument variable for migration and remittances that we discussed above and the error terms ( $\varepsilon$  and  $\delta$ ) are allowed to be correlated. A regression equation is fitted separately for each child outcome and each migration indicator. The regression model used and the exact functional form in equations (1) and (2) depend on the nature of the dependent and endogenous variables examined.

As will be shown in the following sub-sections, our dependent variables and migration indicators will either be binary or left-censored resulting in various binary-censored combinations. Using 2-SLS will be inconsistent in these cases and employing 2-stage estimators that take into account that the dependent and endogenous variables are not continuous will result in efficiency gains. Such models, however, are not implementable using built-in commands in statistical packages. We use the user-written Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) command in Stata (Roodman 2007) in all regressions. CMP fits a host of multi-equation estimators that accommodate various types of dependent variables in each estimated equation. We jointly estimate a reduced-form migration/remittance equation and a structural schooling/child work equation as a joint Tobit/Probit and Probit/Tobit model depending on the nature of the migration variable and the outcome variable examined.

We also report results based on (single-equation) models that assume exogeneity of migration and remittances. We use Probit models for binary outcomes and Tobit models for left-censored outcomes. These models are particularly relevant in the cases where we find no evidence that the correlation between the two equations is significant or in other words no evidence that migration or remittances are endogenous to the outcome of interest.

#### 3.2.3. Migration Indicators

The vector Z in the outcome equation contains three migration-related measures: (1) a binary variable indicating whether the child lives in a migrant household or not, where we define a migrant member as migrated within the last five years whether or not he/she returned; (2) a binary variable indicating whether the child lives in a household that receives remittances from a (current) migrant household member and (3) a left-censored variable (i.e., unconditional on receiving remittances) indicating the average monthly amount of remittances received by the household expressed in 100 L.E. The variables are referred to in short as: migration, remittance-receipt and remittance-level.

While the remittance-receipt measure is used more often in the literature compared to the migration measure, we prefer including migration as a separate measure because remittances is not the only outcome of migration. For example, migration affects households through the effect of absence of a household member which may result in a disruption of family life. Also, as noted by Sasin (2008), the income lost due to the absence of a migrant household member may not be fully offset by remittances he/she sends. In addition, not all international migrants choose to remit money.

We include both remittance level and remittance receipt because the remittance level measure may suffer from recall bias as respondents may not recall exact amounts especially that remittances are usually pooled with other income sources. On the other hand, respondents should recall whether they ever received remittances during the year (Acosta 2006). Caution should be taken in interpreting the impact of the level of remittances since as per Acosta (2006), the level of remittances may be underreported in household surveys thereby creating an underestimate of the impact of remittances on outcomes. Despite the concerns outlined above, we do not exclude the remittance level indicator as it may not be just receiving remittances that have an effect but rather how much a household receives.

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 $<sup>^4</sup>$  The exchange rate at the time of data collection for ELMPS 06 was 1 US\$ = 5.7 L.E.

We use the intensity of migration network at the local level as an instrument variable *IV* for the three migration indicators. While migration networks are thought to facilitate migrating and not necessarily remitting, the instrument would still capture remittances since migration and remittances are correlated. In Egypt, Binzel and Assaad (2008) found using ELMPS 06 that 66% of migrant households do receive remittances. In addition, alternative variables used in the literature to instrument for remittances would not be relevant in the case of Egypt. For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) use the per capita count of Western Union offices in the state (interacted with a household education variable) as an instrument for remittances. This variable is linked to remittances as it captures the accessibility and extent of use of money transfer providers. This variable, however, will not capture remittance flows in Egypt because remittances tend to be transferred informally and often by hand. Wahba (2007) found, using ELMPS 06, that only 22% of remittances were received through the banking system.

#### 3.2.4. Schooling and Child Work Outcomes

A general improvement in education took place over the last two decades partly because of the implementation of an enormous school-building plan in rural areas<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, groups traditionally suffering from lower educational attainment such as girls in rural areas and more generally residents of rural areas witnessed a relatively larger improvement. As a result, gender and urban/rural gaps in enrollment and attainment are closing (Elbadawy, forthcoming). However, girls remain disadvantaged in terms of school entry (Elbadawy and Assaad 2008). The disparity in school entry is especially evident in rural areas of Upper Egypt. Conditional on entering school, girls are not disadvantaged in terms of remaining in school (Elbadawy and Assaad 2008, Lloyd et al. 2003). A key feature of the education system in Egypt, as in many developing countries, is the use of private tutoring classes to supplement formal schooling. Based on ELMPS 06, 45% of pre-university students use private tutoring services. Exam scores are the only criteria determining entry into higher education levels. Private tutoring is, therefore, a strategy adopted by households to enhance children's competitiveness via facilitating obtaining higher scores<sup>6</sup>. Concurrent to the improvements in several education indicators, there have been considerable reductions in the incidence of child labor (Assaad 2002b, Zibani 2002). Assaad et al. (2008) present descriptive analysis of Egyptian children's work experience.

The Y vector consists of schooling outcomes as well as child work outcomes. The schooling outcomes are mainly school attendance and private tutoring outcomes<sup>7</sup>. For the bulk of the analysis, we restrict our analysis to the school-aged group 6-17. Specifically, we use the following schooling variables: (1) school attendance for school-aged children (binary), (2) school attendance conditional on school entry for school-aged children (binary), (3) school attendance for the university-aged children 19-21, (4) private tutoring (binary), and (5) the annual level of spending on private tutoring (left-censored i.e., unconditional on taking tutoring)<sup>8</sup>.

The unconditional school attendance outcome captures attendance resulting from remaining in school and from entering school to start with. The school attendance conditional on school entry captures survival in school. School attendance for those 19-21 is meant to capture the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Elbadawy (forthcoming) describes the education system in Egypt in some detail and provides an overview of education trends in Egypt.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Elbadawy et al. (2005) examines private tutoring determinants in Egypt.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The school attendance variables reflect actual school attendance rather than just being enrolled in school. Actual attendance is expected to be more accurate since it is not uncommon in developing countries that some of the children that enroll at school end up not attending classes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> ELMPS 06 does not have information on academic performance and exam scores.

more discretionary university education. Due to its discretionary nature, university attendance is expected to be more elastic to remittance income. While the broader 18-22 age group is relevant for university attendance, we excluded the 18 year olds since they may still be in high school, and excluded the 22 year olds since they could have already completed their university education. Examining the effect of migration and remittances on a discretionary yet important education investment such as private tutoring contributes to the literature. Like in the case of university-aged attendance outcome, we expect tutoring to be more elastic to remittance income than school attendance.

We use multiple measures for child work reflecting the multiple definitions of what constitutes work, and the amount of work. There are three types of work activities: market, subsistence and domestic. Labor market work is work involving productive activities for the purpose of market exchange. Subsistence work includes activities involving the production and processing of primary goods for purposes of household consumption. Domestic work includes activities such as cooking, errands, house cleaning, collecting water, laundry, and childcare. Given that a considerable number of hours can be spent on domestic work, conventional definitions that exclude such activities can significantly underestimate estimates of child work especially for girls. ELMPS 06 has the advantage of having information on weekly domestic hours for boys and girls. Following Assaad, Levison and Zibani (2008), we use a broad and a narrow definition of work. The "market" definition limits work to labor market work only while the "inclusive" definition includes the three types of work: market, subsistence, and domestic.

For both the "market" and the "inclusive" definition, we use two variables that are based on the number of hours spent on the relevant work activities. Following international recommendations, we use a 1-hour cut-off where a child is counted as worker when he/she engages in a work activity for at least 1 hour per week. Following Assaad et al. (2008), we also use a higher cut-off level of 14 hours per week. In addition, we employ two child work measures that exclusively focus on domestic work. One is a binary variable taking the value one if the child did 1-hour of domestic work and the second is a binary variable taking the value one if the child did 14-hour of domestic work. Examining domestic work allows us to capture the possible substitution effect for time within the household because of absence of household members because of migration (directly or indirectly).

To sum up, we have the following child work variables, (1) 14-hour cut-off variable based on the market definition of work, (2) 1-hour cut-off variable based on the market definition of work, (3) 14-hour cut-off variable based on the inclusive definition of work, (4) 1-hour cut-off variable based on the inclusive definition of work, (5) 14-hour cut-off variable for domestic work, and (6) 1-hour cut-off variable for domestic work.

For all outcomes, we run separate regressions for boys and girls. This is because migration/remittances and the other explanatory variables can affect boys' and girls' schooling and child work differently.

#### 3.2.5. Explanatory Variables

The migration variables were explained in detail above. In the regressions, we interact the migration variable whose impact is examined with the age-groups: 6-11, 12-14 and 15-17. This is to allow for a differential impact by age groups as found in the literature. While it was found in the literature that the migration effect was weaker or sometimes negative for older age-groups, we expect that migration in Egypt may have a stronger effect on the older age-group. For example, with respect to school attendance, younger children are more likely to be

<sup>9</sup> Assaad et al. (2008) experimented with cut-off levels between 8 and 14 hours and found the percentage of child work not to significantly vary by cut-off level.

in school because of a cohort effect; their cohort would benefit more from the general improvement in education as mentioned above. They are also more likely to be in school because older children are more likely to have dropped out of schooling already because surviving to higher education levels is generally more optional.

Migration variables are not interacted in the regressions of university-aged school attendance. In some child work regressions, particularly under the market work definition for younger groups, some age-interactions with the migration variable were dropped during estimation because there were not enough observations for children that are working. Therefore, the age-groups had to be lumped into 6-14 and 15-17. In the few cases, where the younger 6-14 age-group was dropped, age-interactions with the migration variable were removed from the regression and only the migration variable itself was included (Tables A1.16-A1.18 & Tables A2.16-A2.18).

A uniform set of independent variables  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  is used in all regressions. Broadly speaking, the vector of independent variables in the outcome equation  $X_1$ , include child, parents, and household characteristics. Specifically, it consists of the following variables: child age, child age squared, whether the child is the eldest child of the household head, whether the child lives in an extended household, father's age when child was 6, mother's age when child was  $6^{10}$ , whether the father is absent permanently, father's years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, and a set of dummy variables indicating the region where the child resides<sup>11</sup>. While we largely followed the specification in Assaad et al. (2008), we excluded variables that are arguably associated with migration such as household wealth, household composition, relationship to household head, and temporary absence of parents. Similarly, we did not use variables like current household head characteristics (used by Acosta 2006) since the head (and therefore his/her characteristics) can directly change as a result of migration.

We use the same migration equation specification used in concurrent work by Roushdy et al. (2008) and Binzel and Assaad (2008). In addition to the IV variable explained above, the migration equation vector of independent variables in the migration equation  $X_2$  contains household composition and household education variables: the number of children 6-14, number of males 15-29, number of females 15-29, number of elderly 64 and above, average years of schooling for males 18 and above, average years of schooling for females 18 and above. We were careful not to include variables that can possibly be affected by migration such as the number of children in the household below age 5, household wealth, current region of residence and current household head characteristics. The number of children under the age of 5 can be affected by a spouse's absence due to migration  $^{12}$ . Similarly, the current level of household wealth can be affected by remittance inflows to the household.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Younger parents are more likely to be resource-constrained and therefore are more likely not to afford schooling. Because older kids are more likely to have older parents, we fix parents' age at a given child age to allow for a meaningful comparison. We chose to use parents age when the child was age 6 because this is the age at which school decisions are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The region definition we use incorporates an urban/rural breakdown. The regional categorization is as follows: Greater Cairo region, Alexandria and Suez Canal governorates, Urban Lower Egypt, Rural Lower Egypt, Urban Upper Egypt and Rural Upper Egypt. Greater Cairo is treated as the reference category.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> As mentioned earlier in the paper, migration in Egypt is mostly temporary. Therefore, we do not expect the number of children above age 6 to be affected by spousal absence due to migration.

#### 4. Results

Due to their large volume, detailed results are provided in the appendices of this paper<sup>13</sup>. In Appendix 1 (Tables A1.1-Table A1.24), marginal effects results are shown<sup>14</sup>. The unconditional probability of the binary schooling/work outcomes for the reference boy and girl are listed in the top row of each table<sup>15</sup>. The reference school-aged boy (girl) is a 12 year old boy (girl) who lives in the Greater Cairo region in a nuclear household. He (she) is not the eldest child of the household head. His (her) father and mother have mean years of schooling and have mean age (among parents whose child is 6 years of age). His (her) father is not absent permanently. The reference university-aged boy (girl) only differs in terms of age. His (her) age is 20 years. Coefficient estimates, including first-stage (migration equation) coefficients, are shown in Appendix 2 (Tables A2.1-Table A2.24). First-stage results show that the instrument variable we use performs reasonably well as it is consistently positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for each migration indicator instrumented for.

In all models, we test for exogeneity of the instrumented variable to the outcome variable using the estimate of *athanhrho* that is part of the output of the CMP command. It is linked to the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and migration equations. The null hypothesis is that this correlation is zero which signifies that the migration variable is exogenous to the error term in the outcome equation, in which case models assuming exogeneity (in our case Probit/Tobit models) will be more efficient and there would be no need to use an IV estimation. Estimates of *athanrho* are provided in the bottom row of each table in the appendices.

In this section, we only provide summary result tables focusing on migration indicators effects (based on the marginal effects tables A1.1-A1.24). We focus on the level of statistical significance of the migration variables. If the migration variable is statistically significant, its sign as well as its marginal effect estimate are also provided. In indicating the level of significance, a "0" denotes that the migration indicator has a statistically insignificant effect, "+++"/"---" denotes that the migration variable has a positive/negative effect that is significant at the 1% level, "++"/"---" sign indicates that the migration variable has a positive/negative effect that is significant at the 5% level, while "+" or "-" sign indicates that the migration variable has a positive/negative effect that is significant only at the 10% level.

We report results based on both the CMP and the Probit/Tobit models in the summary tables. When we have no evidence against exogeneity (i.e., when *athanrho* is statistically insignificant), we mainly use the Probit/Tobit models' estimates for interpretation. For easy reference, we highlighted the columns used in interpretation.

Table 1 shows the effects on schooling of boys. With respect to the effects on schooling attendance, we found that there is not much of an effect of migration indicators on young boys 6-11 and 12-14. In addition, there was consistently no impact on tutoring variables for school-aged boys. We found a mild positive effect of remittances receipt and remittance level on school attendance for boys aged 15-17. More importantly, remittances have a strong positive effect on attendance for university-aged boys. The unconditional probability of attending school for the reference university-aged boy is 30%. This probability increases by 20 percentage points when the household receives remittances. It also increases by 3.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> It is worth mentioning that we tried specifications where the migration indicators were interacted with having a mother whose level of education is low. This was in an effort to examine if effects like that found in the literature where the migration effect was stronger when the mother was not highly educated will hold. However, these specifications were unstable and provided unreliable results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Marginal effects are based on marginal change for continuous variables and change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For binary outcomes, the marginal effects are calculated based on the probability of a positive outcome. For censored outcomes, the marginal effects are calculated based on linear predictions.

percentage point per every 100 L.E of monthly remittances. It is worth noting that, unlike remittances, there was no positive effect of having a migrant member on school attendance of older boys 15-17 and 19-21. This suggests that the positive remittance effect is offset by the disruptive effect of the migrant absence resulting in an insignificant effect of migration.

With respect to the effect of migration and remittances on schooling of girls (Table 2), we found some evidence that migration and remittance receipt increase the likelihood of attending school. For young girls 6-11, the positive migration effect can be interpreted as a speeding-up of school attendance since we observe no effect on conditional school attendance: girls 6-11 in migrant households are less likely to be late school-entrants. There is also some positive effect of migration and receiving remittances on school attendance for older girls. However, according to the CMP model, remittance level has a negative effect on attendance for girls. The non-robustness in the result for girls schooling makes it non-trustable especially that this is one of the few schooling regressions where *athanrho* is statistically significant.

Like in the case of boys, we found that remittances receipt may increase the probability of school attendance for university-aged girls. However, the result is not as robust as for boys. Another result we found with respect to girls schooling and which we discount, is that related to the impact on private tutoring variables. Under CMP, migration variables consistently have a negative impact on tutoring. We find this unbelievable particularly that the Probit/Tobit models are generally producing insignificant impacts on tutoring taking and tutoring spending.

Now moving to the impacts on child work for boys (Table 3), we found a very large effect of migration and remittances on young boys' market work. Migration practically reduces the probability of market work to zero in the case of boys 6-14. Interestingly, living in a migrant household seems to increase the likelihood of light work for older boys 15-17 (1-hour cut-off under the inclusive definition). This seems to be driven by an increased likelihood of performing light domestic work (1-hour cut-off of domestic work).

With regard to impact on girls' work (Table 4), the results on girls' market work are unstable. The probability of market work is very low for girls, which seems to result in contradictory results. We, therefore, discount the results obtained under the market definition. Another interesting result is that unlike boys 15-17, girls 15-17 seem to enjoy a reduction in the heavy domestic hours category as a result of the remittance income.

#### 5. Conclusions

In this paper, we examined the effects of migration, remittance receipt and remittances on a host of child schooling and work outcomes. With respect to schooling outcomes, we extended the literature by attempting to look at the effect on educational investment represented by private tutoring variables. Regarding work variables, we not only studied impacts on market work but also studied activities like domestic work. This helps to shed the light on possible substitution effects in time within the household as well as to capture effects on girls' work which is often not in the form of market work.

Our findings for boys suggest that remittances have a substantial effect on school attendance for the university-aged. This makes sense given that pre-university education for boys is becoming a necessity in Egypt and hence is less income elastic compared to university education. As for girls' schooling, we found a positive impact on school attendance (ever-enrolling) and some positive effect on conditional attendance for girls 15-17. There is also a mild effect on school attendance of university-aged girls. Impacts on tutoring were insignificant for boys and implausible for girls.

The results for impacts on child work are interesting. For boys, there is a large and significantly negative impact on market work for boys 6-14 (using either cut-off). There is a negative impact on inclusive work for long durations. As for boys 15-17, we found the impact to be in the form of an increase in domestic work which indicates that boys may be substituting for their father or absent migrant household members in domestic chores. Based on the above, the remittance income effect is dominant for market work especially for young boys and the substitution effect is dominant for older boys especially for short-duration domestic work.

Different effects were found on girls' work. For market work, the results were inconclusive. For inclusive-definition work, we found a negative impact on long-duration work which appears to stem from a reduction in domestic work. This may be facilitated by households using remittance money to purchase time-saving devices.

Overall, our results enrich the literature. For example, the stronger effect we found on older boys as opposed to younger boys diverges from that found in the literature on Latin American countries. As noted earlier, in Egypt a stronger effect on the older age-group is expected because of two reasons. Younger children are more likely to be in school anyways because of a cohort effect; younger boys belong to a cohort where improvements in education in had already taken place. Also, older children are less likely to survive in school because surviving to higher education levels is generally more optional. It is also interesting that, generally, we found more of an impact on boys schooling as opposed to girls schooling unlike in the literature.

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**Table 1: Effects of Migration and Remittances on Schooling of Boys** 

					School-Ag	ed 6 - 17				University 19-21	
	Uncond. Prob.*	School Atte	endance	Conditional Attenda		Private Tu	toring	Private Tu Spendi		School Atte	ndance
		CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit	CMP Probit	Probit
		0.95		0.99		0.40				0.30	
	6 - 11	0	+++ (0.038)	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Migration	12 - 14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Migration	15 - 17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	19 - 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0
	Exog.: Y/N*	N ++		Y		Y		N ++		Y	
	6 – 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	12 - 14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Remittance Receipt	15 – 17	0	+ (0.028)	0	+ (0.006)	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
тестр	19 – 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	++ 0.225
	Exog.: Y/N*	N +		Y		Y		Y		Y	
	6 – 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	12 - 14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Remittance Level	15 – 17	0	+ (0.010)	+ (0.003)	+ (0.003)	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Levei	19 - 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	++ (0.036)
w TT 1'.' 1	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		Y	: 1 66 4	Y	.1 .	Y	

<sup>\*</sup> Unconditional probability for the reference boy, Exogeneity (Y/N) is based on the athanrho estimate, marginal effects values in parenthesis

**Table 2: Effects of Migration and Remittances on Schooling of Girls** 

					School-A	ged 6 - 17				University-A	ged 19-21
	Uncond.	School Atte	ndance	Conditional Attenda		Private Tu	toring	Private Tu Spendi	0	School Atte	ndance
	Prob.*	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit	CMP Probit	Probit
		0.94		0.99		0.43	0.43			0.2	
	6 – 11	0	++ (0.032)	+ (0.009)	0	(-0.405)	- (-0.106)	 (-461.639)	0	N/A	N/A
	12 – 14	0	0	++ (0.009)	0	(-0.347)	0	- (-242.675)	0	N/A	N/A
Migration	15 – 17	0	+ (0.026)	++ (0.009)	+ (0.005)	(-0.357)	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	19 - 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	 (-0.147)	0
	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		N +++		N +++		Y	
	6 – 11	0	0	0	0	(-0.397)	0	- (-344.199)	0	N/A	N/A
Remittance	12 – 14	0	++ (0.043)	0	0	(-0.395)	0	 (-379.374)	0	N/A	N/A
Receipt	15 – 17	0	+++ (0.037)	0	++ (0.005)	(-0.391)	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	19 - 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(-0.224)	+ (0.128)
	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		N +		N ++		Y	
	6 – 11	(-0.011)	0	0	0	0	0	(53.159)	(- 25.932)	N/A	N/A
Remittance	12 – 14	0	0	0	0	0	0	 (-52.984)	0	N/A	N/A
Level	15 – 17	- (-0.012)	0	0	0	0	++ (0.052)	0	0	N/A	N/A
	19 - 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	++ (0.008)
kI In a an diti an al mu	Exog.: Y/N*	N +++		Y		Y		N ++		N +	

<sup>\*</sup>Unconditional probability for the reference girl, Exogeneity (Y/N) is based on the athanrho estimate, marginal effects values in parenthesis

Table 3: Effects of Migration and Remittances on Child Work Activities of Boys 6-17

			Market I	Definition			Inclusive D	Definition			Domes	tic Work	
	Umaamd	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	Uncond. Prob.*	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
		0.0	)26	0.02	28	0.0	41	0.2	25	0.00	08	0	25
	6 – 14	0	(-0.022)	0	 (-0.022)	- (-0.031)	 (-0.024)	- (-0.152)	0	- (-0.008)	0	- (-0.152)	0
Migration	15 – 17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	++ (0.140)	0	0	0	++ (0.140)
	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		Y		Y		N +++		Y	
-	6 – 14	0	(-0.018)	0	 (-0.017)	0	 (-0.025)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Remittance	15 - 17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Receipt	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
D:44	6 – 14	0	- (-0.012)	0	0	(-0.026)	(-0.020)	0	0	(-0.007)	0	0	0
Remittance	15 - 17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Level	Exog.: Y/N*	Y		Y		Y		Y		N +		Y	

<sup>\*</sup>Unconditional probability for the reference boy, Exogeneity (Y/N) is based on the athanrho estimate, marginal effects values in parenthesis

Table 4 Effects of Migration and Remittances on Child Work Activities of Girls 6-17

			Market I	<b>Definition</b>			Inclusive	Definition			Domesti	c Work	
	Umaand	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	·Cutoff	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	Uncond. Prob.*	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
		0.0	005	0.0	006	0.	11	0.	41	0.0	093	0.4	41
	6 – 14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	15 - 17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Migration	6 – 17	+++ (0.349)	- (-0.004)	+++ (0.454)	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Exog.: Y/N*	Y	, ,	N +		Y		Y		Y		Y	
	6 – 14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Remittance	15 – 17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	 (-0.068)	0	0	0	 (-0.056)	0	0
Receipt	6 - 17	+++ (0.492)	 (-0.004)	0	 (-0.006)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Exog.: Y/N*	Y	, ,	Y	, ,	Y		Y		Y		Y	
	6 – 14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	+ (0.014)	0	0	0	+ (0.014)
Remittance	15 - 17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Level	6 – 17	+++ (0.003)	0	+++ (0.004)	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Exog.: Y/N*	N		N		N		Y		N		Y	

<sup>\*</sup>Unconditional probability for the reference girl, Exogeneity (Y/N) is based on the athanrho estimate, marginal effects values in parenthesis

### **Appendix 1: Marginal Effects**

A1.1	The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Boys
A1.2	The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Boys
A1.3	The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys
A1.4	The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Girls
A1.5	The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Girls
A1.6	The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Girls
A1.7	The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Boys
A1.8	The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Boys
A1.9	The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys
A1.10	The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Girls
A1.11	The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Girls
A1.12	The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Girls
A1. 13	The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Boys
A1.14	The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Boys
A1.15	The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Boys
A1.16	The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Girls
A1.17	The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Girls
A1.18	The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Girls
A1.19	The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Boys
A1.20	The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Boys
A1.21	The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Boys
A1.22	The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Girls
A1.23	The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls
A1.24	The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls

Table A1.1: The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Boys

	Atten	dance	Condi Atten			sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.947	0.949	0.989	0.989	0.300	0.300
International migrant in HH					0.029	0.096
					(0.198)	(0.061)
Interaction of M with age 6-11	-0.052	0.038***	-0.017	-0.005		
	(0.092)	(0.011)	(0.039)	(0.017)		
Interaction of M with age 12-14	-0.174	-0.009	-0.007	0.000		
	(0.148)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.008)		
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.145	0.006	-0.009	-0.001		
	(0.127)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.006)		
Age	0.076***	0.074***	- 0.009**	- 0.009**	0.680	0.684
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(1.171)	(1.171)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.004***	0.000	0.000	-0.019	-0.019
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Eldest son or daughter of head	0.008	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.035	0.035
(d)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.022	-0.022
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.011	0.010	-0.000	-0.000	-0.062	-0.062
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.007***	0.002***	0.002***	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mother's years of schooling	0.004***	0.004***	0.001***	0.001***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.020	-0.020	-0.008	-0.008	-0.090*	-0.090*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.010	0.009	0.005	0.005	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.014	0.013	0.007**	0.007**	-0.066	-0.066
<b>.</b>	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.023**	0.021*	0.006*	0.006*	0.019	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.003	0.001	0.005	0.005	-0.043	-0.046
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.051)
atanhrho_12	0.442**		0.118		0.092	
	(0.223)	4000	(0.243)	4005	(0.273)	10.50
N Robust standard errors in parenthes	4213	4202 1 ** p<0.05	4094	4086	1252	1250

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.2: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Boys

	Atte	ndance		ditional ndance		sity-Age idance
	CMP		CMP	naance	CMP	idance
	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.948	0.949	0.990	0.990	0.299	0.299
HH receives remittances					0.238	0.225**
					(0.404)	(0.0938)
Interaction of RR with age 6-	-0.079	0.0261	-0.034	-0.0193		
11	(0.108)	(0.0186)	(0.060)	(0.0312)		
Interaction of RR with age	-0.133	0.00275	-0.008	-0.00190		
12-14	(0.134)	(0.0283)	(0.025)	(0.00882)		
I ( CDD )	0.062	0.0204*	0.004	0.00624*		
Interaction of RR with age	-0.063	0.0284*	0.004	0.00634*		
15-17	(0.093) 0.074***	(0.0146) 0.0735***	(0.011) -0.009**	(0.00355) -0.00919**	0.668	0.667
Age	(0.009)	(0.00907)	(0.004)	(0.00376)	(1.174)	(1.172)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.00353***	0.004) $0.000$	(0.00376) 5.13e-05	-0.019	-0.0189
Age squared	(0.000)	(0.000382)	(0.000)	(0.000161)	(0.029)	(0.0293)
Eldest son or daughter of	0.008	0.00732	0.000)	0.00209	0.029)	0.0309
head (d)	(0.008)	(0.00799)	(0.002)	(0.00238)	(0.030)	(0.0298)
` ´	` /	` ′	` /	` ′		,
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.002	-0.00224	-0.001	-0.000964	-0.021	-0.0210
	(0.008)	(0.00826)	(0.003)	(0.00254)	(0.035)	(0.0352)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000366	0.000	4.92e-05	-0.001	-0.000920
<b>M</b> (1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	(0.000)	(0.000360)	(0.000)	(9.75e-05)	(0.002)	(0.00153)
Mother age when child was 6	0.001*	0.000716*	0.000	0.000116	0.003	0.00282
E-4b	(0.000) 0.011	(0.000423) 0.0107	(0.000) 0.001	(0.000120) 0.000999	(0.002)	(0.00179)
Father absent permanently	(0.011)	(0.0162)	(0.001)	(0.00494)	-0.032 (0.073)	-0.0316 (0.0735)
(d)	` /	` ,	` ′	` ′	` ′	` /
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.00682***	0.002***	0.00204***	0.019***	0.0190***
	(0.001)	(0.000875)	(0.000)	(0.000469)	(0.004)	(0.00356)
Mother's years of schooling	0.004***	0.00419***	0.001***	0.00127***	0.022***	0.0219***
	(0.001)	(0.000921)	(0.000)	(0.000371)	(0.004)	(0.00401)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.021	-0.0205	-0.008	-0.00831	-0.088	-0.0879
	(0.019)	(0.0188)	(0.007)	(0.00711)	(0.054)	(0.0536)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.009	0.00839	0.004	0.00442	-0.012	-0.0122
Huban Hunau Egymt(d)	(0.015) 0.014	(0.0148) 0.0133	(0.004) 0.007**	(0.00370) 0.00694**	(0.053) -0.066	(0.0525) -0.0662
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	(0.014)	(0.0133)	$(0.007^{**})$	(0.00694*** $(0.00300)$	(0.050)	-0.0662 (0.0498)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.013)	0.0123)	0.003)	0.00581*	0.030)	0.0498)
Kurai Lower Egypi(u)	(0.011)	(0.0111)	(0.003)	(0.00327)	(0.013)	(0.0504)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.001	0.000288	0.005	0.00327)	-0.046	-0.0453
itarar Opper Egypuu)	(0.013)	(0.0131)	(0.003)	(0.00330)	(0.052)	(0.0514)
atanhrho 12	0.381*	(0.0151)	0.086	(0.00550)	-0.015	(0.0511)
	(0.200)		(0.230)		(0.443)	
N	4213	4202	4094	4086	1252	1250
Dobugt standard arrars in parant				1000	1494	1230

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1
Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

Outcomes: school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.3: The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys

	Atten	dance	Condi Atten			sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.949	0.949	0.990	0.990	0.299	0.299
Level of remittances received by HH					0.012 (0.029)	0.036** (0.017)
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.005	0.001	-0.002	-0.003	(0.029)	(0.017)
interaction of the with age of 11	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)		
Interaction of RL with age 12-	0.001	0.007	0.002	0.002		
14	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Interaction of RL with age 15-	0.003	0.010*	0.003*	0.003*		
17	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Age	0.073***	0.072***	-0.010**	-0.010**	0.667	0.675
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(1.168)	(1.170)
Age squared	-0.003***	-0.003***	0.000	0.000	-0.019	-0.019
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Eldest son or daughter of head	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.031	0.032
(d)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.023	-0.024
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother age when child was 6	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.012	0.010	0.002	0.002	-0.031	-0.036
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.007***	0.002***	0.002***	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mother's years of schooling	0.004***	0.004***	0.001***	0.001***	0.022***	0.022***
•	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.021	-0.021	-0.008	-0.008	-0.086	-0.086
`,	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.008	0.008	0.004	0.004	-0.010	-0.009
3.1 ( )	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.013	0.013	0.007**	0.007**	-0.065	-0.065
301 ( )	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.020*	0.021*	0.006*	0.006*	0.018	0.021
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.005	-0.040	-0.041
EX SUR ( )	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.052)
atanhrho 12	0.169	, ,	-0.049	, ,	0.185	
_	(0.118)		(0.132)		(0.179)	
N	4213	4202	4094	4086	1252	1250
Robust standard errors in parenthes	oc *** n/0 0	1 ** n<0.05	* ·· < 0 1			

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.4: The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Girls

	Atten	dance		itional idance	Univers Atten	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.939	0.940	0.991	0.992	0.206	0.200
International migrant in HH					-0.147**	0.041
					(0.071)	(0.057)
Interaction of M with age 6-11	0.045	0.032**	0.009*	0.001		
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.008)		
Interaction of M with age 12-14	0.036	0.020	0.009**	0.004		
	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Interaction of M with age 15-17	0.041	0.026*	0.009**	0.005*		
	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.002)		
Age	0.084***	0.083***	-0.005	-0.004	1.252	1.219
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(1.021)	(1.026)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.034	-0.033
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Eldest son or daughter of head	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.064**	0.060*
(d)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.002	0.002	0.003	-0.014	-0.013
` ,	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Father age when child was 6	0.001**	0.001**	0.000**	0.000***	0.005***	0.005***
3	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004**	0.004**
<u> </u>	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.032**	0.033**	0.007**	0.006***	0.164*	0.168*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.007***	0.001***	0.001***	0.012***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother's years of schooling	0.008***	0.008***	0.002***	0.001***	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.052	-0.052	-0.009	-0.008	-0.073**	-0.072**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.025	-0.024	-0.004	-0.003	-0.035	-0.038
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.030	-0.030	-0.000	-0.000	-0.067*	-0.066*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.057	-0.059*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.081***	-0.080***	-0.010	-0.008	-0.150***	-0.156***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.031)
atanhrho_12	-0.117		-0.450		0.463	
	(0.284)		(0.327)		(0.313)	
N Robust standard errors in parenthe	4027	4021 01 ** p<0.05	3767	3762	1365	1363

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.5: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Girls

	Atte	ndance	Condition	al Attendance		sity-Age idance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.940	0.940	0.992	0.992	0.222	0.200
HH receives remittances					-0.224***	0.128*
					(0.043)	(0.0667)
Interaction of RR with age	0.035	0.0318	-0.002	-0.00267		
6-11	(0.043)	(0.0194)	(0.028)	(0.0127)		
Interaction of RR with age	0.045	0.0431**	0.006	0.00533		
12-14	(0.034)	(0.0220)	(0.007)	(0.00382)		
Interaction of RR with age	0.040	0.0372***	0.006	0.00542**		
15-17	(0.039)	(0.0142)	(0.007)	(0.00232)		
Age	0.083***	0.0832***	-0.005	-0.00453	1.119	1.227
S	(0.010)	(0.00976)	(0.004)	(0.00349)	(1.007)	(1.022)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.00405***	-0.000	-7.75e-05	-0.030	-0.0332
	(0.000)	(0.000417)	(0.000)	(0.000164)	(0.025)	(0.0256)
Eldest son or daughter of	0.004	0.00383	0.002	0.00198	0.071**	0.0571*
head (d)	(0.009)	(0.00901)	(0.002)	(0.00195)	(0.032)	(0.0306)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.001	-0.00120	0.003	0.00257	-0.011	-0.0122
	(0.009)	(0.00922)	(0.002)	(0.00188)	(0.031)	(0.0330)
Father age when child was	0.001**	0.000811**	0.000**	0.000220***	0.004***	0.00491***
6	(0.000)	(0.000367)	(0.000)	(8.52e-05)	(0.001)	(0.00138)
Mother age when child was 6	0.000	0.000414	0.000	0.000118	0.004**	0.00333**
	(0.000)	(0.000493)	(0.000)	(0.000104)	(0.001)	(0.00165)
Father absent	0.033**	0.0327**	0.006***	0.00611***	0.135	0.179**
permanently (d)	(0.013)	(0.0132)	(0.002)	(0.00215)	(0.093)	(0.0908)
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.00657***	0.001***	0.000953***	0.012***	0.0129***
rather s years or schooling	(0.001)	(0.000978)	(0.000)	(0.000330)	(0.003)	(0.00291)
Mother's years of	0.008***	0.00785***	0.001***	0.00138***	0.019***	0.0191***
schooling	(0.001)	(0.00109)	(0.000)	(0.000385)	(0.003)	(0.00329)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.054	-0.0537	-0.008	-0.00817	-0.072**	-0.0696*
meannar a ana saez(a)	(0.033)	(0.0328)	(0.008)	(0.00766)	(0.036)	(0.0363)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.025	-0.0250	-0.003	-0.00341	-0.041	-0.0379
	(0.025)	(0.0245)	(0.005)	(0.00497)	(0.039)	(0.0391)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.030	-0.0298	-0.000	-0.000140	-0.064*	-0.0650*
3,1	(0.022)	(0.0218)	(0.003)	(0.00347)	(0.037)	(0.0373)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.000973	0.002	0.00184	-0.057	-0.0602*
	(0.016)	(0.0163)	(0.003)	(0.00296)	(0.035)	(0.0359)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.080***	-0.0801***	-0.008	-0.00774	-0.142***	-0.156***
	(0.024)	(0.0237)	(0.005)	(0.00526)	(0.034)	(0.0311)
atanhrho_12	-0.024		-0.023		1.512	
	(0.327)	4054	(0.478)	25.5	(1.266)	10.53
N Robust standard errors in	4027	4021	3767	3762	1365	1363

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.6: The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Girls

	Atten	dance		itional dance	Univers Atten	
	CMP	Probit	CMP	Probit	CMP	Probit
	Probit	110011	Probit	TTODIC	Probit	11001
Base Probability (y=)	0.938	0.939	0.992	0.992	0.202	0.201
Level of remittances received by					-0.010	0.019**
НН					(0.015)	(0.008)
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.011***	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001		
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.007	0.006	-0.001	0.001		
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.012*	0.002	-0.001	0.001		
	(0.007) 0.083***	(0.006) 0.083***	(0.001)	(0.001)	1 2 4 7	1 240
Age	(0.010)		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	1.247	1.240
Age squared	-0.004***	(0.010) -0.004***	-0.000	-0.000	(1.018) -0.034	(1.026) -0.034
Age squareu	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Eldest son or daughter of head	0.000)	0.000)	0.000)	0.000)	0.058*	0.020)
(d)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.031)
• •	, , , ,	, ,		, ,	, ,	` ′
Live in extended HH (d)	0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.003	-0.012	-0.013
F. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Father age when child was 6	0.001**	0.001	0.000**	0.000**	0.005***	0.005***
M 41 1 121 6	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.003**	0.003**
Eath on absent mannamently (d)	(0.000) 0.032**	(0.000) 0.024	(0.000) 0.006***	(0.000) 0.006**	(0.002) 0.181**	(0.002) 0.178*
Father absent permanently (d)	$(0.032^{++})$	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Father's years of schooling	0.014)	0.013)	0.002)	0.002)	0.013***	0.013***
rather's years of schooling	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.013)
Mother's years of schooling	0.008***	0.001)	0.000)	0.000)	0.003)	0.003)
Within 5 years of schooling	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.054	-0.052	-0.008	-0.008	-0.070*	-0.070*
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.025	-0.023	-0.003	-0.003	-0.037	-0.036
Sv 1 ( /	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.030	-0.029	-0.000	-0.000	-0.066*	-0.063*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.060*	-0.056
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.079***	-0.078***	-0.008	-0.008	-0.155***	-0.155***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.031)
lnsig_2	2.362***		2.333***		2.226***	
	(0.086)		(0.090)		(0.152)	
atanhrho_12	0.335***		0.233		0.321*	
<b>N</b> T	(0.125)	4021	(0.145)	27/2	(0.184)	1272
N	4027	4021	3767	3762	1365	1363

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.7: The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Boys** 

	Private T	utoring	Private Tutori	ing Spending
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.415	0.414	-338.826	-338.698
Interaction of M with age 6-11	-0.173	-0.011	-128.991	103.938
	(0.270)	(0.065)	(161.274)	(142.492)
Interaction of M with age 12-14	-0.164	-0.003	-223.491	4.073
_	(0.283)	(0.074)	(175.846)	(140.477)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.089	0.087	-148.903	83.742
_	(0.327)	(0.077)	(172.061)	(150.188)
Age	0.166***	0.167***	131.026**	131.253**
-	(0.026)	(0.026)	(54.118)	(54.104)
Age squared	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.478	-0.505
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.313)	(2.312)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.069***	0.070***	91.889**	92.669**
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(45.139)	(45.158)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.007	-10.845	-15.521
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(49.629)	(49.338)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-1.151	-1.071
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.204)	(2.207)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-0.494	-0.580
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.831)	(2.831)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.012	0.013	-39.172	-38.916
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(112.632)	(112.728)
Father's years of schooling	0.006**	0.007***	12.915***	13.803***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(4.835)	(4.814)
Mother's years of schooling	0.011***	0.011***	36.067***	35.850***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.494)	(5.482)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.088**	0.089**	164.359	164.740
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(116.079)	(116.024)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.214***	0.214***	60.755	59.134
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(85.869)	(85.821)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.002	-0.003	-342.113***	-343.218***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(86.472)	(86.432)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.119***	0.118***	-155.718**	-157.291**
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(74.049)	(74.025)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.141***	-0.146***	-630.131***	-636.103***
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(92.773)	(92.647)
atanhrho_12	0.233		0.123**	
	(0.455)		(0.052)	
N	3497	3497	3497	3497

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal Effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.8: The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Boys

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.414	0.414	-338.575	-338.566
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	0.049	0.000	-78.857	110.459
Ţ.	(0.543)	(0.080)	(208.513)	(166.318)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	0.101	0.055	-104.697	73.906
	(0.515)	(0.094)	(215.085)	(164.778)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	0.088	0.040	-262.729	-78.495
	(0.544)	(0.092)	(207.089)	(175.917)
Age	0.164***	0.164***	123.894**	124.652**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(53.825)	(53.832)
Age squared	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.168	-0.209
•	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.303)	(2.303)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.070***	0.070***	92.511**	91.845**
, ,	(0.021)	(0.021)	(45.211)	(45.141)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.008	-0.007	-12.082	-14.168
• •	(0.025)	(0.024)	(49.580)	(49.380)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-1.498	-1.490
_	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.173)	(2.172)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-0.418	-0.428
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.803)	(2.802)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.015	0.015	-53.030	-56.152
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(112.263)	(112.277)
Father's years of schooling	0.007**	0.007***	13.241***	13.869***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(4.841)	(4.822)
Mother's years of schooling	0.011***	0.011***	35.907***	35.729***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.494)	(5.481)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.089**	0.089**	168.271	168.360
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(115.957)	(115.957)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.214***	0.214***	61.533	60.791
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(85.832)	(85.821)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.003	-0.003	-342.170***	-342.243***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(86.584)	(86.557)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.118***	0.118***	-156.704**	-157.118**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(74.096)	(74.087)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.147***	-0.147***	-631.123***	-633.592***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(92.643)	(92.572)
Insig_1 (sigma for tobit)			6.859***	951.973***
			(0.073)	(69.441)
atanhrho_12	-0.059		0.096	
	(0.644)		(0.064)	
N	3497	3497	3497	3497

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipts are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.9: The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.414	0.414	-338.887	-338.857
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.005	0.005	-2.619	13.147
G	(0.024)	(0.015)	(31.304)	(28.182)
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.022	-0.015	-42.360	-28.914
G	(0.019)	(0.013)	(32.837)	(28.832)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.001	0.007	-4.344	8.403
G	(0.024)	(0.017)	(43.824)	(36.314)
Age	0.167***	0.167***	131.201**	131.631**
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(53.526)	(53.530)
Age squared	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.504	-0.525
•	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.286)	(2.286)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.070***	0.070***	92.475**	91.719**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(45.208)	(45.144)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.006	-0.007	-12.376	-13.535
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(49.517)	(49.381)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-1.449	-1.727
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.148)	(2.081)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-0.342	-0.249
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.806)	(2.812)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.014	0.006	-51.648	-66.404
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(111.760)	(108.883)
Father's years of schooling	0.007***	0.007***	13.490***	13.735***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(4.837)	(4.823)
Mother's years of schooling	0.011***	0.011***	35.882***	35.756***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.499)	(5.482)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.087**	0.087**	163.769	163.752
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(115.780)	(115.805)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.214***	0.214***	59.052	60.073
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(85.941)	(85.913)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.005	-0.004	-344.033***	-342.596***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(86.570)	(86.364)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.117***	0.118***	-158.637**	-157.524**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(74.096)	(74.007)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.147***	-0.147***	-634.963***	-634.279***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(92.531)	(92.427)
lnsig_2 / Sigma for Tobit			6.859***	952.127***
	0.0-4		(0.073)	(69.522)
atanhrho_12	0.074		0.053	
	(0.136)	2.40=	(0.073)	2.10=
N  Behavet standard among in momenth asset	3497	3497	3497	3497

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the binary private tutoring variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable. Results for the left-censored private tutoring spending variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittances level are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.10: The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Girls** 

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.431	0.431	-298.432	-297.444
Interaction of M with age 6-11	-0.405***	-0.106*	-461.639***	-118.831
	(0.032)	(0.061)	(154.193)	(126.436)
Interaction of M with age 12-14	-0.347***	0.125	-242.675*	108.379
	(0.063)	(0.087)	(146.641)	(116.615)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.357***	0.083	-98.334	256.637
G	(0.054)	(0.077)	(275.503)	(230.905)
Age	0.130***	0.136***	47.160	46.988
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(54.229)	(54.169)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.004***	3.559	3.547
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.350)	(2.348)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.058***	0.063***	148.478***	149.110***
0 ( )	(0.022)	(0.023)	(47.880)	(47.793)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.010	-0.002	-36.608	-43.001
. ,	(0.026)	(0.027)	(47.209)	(47.130)
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.001	0.108	0.275
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.149)	(2.155)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	0.228	0.180
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.796)	(2.804)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.065	0.072	169.293	170.807
	(0.058)	(0.063)	(116.964)	(117.215)
Father's years of schooling	0.004	0.007**	13.527***	14.962***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.246)	(5.173)
Mother's years of schooling	0.007***	0.006**	23.703***	22.954***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.002)	(4.970)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.184***	0.195***	273.941**	274.614**
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(110.143)	(110.026)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.281***	0.286***	146.885	143.289
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(89.826)	(89.716)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.033	0.033	-348.462***	-347.440***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(90.109)	(90.025)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.170***	0.175***	-132.504*	-134.167*
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(78.016)	(77.941)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.138***	-0.164***	-731.052***	-737.972***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(100.241)	(100.039)
atanhrho_12	0.884***		0.195***	
_	(0.306)		(0.062)	
N Dehvet standard arrors in parentheses	3241	3241	3241	3241

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal Effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.11: The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Girls** 

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.431	0.431	-297.441	-296.744
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	-0.397***	-0.052	-344.199*	-27.138
· ·	(0.044)	(0.075)	(184.078)	(141.262)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	-0.395***	0.059	-379.374**	-25.532
· ·	(0.050)	(0.099)	(180.823)	(129.365)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-0.391***	0.095	-75.448	287.722
· ·	(0.056)	(0.096)	(346.560)	(262.974)
Age	0.135***	0.140***	53.169	52.162
3	(0.025)	(0.026)	(54.152)	(54.111)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.004***	3.351	3.389
<b>.</b>	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.346)	(2.345)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.062***	0.063***	149.063***	148.817***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(47.970)	(47.906)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.001	-0.001	-38.888	-39.622
` '	(0.026)	(0.027)	(46.992)	(46.995)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	0.338	0.560
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.268)	(2.271)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.002	0.014	0.016
C	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.840)	(2.846)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.078	0.084	180.307	181.319
• • • •	(0.059)	(0.064)	(121.202)	(121.463)
Father's years of schooling	0.004	0.007**	13.370**	14.773***
,	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.219)	(5.148)
Mother's years of schooling	0.007***	0.006**	23.794***	22.960***
•	(0.003)	(0.003)	(4.999)	(4.960)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.181***	0.195***	272.000**	273.793**
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(110.394)	(110.342)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.278***	0.284***	143.533	140.455
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(90.085)	(89.972)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.028	0.031	-352.921***	-350.990***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(90.508)	(90.423)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.168***	0.175***	-135.203*	-135.173*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(78.277)	(78.197)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.146***	-0.164***	-736.048***	-738.768***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(100.277)	(100.105)
Insig_1 (sigma for tobit)			6.829***	921.602***
<u> </u>			(0.060)	(55.599)
atanhrho_12	1.046*		0.185**	
_	(0.569)		(0.075)	
N	3241	3241	3241	3241

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from an IV estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipts are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.12: The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Girls

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Base Probability (y=)	0.431	0.431	-297.153	-296.998
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.021	-0.011	-53.159***	-25.923*
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(19.120)	(15.684)
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.010	0.001	-52.984***	-22.702
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(19.436)	(15.379)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	0.033	0.052**	4.031	45.022
<u> </u>	(0.029)	(0.024)	(62.095)	(58.243)
Age	0.142***	0.141***	51.435	50.389
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(53.947)	(53.944)
Age squared	-0.004***	-0.004***	3.422	3.463
3 1	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.338)	(2.338)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.064***	0.063***	150.373***	146.466***
3 ( )	(0.023)	(0.023)	(47.851)	(47.780)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.000	-0.001	-39.624	-40.606
` ,	(0.027)	(0.027)	(46.981)	(46.962)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	0.305	-0.352
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.154)	(2.157)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005	0.459
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.834)	(2.846)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.100	0.087	179.036	141.872
• • • •	(0.063)	(0.063)	(117.509)	(117.470)
Father's years of schooling	0.006**	0.007**	13.909***	14.881***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.188)	(5.153)
Mother's years of schooling	0.006**	0.006**	23.766***	22.950***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(5.007)	(4.960)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.196***	0.196***	271.305**	274.181**
` '	(0.042)	(0.042)	(110.366)	(110.365)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.284***	0.285***	143.676	145.780
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(89.798)	(89.941)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.030	0.031	-355.855***	-350.712***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(90.558)	(90.418)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.174***	0.176***	-138.466*	-134.074*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(78.347)	(78.311)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.164***	-0.164***	-737.707***	-735.273***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(100.035)	(99.957)
Insig 2 / Sigma for Tobit	2.347***	` /	2.347***	` '
<u> </u>	(0.094)		(0.094)	
atanhrho 12	0.119		0.146**	
_	(0.129)		(0.065)	
N	3241	3241	3241	3241
Robust standard errors in parentheses				

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the binary private tutoring variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable. Results for the left-censored private tutoring spending variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittances level are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1. 13: The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Boys

		Market	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Base Probability (y=)	0.026	0.026	0.028	0.028	0.041	0.041	0.256	0.254
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.011	-0.022***	-0.014	-0.022***	-0.031*	-0.024**	-0.152*	0.034
_	(0.037)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.090)	(0.048)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	0.043	0.004	0.024	0.001	0.005	0.024	-0.096	0.140**
_	(0.121)	(0.013)	(0.087)	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.023)	(0.130)	(0.060)
Age	0.011*	0.011*	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.032**	0.032**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000	-0.001	0.009	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
_	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.010	-0.010	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.010	-0.010	0.011	0.008
-	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Father's years of schooling	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.006***	-0.005***
·	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.005	0.005	0.170***	0.172***
, ,	(.)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.013	0.013	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.009	0.032	0.032
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.031)

Table A1. 13: continued

	Market Definition				Inclusive Definition			
	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	0.005	0.004	0.031	0.028
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.015	0.015	0.021*	0.021*	0.034**	0.033**	0.092***	0.087***
<b>11 31 1 7</b>	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.032)
atanhrho 12	-0.207		-0.142		0.088		0.383	
_	(0.440)		(0.390)		(0.248)		(0.277)	
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.14: The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Boys** 

		Market I	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	·Cutoff		·Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Base Probability (y=)	0.026	0.026	0.028	0.028	0.042	0.041	0.254	0.254
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	-0.016	-0.018***	-0.014	-0.017**	-0.001	-0.025**	0.038	0.039
	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.089)	(0.011)	(0.305)	(0.059)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-0.004	-0.008	-0.008	-0.012	0.048	0.000	0.102	0.103
	(0.042)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.009)	(0.158)	(0.018)	(0.337)	(0.067)
Age	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.031*	0.031*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head	-0.007	-0.007	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.003	-0.002	0.002	0.002
(d)								
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.004
,	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.011	-0.011	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.013	-0.013	0.003	0.003
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Father's years of schooling	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.005**	-0.005***
•	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004*	-0.004*
•	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	0.005	0.005	0.172***	0.172***
, ,	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.014	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.009	0.032	0.032
11 001 ( /	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.004	0.005	0.028	0.028
OV I \ /	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.029)

Table A1.14: continued

		Market Definition				Inclusive Definition			
	14-Hour	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.015	0.016	0.021*	0.021*	0.033**	0.033**	0.086***	0.086***	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.032)	
atanhrho 12	-0.043		-0.038		-0.186		0.002		
_	(0.358)		(0.337)		(0.455)		(0.416)		
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.15: The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Boys** 

		Market	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Base Probability (y=)	0.025	0.025	0.029	0.029	0.040	0.040	0.254	0.254
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	-0.013	-0.012*	0.001	-0.001	-0.026*	-0.020**	0.001	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.005	-0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.008	-0.004	0.003	0.009
_	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Age	0.011*	0.011*	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.030*	0.030*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
•	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.007	-0.007	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
-	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.014*	-0.013	-0.016	-0.017	0.004	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Father's years of schooling	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004*	-0.004*
,	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	0.006	0.006	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.014	0.014	-0.011	-0.011
OVI ( /	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.009	0.032	0.033
11 0/1 ( /	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.031)

Table A1.15: continued

		Marke	t Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour	1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	0.004	0.005	0.029	0.029
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.015	0.015	0.021*	0.021*	0.032**	0.033**	0.087***	0.088***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.032)
atanhrho 12	0.034		-0.135		0.134		0.070	
_	(0.142)		(0.127)		(0.146)		(0.108)	
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.16: The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Girls** 

		Market	Definition			<b>Inclusive</b>	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.007	0.005	0.009	0.006	0.110	0.110	0.409	0.408
Interaction of M with age 6-14					-0.039	-0.021	0.199	0.040
					(0.129)	(0.029)	(0.339)	(0.054)
Interaction of M with age 15-17					-0.042	-0.024	0.193	0.031
_					(0.129)	(0.028)	(0.335)	(0.080)
International migrant in HH	0.349***	-0.004*	0.454***	-0.002				
_	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.053)	(0.003)				
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.025*	0.025*	0.091***	0.091***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.017	0.017
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004*	-0.002	0.008	0.007	0.013	0.016
• •	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003**	-0.003**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.004	0.002	-0.001	0.005	-0.023	-0.024	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Father's years of schooling	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.009***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.001
·	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.014	0.002	0.011	-0.000	0.022	0.021	0.061	0.061
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	-0.038	-0.036
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.007	0.080***	0.080***	0.085**	0.085**
** OF * /	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)

Table A1.16: continued

		Marke	t Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour	1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.005	-0.003	-0.006	-0.004	0.024	0.024	0.007	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.011	0.009	0.015	0.013	0.105***	0.105***	0.136***	0.141***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.035)
atanhrho 12	-13.120		-13.467*		0.064		-0.208	
_	(16.286)		(8.003)		(0.468)		(0.449)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Table A1.17: The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Girls** 

		Market I	Definition		robit         CMP Probit         Probit           006         0.110         0.110           0.074         -0.028           (0.171)         (0.036)           0.005         -0.068***           (0.136)         (0.022)           006**         (0.022)           001         0.024*         0.025*           002)         (0.013)         (0.013)           000         0.000         0.000           000         0.005         0.005           002)         (0.013)         (0.013)           002         0.005         0.005           002)         (0.013)         (0.013)           002         0.006         0.007           002         (0.014)         (0.013)           000         0.001         (0.001)           000         0.001         (0.001)           000         (0.001)         (0.001)           000         (0.001)         (0.001)           000         (0.002)         (0.002)           001***         -0.005***         -0.005***           000         (0.001)         (0.001)           001***         -0.004***         -0.004***		Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.110	0.110	0.408	0.408
Interaction of RR with age 6-14					0.074	-0.028	0.231	0.089
					(0.171)	(0.036)	(0.363)	(0.065)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17					0.005	-0.068***	0.218	0.065
					(0.136)	(0.022)	(0.375)	(0.095)
HH receives remittances	0.492***	-0.004**	0.116	-0.006**				
	(0.121)	(0.002)	(0.351)	(0.002)				
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.024*	0.025*	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
•	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.018	0.018
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.006	0.007	0.016	0.017
` *	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
3	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.004	-0.031	-0.030	0.002	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Father's years of schooling	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.005***		-0.008***	-0.009***
•	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001*	-0.001*			-0.002	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.008	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.022	0.022	0.060	0.060
· /	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001		\ /	-0.040	-0.039
OU 1 \ /	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.007	0.081***	0.081***	0.085**	0.085**
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)

Table A1.17: continued

		Market	t Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour	1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.004	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004	0.024	0.024	0.007	0.007
3.1	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.010	0.009	0.014	0.013	0.105***	0.106***	0.137***	0.139***
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.035)
atanhrho 12	-16.602		-0.914		-0.244		-0.184	
_	(0.000)		(0.956)		(0.299)		(0.479)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.18: The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Girls** 

		Market I	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Base Probability (y=)	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.110	0.110	0.408	0.408
Interaction of RL with age 6-14					0.010	-0.002	0.011	0.014*
<u> </u>					(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17					0.005	-0.010	0.008	0.012
					(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.019)
RL received by HH	0.003***	-0.000	0.004***	-0.000				
*	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.024*	0.025*	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.018	0.017
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.006	0.007	0.017	0.017
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.006	-0.032	-0.022	0.003	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Father's years of schooling	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.004***	-0.004**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.000	0.022	0.022	0.061	0.061
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.002	-0.038	-0.038
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.007	0.081***	0.080***	0.086**	0.086**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)

Table A1.18: continued

		Market 1	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour (	1-Hour Cutoff		14-Hour Cutoff		Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	0.024	0.023	0.009	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.010	0.009	0.013	0.012	0.105***	0.104***	0.141***	0.141***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.035)
atanhrho 12	-0.784***	, , ,	-0.782***	, , , ,	-0.241**	, í	0.030	
_	(0.200)		(0.163)		(0.111)		(0.100)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.19: The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Boys

	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.008	0.004	0.256	0.254
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.008*	0.005	-0.152*	0.034
_	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.090)	(0.048)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.007	0.015	-0.096	0.140**
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.130)	(0.060)
Age	0.002	0.001	0.032**	0.032**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.001	0.000	0.009	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.000	-0.000	0.011	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Father's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006***	-0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.006	0.004	0.170***	0.172***
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.009	0.006	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.005	-0.003	0.032	0.032
D 11 D ((1)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.006	0.004	0.031	0.028
D 15 E (4)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.003	0.001	0.092***	0.087***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.032)
atanhrho_12	0.817***		0.383	
	(0.280)	1201	(0.277)	1201
N	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour cutoff binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.20: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Boys

	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.006	0.004	0.254	0.254
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	-0.006*	0.000	0.038	0.039
<u> </u>	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.305)	(0.059)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-0.005	0.004	0.102	0.103
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.337)	(0.067)
Age	0.002	0.001	0.031*	0.031*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.002	-0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Father's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005**	-0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.006	0.005	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.008	0.007	-0.011	-0.011
T. I. T. T. (1)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.004	-0.003	0.032	0.032
D II E ((1)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.005	0.004	0.028	0.028
D III E ((1)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.002	0.001	0.086***	0.086***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.032)
atanhrho_12	0.606		0.002	
<b>N</b> T	(0.393)	4204	(0.416)	4204
N	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A1.21: The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Boys

	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.005	0.004	0.254	0.254
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	-0.007**	-0.003	0.001	0.008
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.001	0.000	0.003	0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Age	0.002	0.001	0.030*	0.030*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Father's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.005	0.005	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.007	0.007	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.003	-0.003	0.032	0.033
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.004	0.004	0.029	0.029
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.001	0.002	0.087***	0.088***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.032)
atanhrho_12	0.479*		0.070	
	(0.290)		(0.108)	
N	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, 1-hour cutoff binary variable, and left-censored domestic hours.

Results are from IV/Tobit estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.22: The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Girls** 

	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.093	0.093	0.409	0.408
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.040	-0.016	0.199	0.040
	(0.092)	(0.027)	(0.339)	(0.054)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.044	-0.020	0.193	0.031
	(0.090)	(0.026)	(0.335)	(0.080)
Age	0.024*	0.024*	0.091***	0.091***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.001	0.001	0.017	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.007	0.007	0.013	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.022	-0.023	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Father's years of schooling	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.008***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.021	0.021	0.061	0.061
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.009	-0.009	-0.038	-0.036
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.069***	0.069***	0.085**	0.085**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.083***	0.082***	0.136***	0.141***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.035)
atanhrho_12	0.099		-0.208	
	(0.414)	4000	(0.449)	4000
N	4027	4022	4027	4022

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.23: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls** 

	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.094	0.093	0.408	0.408
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	0.046	-0.034	0.231	0.089
_	(0.135)	(0.031)	(0.363)	(0.065)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	0.007	-0.056***	0.218	0.065
-	(0.117)	(0.020)	(0.375)	(0.095)
Age	0.023*	0.024*	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.000	0.001	0.018	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.006	0.006	0.016	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.031	-0.030	0.002	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Father's years of schooling	-0.003**	-0.004***	-0.008***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.021	0.021	0.060	0.060
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.009	-0.008	-0.040	-0.039
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.069***	0.069***	0.085**	0.085**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.015	0.016	0.007	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.083***	0.083***	0.137***	0.139***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.035)
atanhrho_12	-0.229		-0.184	
	(0.276)		(0.479)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A1.24: The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls** 

	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP	Probit	CMP	Probit
Base Probability (y=)	0.094	0.093	0.408	0.408
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	0.007	-0.003	0.011	0.014*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	0.002	-0.012	0.008	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Age	0.024*	0.024*	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.000	0.001	0.018	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.006	0.006	0.017	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.031	-0.024	0.003	-0.001
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Father's years of schooling	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.021	0.021	0.061	0.061
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.009	-0.009	-0.038	-0.038
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.070***	0.068**	0.086**	0.086**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.015	0.014	0.009	0.009
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.082***	0.082***	0.141***	0.141***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.035)
atanhrho_12	-0.230**		0.030	
	(0.110)	40.7.7	(0.100)	46
N	4027	4022	4027	4022

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Marginal effects are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

## **Appendix 2: Coefficients & First-Stage Results**

A2.1 The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Boys A2.2 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Boys A2.3 The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys A2.4 The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Girls A2.5 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Girls A2.6 The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Girls A2.7 The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Boys A2.8 The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Boys A2.9 The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Boys A2.10 The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Girls A2.11 The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Girls A2.12 The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Girls A2.13 The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Boys A2.14 The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Boys A2.15 The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Boys A2.16 The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Girls A2.17 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Child Work for Girls A2.18 The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Girls A2.19 The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Boys A2.20 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Boys A2.21 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Boys A2.22 The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls A2.23 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls A2.24 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls A2.24 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls		
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A2.23 The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls	A2.21	The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Boys
·	A2.22	The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Girls
A2.24 The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls	A2.23	The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls
	A2.24	The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls

Table A2.1: The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Boys

	Atten	dance		itional dance		sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation International migrant in HH					0.083	0.262
					(0.550)	(0.161)
Interaction with age 6-11	-0.363	0.559**	-0.391	-0.153		
T 4 12 14 10 14	(0.507)	(0.281)	(0.625)	(0.428)		
Interaction with age 12-14	-0.876*	-0.078	-0.207	0.011		
Interaction with age 15-17	(0.485) -0.776*	(0.275) 0.060	(0.523) -0.247	(0.279) -0.018	0.083	0.262
interaction with age 13-17	(0.451)	(0.200)	(0.536)	(0.201)	(0.550)	(0.161)
Age	0.698***	0.709***	-0.328**	-0.331**	1.956	1.969
Age .	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(3.373)	(3.376)
Age squared	-0.033***	-0.034***	0.002	0.002	-0.055	-0.056
11ge squared	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.079	0.073	0.083	0.081	0.101	0.100
Ziacov son or anagmer or near (a)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.006	-0.019	-0.025	-0.030	-0.064	-0.064
(u)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Father age when child was 6	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mother age when child was 6	0.007*	0.007*	0.005	0.005	0.009*	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.108	0.102	-0.003	-0.005	-0.185	-0.184
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.180)	(0.187)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.213)	(0.213)
Father's years of schooling	0.062***	0.065***	0.073***	0.074***	0.054***	0.054***
, E	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mother's years of schooling	0.040***	0.040***	0.046***	0.046***	0.063***	0.063***
, c	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.169	-0.172	-0.231	-0.232	-0.278	-0.279
	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.095	0.092	0.197	0.196	-0.021	-0.024
	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.137	0.136	0.318*	0.318*	-0.197	-0.199
	(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.156)	(0.155)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.226*	0.218*	0.247*	0.244*	0.056	0.052
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.028	0.006	0.195	0.188	-0.125	-0.134
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.155)	(0.154)
Constant	-2.670***	-2.756***	4.775***	4.790***		
	(0.451)	(0.457)	(1.094)	(1.102)		
IV Equation						
No. Children 6-14	0.014		0.017			
N. N. I. 15.00	(0.047)		(0.048)			
No. Males 15-29	0.112***		0.118***			
N F 1 15 20	(0.043)		(0.044)			
No. Females 15-29	0.030		0.035			
N. Fideda (A)	(0.048)		(0.049)			
No. Elderly 64+	0.181*		0.174*			
A M-1- 10   X/	(0.097)		(0.100)			
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.044***		-0.044***			
A F1- 10   W	(0.010)		(0.010)			
Avg Female 18+ Years of	0.010		0.008			
schooling	(0.009)		(0.009)			

Table A2.1: continued

	Attend	dance		Conditional Attendance		sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
IV: % of HH with Migrants in Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	0.111*** (0.016)		0.110*** (0.017)			
Constant	-1.734*** (0.155)		-1.722*** (0.159)			
atanhrho_12	0.442** (0.223)		0.118 (0.243)		0.092 (0.273)	
N	4213	4202	4094	4086	1252	1250

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.2: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Boys

	Atten	dance		itional dance		sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation HH receives remittances					0.622 (1.020)	0.590** (0.237)
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	-0.507	0.324	-0.620	-0.433	(1.020)	(0.207)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	(0.508) -0.730	(0.310) 0.027	(0.652) -0.232	(0.475) -0.065		
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	(0.500) -0.427 (0.475)	(0.283) 0.366 (0.266)	(0.541) 0.154 (0.559)	(0.279) 0.335 (0.273)		
Age	0.697***	0.704***	-0.335**	-0.336**	1.923	1.921
8-	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(3.382)	(3.381)
Age squared	-0.033***	-0.034***	0.002	0.002	-0.055	-0.054
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.082	0.072	0.083	0.080	0.088	0.088
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.016	-0.021	-0.033	-0.035	-0.061	-0.061
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Father age when child was 6	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	-0.003	-0.003
M 4 1 131 6	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mother age when child was 6	0.007*	0.007*	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.008
Eath an absort name and sty (d)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.113	0.111	0.040 (0.194)	0.038 (0.194)	-0.092 (0.219)	-0.093 (0.220)
Father's years of schooling	(0.179) 0.063***	(0.181) 0.065***	0.194)	0.194)	0.055***	0.055***
rather's years of schooling	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mother's years of schooling	0.040***	0.000)	0.047***	0.047***	0.063***	0.063***
Would s years of schooling	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.171	-0.175	-0.240	-0.241	-0.271	-0.271
- 110.14ma114 4ma 2442(4)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.085	0.085	0.191	0.191	-0.035	-0.035
8,1 (4)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.137	0.137	0.319*	0.319*	-0.199	-0.199
11 231 ( )	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.156)	(0.156)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.214*	0.212*	0.240*	0.239*	0.038	0.038
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.013	0.003	0.183	0.181	-0.134	-0.133
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.154)
Constant	-2.639***	-2.704***	4.844***	4.847***	-17.783	-17.765
	(0.455)	(0.457)	(1.116)	(1.119)	(33.765)	(33.748)
IV Equation						
No. Children 6-14	-0.009		-0.007		0.052	
N. M. 1. 15.00	(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.074)	
No. Males 15-29	0.131***		0.136***		-0.043	
No Famelog 15 20	(0.050)		(0.052)		(0.089)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.013		-0.002		0.135*	
No Eldorly 641	(0.055)		(0.055)		(0.080)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.118		0.128		-0.281 (0.210)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	(0.124) -0.063***		(0.126) -0.063***		(0.219) 0.028	
Avg wate 10+ 1 cars of schooling	(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.028)	
	(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.022)	

Table A2.2: continued

	Attendance		Condit Attend		University-Age Attendance	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.018*		0.016		-0.005	
	(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.014)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.103***		0.105***		0.103***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.027)	
Constant	-1.802***		-1.804***		-2.342***	
	(0.171)		(0.174)		(0.335)	
atanhrho 12	0.381*		0.086		-0.015	
_	(0.200)		(0.230)		(0.443)	
N	4213	4202	4094	4086	1252	1250

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.3: The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Boys

	Atten	dance	Condi Atten	itional dance	Univers Atten	
-	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation						0.102**
Level of remittances received by HH					0.035 (0.084)	0.103** (0.049)
-	-0.052	0.010	-0.077	-0.097	(0.064)	(0.049)
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.081)		
Interaction of RL with age	0.006	0.066	0.077	0.060		
12-14	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.055)		
Interaction of RL with age	0.029	0.095*	0.119*	0.099*		
15-17	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.054)		
Age	0.692***	0.692***	-0.350**	-0.350**	1.920	1.945
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(3.365)	(3.373)
Age squared	-0.033***	-0.033***	0.002	0.002	-0.054	-0.055
igo squared	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Eldest son or daughter of	0.078	0.076	0.082	0.083	0.089	0.091
head (d)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.085)	(0.085
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.021	-0.027	-0.039	-0.037	-0.067	-0.069
Live in extended IIII (d)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.103)	(0.103
Father age when child was	` ′	` ′	` /	` ′	` ′	`
6	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.003	-0.003
March 1 1711	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004
Mother age when child was	0.007*	0.007*	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005
Father absent permanently	0.129	0.098	0.080	0.088	-0.091	-0.107
(d)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.221)	(0.222
Father's years of schooling	0.064***	0.065***	0.075***	0.075***	0.055***	0.055**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mother's years of schooling	0.040***	0.040***	0.046***	0.046***	0.063***	0.063**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.177	-0.177	-0.245	-0.245	-0.266	-0.266
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.082	0.082	0.189	0.189	-0.030	-0.026
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.153)	(0.154)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.136	0.139	0.319*	0.318*	-0.195	-0.194
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.157)	(0.157
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.211*	0.214*	0.241*	0.240*	0.051	0.060
6) F (*)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.144
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.007	0.010	0.186	0.184	-0.117	-0.120
carar Oppor Dgypt(a)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.154)	(0.154
Constant	-2.628***	-2.619***	4.902***	4.896***	-17.725	-17.96
Constant	(0.452)	(0.453)	(1.118)	(1.117)	(33.587)	(33.665
IV Equation	(0.152)	(0.155)	(1.110)	(1.11/)	(33.301)	(55.00
No. Children 6-14	-0.084		-0.049		0.578	
	(0.487)		(0.493)		(0.654)	
					-0.149	
No. Males 15-29	1.466***		1.560***		-() 149	

Table A2.3: continued

	Attend	ance	Conditional Attendance		Universi Attend	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
No. Females 15-29	-0.139		-0.034		1.431*	
	(0.552)		(0.548)		(0.799)	
No. Elderly 64+	1.380		1.419		-2.721	
	(1.219)		(1.222)		(2.092)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of	-0.635***		-0.637***		0.333	
schooling	(0.115)		(0.118)		(0.223)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of	0.230**		0.217*		-0.036	
schooling	(0.112)		(0.112)		(0.137)	
IV:% of HH with Migrants	0.956***		0.958***		0.933***	
in Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.168)		(0.170)		(0.245)	
Constant	-18.640***		-18.641***		-24.270***	
	(2.650)		(2.676)		(4.569)	
lnsig 2	2.317***		2.314***		2.287***	
<del></del>	(0.088)		(0.089)		(0.111)	
atanhrho 12	0.169		-0.049		0.185	
_	(0.118)		(0.132)		(0.179)	
N	4213	4202	4094	4086	1252	1250

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.4: The Impact of Migration on School Attendance of Girls

	Atten	dance	Condi Atten	tional dance		sity-Age idance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation International migrant in HH					-0.694 (0.458)	0.138 (0.184)
Interaction of M with age 6-11	0.562 (0.556)	0.349 (0.240)	0.728 (0.679)	0.075 (0.460)		
Interaction of M with age 12-14	0.416 (0.600)	0.195 (0.276)	1.018* (0.530)	0.277 (0.356)		
Interaction of M with age 15-17	0.501 (0.587)	0.269 (0.191)	1.098** (0.508)	0.297 (0.209)		
Age	0.698*** (0.074)	0.698*** (0.074)	-0.184 (0.189)	-0.197 (0.193)	4.398 (3.607)	4.348 (3.683)
Age squared	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.119 (0.090)	-0.118 (0.092)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.027 (0.077)	0.030 (0.077)	0.077 $(0.098)$	0.094 (0.100)	0.214** (0.099)	0.205** (0.101)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.021 (0.078)	-0.016 (0.076)	0.102 (0.097)	0.130 (0.097)	-0.049 (0.117)	-0.048 (0.120)
Father age when child was 6	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)
Mother age when child was 6	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.336* (0.181)	0.346* (0.180)	0.413** (0.207)	0.463** (0.210)	0.504** (0.245)	0.520** (0.251)
Father's years of schooling	0.056*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)
Mother's years of schooling	0.065*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.066*** (0.012)	0.068*** (0.011)	0.068*** (0.011)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.350* (0.179)	-0.349* (0.179)	-0.284 (0.198)	-0.284 (0.203)	-0.282* (0.155)	-0.283* (0.158)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.186 (0.165)	-0.183 (0.165)	-0.154 (0.174)	-0.141 (0.178)	-0.130 (0.150)	-0.141 (0.153)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.225 (0.146)	-0.225 (0.146)	-0.018 (0.160)	-0.011 (0.164)	-0.254 (0.155)	-0.254 (0.157)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.008 (0.137)	0.011 (0.137)	0.079 (0.153)	0.091 (0.157)	-0.208 (0.139)	-0.222 (0.141)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.551*** (0.134)	-0.547*** (0.134)	-0.318** (0.150)	-0.304** (0.154)	-0.621*** (0.167)	-0.669*** (0.168)
Constant	-2.488*** (0.439)	-2.481*** (0.440)	3.919*** (1.257)	4.098*** (1.282)	-41.955 (35.938)	-41.454 (36.693)
IV Equation No. Children 6-14	-0.008		0.006		0.020	
No. Males 15-29	(0.045) 0.025		(0.047) 0.022		(0.072) 0.062	
	(0.053)		(0.057)		(0.066)	

Table A2.4: continued

	Attendance		Conditional Attendance				Universi Attend	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit		
No. Females 15-29	0.050		0.070		-0.053			
	(0.046)		(0.049)		(0.087)			
No. Elderly 64+	0.316***		0.284***		0.080			
	(0.102)		(0.108)		(0.144)			
Avg Male 18+ Years of	-0.050***		-0.052***		-0.052***			
schooling	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.012)			
Avg Female 18+ Years of	0.024**		0.022**		0.030*			
schooling	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.015)			
IV:% of HH with Migrants	0.095***		0.099***		0.156***			
in Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.026)			
Constant	-1.665***		-1.668***		-1.713***			
	(0.160)		(0.163)		(0.209)			
atanhrho 12	-0.117		-0.450		0.463			
_	(0.284)		(0.327)		(0.313)			
N	4027	4021	3767	3762	1365	1363		

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.5: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on School Attendance of Girls** 

	Atten	dance		itional dance		sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation HH receives remittances	2.2.2				-1.451*** (0.505)	0.399** (0.189)
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	0.392 (0.685)	0.345 (0.285)	-0.071 (1.122)	-0.112 (0.474)	(0.303)	(0.10)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	0.606 (0.851)	0.556 (0.495)	0.452 (1.096)	0.404 (0.490)		
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	0.488 (0.761)	0.435* (0.248)	0.465 (1.055)	0.416 (0.265)		
Age	0.695***	0.695***	-0.216	-0.216	3.762	4.385
Age squared	(0.074) -0.034*** (0.003)	(0.074) -0.034*** (0.003)	(0.198) -0.004 (0.007)	(0.198) -0.004 (0.007)	(3.462) -0.102 (0.087)	(3.676) -0.119 (0.092)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.032 (0.077)	0.032 (0.077)	0.100 (0.100)	0.100 (0.100)	0.228** (0.096)	0.195* (0.100)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.010 (0.077)	-0.010 (0.076)	0.133 (0.098)	0.133 (0.097)	-0.039 (0.107)	-0.044 (0.120)
Father age when child was 6	0.007** (0.003)	0.007**	0.010*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)
Mother age when child was 6	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.012*** (0.005)	0.012** (0.006)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.344* (0.180)	0.345* (0.180)	0.454** (0.211)	0.455** (0.212)	0.407 (0.267)	0.550** (0.250)
Father's years of schooling	0.055*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.008)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.010)
Mother's years of schooling  Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.065*** (0.010) -0.357**	0.066*** (0.010) -0.357**	0.066*** (0.012) -0.289	0.066*** (0.012) -0.289	0.064*** (0.011) -0.263*	0.068*** (0.011) -0.273*
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	(0.179) -0.187	(0.179) -0.187	(0.202) -0.143	(0.202) -0.142	(0.146) -0.144	(0.158) -0.142
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	(0.165) -0.222	(0.165) -0.222	(0.178) -0.007	(0.178)	(0.142) -0.230	(0.154) -0.251
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	(0.146) 0.008	(0.146) 0.008	(0.164) 0.092	(0.164) 0.093	(0.145) -0.198	(0.157) -0.226
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	(0.137) -0.548*** (0.134)	(0.137) -0.547***	(0.157) -0.302**	(0.157) -0.302**	(0.127) -0.550***	(0.141) -0.673***
Constant	-2.460*** (0.440)	(0.134) -2.458*** (0.440)	(0.154) 4.236*** (1.315)	(0.154) 4.237*** (1.315)	(0.174) -35.831 (34.424)	(0.168) -41.846 (36.629)
IV Equation	(0.440)	(0.440)	(1.515)	(1.313)	(34.424)	(30.027)
No. Children 6-14	-0.043 (0.050)		-0.029 (0.053)		-0.075 (0.082)	
No. Males 15-29	0.083 (0.058)		0.098 (0.063)		0.012 (0.080)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.034 (0.050)		-0.023 (0.055)		-0.019 (0.078)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.250** (0.124)		0.235* (0.129)		-0.049 (0.132)	

Table A2.5: continued

	Attendance		Conditional Attendance		Universi Attend	• 0
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.075*** (0.012)		-0.080*** (0.012)		-0.061*** (0.016)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.040*** (0.011)		0.038*** (0.011)		0.020 (0.022)	
IV:% of HH with Migrants in Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	0.092*** (0.019)		0.096*** (0.020)		0.098*** (0.035)	
Constant	-1.708***		-1.691***		-1.573***	
	(0.186)		(0.193)		(0.229)	
atanhrho_12	-0.024		-0.023		1.512	
	(0.327)		(0.478)		(1.266)	
N	4027	4021	3767	3762	1365	1363

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.6: The Impact of Remittance Level on School Attendance of Girls** 

	Atten	dance	Condi Atten			sity-Age dance
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Outcome Equation Level of remittances received by HH					-0.035 (0.053)	0.069** (0.029)
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.093*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.042)	-0.087 (0.055)	-0.028 (0.066)		
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.054 (0.060)	0.051 (0.080)	-0.031 (0.057)	0.038 (0.073)		
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.099* (0.055)	0.015 (0.049)	-0.053 (0.058)	0.025 (0.052)		
Age	0.685*** (0.073)	0.690*** (0.073)	-0.200 (0.189)	-0.199 (0.189)	4.432 (3.641)	4.421 (3.680)
Age squared	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.120 (0.091)	-0.120 (0.092)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.036 (0.077)	0.025 (0.077)	0.103 (0.099)	0.094 (0.100)	0.198** (0.100)	0.209**
Live in extended HH (d)	0.000 (0.076)	-0.009 (0.077)	0.137 (0.097)	0.131 (0.097)	-0.044 (0.119)	-0.048 (0.120)
Father age when child was 6	0.006**	0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.120) 0.017*** (0.005)
Mother age when child was 6	0.004	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.012**	0.012** (0.006)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.323* (0.177)	0.233 (0.176)	0.443** (0.212)	0.386* (0.208)	0.554** (0.250)	0.547** (0.256)
Father's years of schooling	0.052*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)
Mother's years of schooling	0.068*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.067*** (0.012)	0.066*** (0.012)	0.068*** (0.011)	0.068*** (0.011)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.356** (0.179)	-0.349* (0.178)	-0.285 (0.202)	-0.279 (0.201)	-0.272* (0.157)	-0.275* (0.158)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.181 (0.163)	-0.176 (0.164)	-0.136 (0.177)	-0.137 (0.178)	-0.138 (0.153)	-0.133 (0.154)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.222 (0.145)	-0.218 (0.146)	-0.005 (0.163)	-0.003 (0.164)	-0.254 (0.157)	-0.243 (0.158)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.009 (0.137)	0.018 (0.137)	0.094 (0.157)	0.097 (0.157)	-0.224 (0.140)	-0.210 (0.141)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.537*** (0.133)	-0.532*** (0.134)	-0.294* (0.153)	-0.288* (0.154)	-0.658*** (0.166)	-0.661*** (0.167)
Constant	-2.372*** (0.436)	-2.385*** (0.439)	4.125*** (1.248)	4.126*** (1.248)	-42.312 (36.276)	-42.193 (36.663)
IV Equation	0.200		0.210		0.260	
No. Children 6-14	-0.390 (0.548)		-0.219 (0.566)		-0.369 (0.682)	
No. Males 15-29	1.179* (0.625)		1.235* (0.663)		0.531 (0.801)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.360 (0.519)		-0.299 (0.525)		0.250 (0.775)	
No. Elderly 64+	2.746** (1.352)		2.630* (1.383)		-0.479 (1.413)	

Table A2.6: continued

	Attend	ance	Conditional Attendance		Universi Attend	• 0
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.814*** (0.138)		-0.852*** (0.142)		-0.609*** (0.148)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.473*** (0.135)		0.459*** (0.135)		0.320* (0.176)	
IV:% of HH with Migrants in Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	0.929*** (0.210)		0.954*** (0.222)		1.071*** (0.271)	
Constant	-18.630***		-18.003***		-16.963***	
lnsig_2	(2.973) 2.362*** (0.086)		(3.014) 2.333*** (0.090)		(3.676) 2.226*** (0.152)	
atanhrho_12	0.335***		0.233		0.321*	
_	(0.125)		(0.145)		(0.184)	
N	4027	4021	3767	3762	1365	1363

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** school attendance for the school-aged (6-17), school attendance for the school-aged (6-17) conditional on ever-going to school, attendance for the university-aged (19-21). Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.7: The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Boys** 

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutoring Spending			
Internation of Maniel and (11	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit		
Interaction of M with age 6-11	-0.483	-0.029	-128.991	103.938		
Internation of Manida and 12 14	(0.851)	(0.167)	(161.274)	(142.492)		
Interaction of M with age 12-14	-0.454	-0.008	-223.491	4.073		
Interaction of Marith and 15 17	(0.880)	(0.190)	(175.846)	(140.477)		
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.237	0.220	-148.903	83.742		
A	(0.904) 0.425***	(0.193) 0.427***	(172.061)	(150.188)		
Age			131.026**	131.253**		
A an agreement	(0.066) -0.014***	(0.066) -0.014***	(54.118)	(54.104)		
Age squared			-0.478	-0.505		
F14t	(0.003)	(0.003) 0.179***	(2.313)	(2.312)		
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.177***		91.889**	92.669**		
I : :	(0.054)	(0.054)	(45.139)	(45.158)		
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.009	-0.019	-10.845	-15.521		
F 4 1 1311 6	(0.064)	(0.062)	(49.629)	(49.338)		
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	-1.151	-1.071		
A. d	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.204)	(2.207)		
Mother age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	-0.494	-0.580		
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.831)	(2.831)		
Father absent permanently (d)	0.032	0.033	-39.172	-38.916		
	(0.148)	(0.149)	(112.632)	(112.728)		
Father's years of schooling	0.016**	0.018***	12.915***	13.803***		
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(4.835)	(4.814)		
Mother's years of schooling	0.028***	0.028***	36.067***	35.850***		
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.494)	(5.482)		
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.223**	0.225**	164.359	164.740		
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(116.079)	(116.024)		
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.543***	0.543***	60.755	59.134		
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(85.869)	(85.821)		
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.006	-0.008	-342.113***	-343.218***		
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(86.472)	(86.432)		
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.302***	0.300***	-155.718**	-157.291**		
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(74.049)	(74.025)		
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.373***	-0.388***	-630.131***	-636.103***		
	(0.101)	(0.096)	(92.773)	(92.647)		
Constant	-3.325***	-3.365***	-1,870.721***	-1,884.828***		
	(0.422)	(0.412)	(335.710)	(335.883)		
IV Equation	, ,	, ,	,	,		
No. Children 6-14	0.013		0.013			
	(0.054)		(0.054)			
No. Males 15-29	0.145***		0.144***			
	(0.047)		(0.046)			
No. Females 15-29	0.040		0.032			
110.10.10.10.10	(0.067)		(0.052)			
No. Elderly 64+	0.157		0.168			
110. Electry 01.	(0.115)		(0.103)			
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.046***		-0.047***			
Avg wate 10+ Tears of schooling	(0.011)		(0.010)			
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.011)		0.012			
11v5 1 chiaic 10 + 1 cars of schooling						
IV. 0/ of IIII with Microsofts in	(0.010) 0.102***		(0.010)			
IV: % of HH with Migrants in			0.102***			
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.018)		(0.017)			
Constant	-1.728***		-1.723***			
	(0.176)		(0.173)			
	` /		` /			

Table A2.7: continued

	Private Tu	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending		
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit	
lnsig_1 (sigma for tobit)			6.860***	952.060***	
			(0.073)	(69.498)	
atanhrho_12	0.233		0.123**		
_	(0.455)		(0.052)		
N	3497	3497	3497	3497	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses

**Table A2.8: The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Boys** 

	Private Tutoring		Private Tutor	ring Spending
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	0.124	0.001	-78.857	110.459
-	(1.368)	(0.205)	(208.513)	(166.318)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	0.255	0.139	-104.697	73.906
-	(1.292)	(0.237)	(215.085)	(164.778)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	0.223	0.102	-262.729	-78.495
	(1.365)	(0.231)	(207.089)	(175.917)
Age	0.422***	0.421***	123.894**	124.652**
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(53.825)	(53.832)
Age squared	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.168	-0.209
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.303)	(2.303)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.179***	0.179***	92.511**	91.845**
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(45.211)	(45.141)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.020	-0.019	-12.082	-14.168
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(49.580)	(49.380)
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	-1.498	-1.490
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.173)	(2.172)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	-0.418	-0.428
P. d. d. (1)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.803)	(2.802)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.037	0.039	-53.030	-56.152
F.4. 1. C. 1. 1.	(0.151)	(0.151)	(112.263)	(112.277)
Father's years of schooling	0.018**	0.018***	13.241***	13.869***
M 4 1 C 1 1	(0.008)	(0.006)	(4.841)	(4.822)
Mother's years of schooling	0.028***	0.028***	35.907***	35.729***
A1 4-i 4 C(4)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.494)	(5.481)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.226**	0.226**	168.271	168.360
II.1 I F+(4)	(0.105) 0.542***	(0.105) 0.543***	(115.957) 61.533	(115.957)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)				60.791
Link on Linn on Formt(d)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(85.832) -342.170***	(85.821) -342.243***
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.007	-0.007 (0.092)		
Dural Lawar Egypt(d)	(0.092) 0.299***	0.092)	(86.584) -156.704**	(86.557) -157.118**
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(74.096)	(74.087)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.390***	-0.389***	-631.123***	-633.592***
Kurar Opper Egypt(u)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(92.643)	(92.572)
Constant	-3.346***	-3.339***	-1,826.781***	-1,838.402***
Constant	(0.415)	(0.409)	(333.432)	(333.877)
IV Equation	(0.413)	(0.409)	(333.432)	(333.877)
No. Children 6-14	-0.037		-0.035	
10. Children 0-14	(0.050)		(0.050)	
No. Males 15-29	0.149***		0.153***	
10. Wates 13-27	(0.058)		(0.055)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.030		-0.022	
140. Temates 13-27	(0.075)		(0.057)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.182		0.175	
No. Electry 04	(0.146)		(0.126)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.066***		-0.066***	
1115 Maic 101 1 cars of schooling	(0.012)		(0.012)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.012)		0.012)	
11.5 I chiaic 10. I cars of schooling	(0.013)		(0.012)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.106***		0.106***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)				
Smakin vinage (Cellous 00)	(0.020)		(0.020)	
Constant	-1.758***		-1.762***	
	(0.191)		(0.188)	
	. /			

Table A2.8: continued

	Private To	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending		
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit	
lnsig_1 (sigma for tobit)			6.859***	951.973***	
-			(0.073)	(69.441)	
atanhrho 12	-0.059		0.096		
_	(0.644)		(0.064)		
N	3497	3497	3497	3497	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipts are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.9: The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Boys** 

*	Private Tutoring		Duity - 4 - T- 4	win a Cu ou din -
			CMP Tobit	ring Spending
Interaction of DI with age 6.11	CMP Probit	Probit	-2.619	Tobit
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.013	0.013		13.147
Internation of DI with and 12 14	(0.060)	(0.040)	(31.304)	(28.182)
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.058	-0.039	-42.360	-28.914
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	(0.048) -0.002	(0.034) 0.018	(32.837) -4.344	(28.832) 8.403
interaction of KL with age 13-17	(0.061)	(0.044)	(43.824)	(36.314)
Ago	0.429***	0.430***	131.201**	131.631**
Age	(0.065)	(0.065)	(53.526)	(53.530)
Age squared	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.504	-0.525
Age squared	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.286)	(2.286)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.179***	0.178***	92.475**	91.719**
Eldest son of daughter of head (d)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(45.208)	(45.144)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.015	-0.017	-12.376	-13.535
Live in extended 1111 (d)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(49.517)	(49.381)
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.003	-1.449	-1.727
Tather age when enna was o	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.148)	(2.081)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	-0.342	-0.249
Wother age when child was o	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.806)	(2.812)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.035	0.016	-51.648	-66.404
rather absent permanentry (u)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(111.760)	(108.883)
Father's years of schooling	0.017***	0.018***	13.490***	13.735***
Tather's years of schooling	(0.006)	(0.006)	(4.837)	(4.823)
Mother's years of schooling	0.028***	0.028***	35.882***	35.756***
Wother's years or schooling	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.499)	(5.482)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.221**	0.221**	163.769	163.752
Alexandria and Suez(d)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(115.780)	(115.805)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.543***	0.544***	59.052	60.073
Cloan Lower Egypt(u)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(85.941)	(85.913)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.012	-0.010	-344.033***	-342.596***
Croan Opper Egypt(a)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(86.570)	(86.364)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.297***	0.299***	-158.637**	-157.524**
Ruful Lower Egypt(u)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(74.096)	(74.007)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.389***	-0.388***	-634.963***	-634.279***
Ruful Opper Egypt(u)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(92.531)	(92.427)
Constant	-3.378***	-3.375***	-1,869.788***	-1,867.683***
Constant	(0.407)	(0.407)	(332.532)	(332.222)
IV Equation	(0.407)	(0.407)	(332.332)	(332.222)
No. Children 6-14	-0.336		-0.330	
1vo. Children 0-14	(0.552)		(0.554)	
No. Males 15-29	1.797***		1.799***	
1vo. ividios 15-27	(0.644)		(0.646)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.241		-0.266	
10. Telliares 13-2)	(0.596)		(0.584)	
No. Elderly 64+	1.755		1.796	
110. Electry 641	(1.311)		(1.289)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.675***		-0.678***	
11.5 maio 10. Tours of schooling	(0.132)		(0.133)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.229*		0.233*	
1115 1 chiale 10 1 1 cars of schooling	(0.125)		(0.123)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.983***		0.985***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.185)		(0.184)	
Smaking vinage (Census 00)	(0.103)		(0.104)	
Constant	-18.628***		-18.631***	
	(2.894)		(2.903)	
	* /			

Table A2.9: continued

	Private Ti	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending			
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit		
Insig 2 / Sigma for Tobit			6.859***	952.127***		
			(0.073)	(69.522)		
atanhrho 12	0.074		0.053			
_	(0.136)		(0.073)			
N	3497	3497	3497	3497		

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the binary private tutoring variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable. Results for the left-censored private tutoring spending variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittances level are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.10: The Impact of Migration on Private Tutoring of Girls** 

	Private 7	Futoring	Private Tutoring Spending			
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit		
Interaction of M with age 6-11	-1.568***	-0.280*	-461.639***	-118.831		
· ·	(0.295)	(0.169)	(154.193)	(126.436)		
Interaction of M with age 12-14	-1.183***	0.314	-242.675*	108.379		
-	(0.383)	(0.220)	(146.641)	(116.615)		
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-1.242***	0.209	-98.334	256.637		
	(0.350)	(0.193)	(275.503)	(230.905)		
Age	0.331***	0.347***	47.160	46.988		
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(54.229)	(54.169)		
Age squared	-0.009***	-0.010***	3.559	3.547		
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.350)	(2.348)		
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.146***	0.158***	148.478***	149.110***		
-	(0.055)	(0.057)	(47.880)	(47.793)		
Live in extended HH (d)	0.026	-0.004	-36.608	-43.001		
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(47.209)	(47.130)		
Father age when child was 6	-0.004	-0.004	0.108	0.275		
-	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.149)	(2.155)		
Mother age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.004	0.228	0.180		
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(2.796)	(2.804)		
Father absent permanently (d)	0.164	0.182	169.293	170.807		
1	(0.146)	(0.159)	(116.964)	(117.215)		
Father's years of schooling	0.010	0.017**	13.527***	14.962***		
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.246)	(5.173)		
Mother's years of schooling	0.017***	0.016**	23.703***	22.954***		
, c	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.002)	(4.970)		
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.466***	0.494***	273.941**	274.614**		
` '	(0.106)	(0.109)	(110.143)	(110.026)		
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.724***	0.736***	146.885	143.289		
	(0.101)	(0.107)	(89.826)	(89.716)		
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.082	0.083	-348.462***	-347.440***		
	(0.092)	(0.097)	(90.109)	(90.025)		
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.430***	0.443***	-132.504*	-134.167*		
37 F ( )	(0.084)	(0.088)	(78.016)	(77.941)		
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.361***	-0.432***	-731.052***	-737.972***		
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(100.241)	(100.039)		
Constant	-2.764***	-2.977***	-1,446.429***	-1,468.647***		
Constant	(0.398)	(0.409)	(326.714)	(326.577)		
IV Equation	(0.570)	(0.10)	(320.711)	(320.377)		
No. Children 6-14	0.026		0.005			
10. Children o 11	(0.046)		(0.052)			
No. Males 15-29	0.036		0.032)			
NO. IVIAICS 13-29	(0.052)		(0.056)			
No Females 15 20	` ′		` ,			
No. Females 15-29	0.100**		0.070			
N. E11 1 (A)	(0.051)		(0.052)			
No. Elderly 64+	0.264**		0.300***			
	(0.114)		(0.116)			
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.050***		-0.054***			
	(0.011)		(0.011)			
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.023**		0.024**			
	(0.010)		(0.011)			
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.106***		0.103***			
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.017)		(0.018)			
Constant	-1.798***		-1.704***			
Constant						
	(0.166)		(0.182)			

Table A2.10: continued

	Private T	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending		
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit	
lnsig 1 (sigma for tobit)			6.831***	921.626***	
			(0.060)	(55.565)	
atanhrho 12	0.884***		0.195***		
_	(0.306)		(0.062)		
N	3241	3241	3241	3241	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipts are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.11: The Impact of Remittance Receipts on Private Tutoring of Girls** 

	Private '	Tutoring	Private Tuto	ring Spending
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit
<b>Outcome Equation</b>				- 70-2
Interaction of RR with age 6-11	-1.540***	-0.135	-344.199*	-27.138
	(0.423)	(0.196)	(184.078)	(141.262)
Interaction of RR with age 12-14	-1.574***	0.148	-379.374**	-25.532
interaction of fife with age 12 11	(0.541)	(0.248)	(180.823)	(129.365)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-1.539***	0.238	-75.448	287.722
inverse of fact with ago 10 17	(0.584)	(0.241)	(346.560)	(262.974)
Age	0.343***	0.356***	53.169	52.162
1190	(0.064)	(0.066)	(54.152)	(54.111)
Age squared	-0.010***	-0.010***	3.351	3.389
1 igo squared	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.346)	(2.345)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.157***	0.160***	149.063***	148.817***
Didest son of daughter of head (a)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(47.970)	(47.906)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.001	-0.002	-38.888	-39.622
Live in extended IIII (d)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(46.992)	(46.995)
Father age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	0.338	0.560
i ather age when clind was o	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.268)	(2.271)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.004	-0.004	0.014	0.016
Within age when thind was o	(0.003)	(0.004)	(2.840)	(2.846)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.197	0.213	180.307	181.319
i ather absent permanentry (d)	(0.148)	(0.160)	(121.202)	(121.463)
Father's years of schooling	0.010	0.017**	13.370**	14.773***
rather's years or schooling	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.219)	(5.148)
Mother's years of schooling	0.019***	0.016**	23.794***	22.960***
Mother's years of schooling	(0.007)	(0.007)	(4.999)	(4.960)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.458***	0.495***	272.000**	273.793**
Alexandria and Suez(d)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(110.394)	(110.342)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.716***	0.731***	143.533	140.455
Orban Lower Egypt(d)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(90.085)	(89.972)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.071	0.079	-352.921***	-350.990***
Orban Opper Egypt(u)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(90.508)	(90.423)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.425***	0.443***	-135.203*	-135.173*
Kurai Lowei Egypt(a)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(78.277)	(78.197)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.381***	-0.433***	-736.048***	-738.768***
Kurar Opper Egypt(u)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(100.277)	(100.105)
Constant	-2.858***	-3.053***	-1,490.582***	-1,508.997***
Collstant	(0.403)	(0.410)	(328.041)	(328.066)
IV Equation	(0.403)	(0.410)	(328.041)	(328.000)
No. Children 6-14	0.018		-0.019	
No. Cilitaren 0-14	(0.055)		(0.064)	
No. Males 15-29	0.092		0.104	
NO. IVIAICS 13-29				
No. Females 15-29	(0.063)		(0.065)	
No. Females 13-29	0.033		-0.023	
No. Elderly 64+	(0.070)		(0.058)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.168		0.203	
Ave Mala 10   Venus of schooling	(0.134)		(0.141)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.074***		-0.080***	
Ava Esmala 10   Vegas -f11	(0.013)		(0.012)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.035***		0.038***	
IV. 0/ of IIII with Misses to in	(0.012)		(0.012)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.103***		0.102***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.019)		(0.020)	
Constant	-1.872***		-1.737***	
	(0.190)		(0.224)	
	` '		` /	

Table A2.11: continued

	Private T	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending			
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit		
lnsig_1 (sigma for tobit)			6.829***	921.602***		
			(0.060)	(55.599)		
atanhrho_12	1.046*		0.185**			
_	(0.569)		(0.075)			
N	3241	3241	3241	3241		

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the impact on the binary private tutoring outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on private tutoring spending outcome are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. Both are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipts are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.12: The Impact of Remittance Level on Private Tutoring of Girls** 

	Private T	- Tutoring	Private Tutor	Private Tutoring Spending			
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit			
Outcome Equation							
Interaction of RL with age 6-11	-0.054	-0.028	-53.159***	-25.923*			
Č	(0.035)	(0.023)	(19.120)	(15.684)			
Interaction of RL with age 12-14	-0.025	0.004	-52.984***	-22.702			
Č	(0.042)	(0.034)	(19.436)	(15.379)			
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	0.083	0.133**	4.031	45.022			
-	(0.073)	(0.061)	(62.095)	(58.243)			
Age	0.361***	0.360***	51.435	50.389			
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(53.947)	(53.944)			
Age squared	-0.010***	-0.010***	3.422	3.463			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.338)	(2.338)			
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.163***	0.160***	150.373***	146.466***			
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(47.851)	(47.780)			
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.000	-0.001	-39.624	-40.606			
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(46.981)	(46.962)			
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.003	0.305	-0.352			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.154)	(2.157)			
Mother age when child was 6	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	0.459			
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(2.834)	(2.846)			
Father absent permanently (d)	0.252	0.220	179.036	141.872			
	(0.159)	(0.157)	(117.509)	(117.470)			
Father's years of schooling	0.016**	0.017**	13.909***	14.881***			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.188)	(5.153)			
Mother's years of schooling	0.016**	0.016**	23.766***	22.950***			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(5.007)	(4.960)			
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.495***	0.498***	271.305**	274.181**			
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(110.366)	(110.365)			
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.731***	0.734***	143.676	145.780			
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(89.798)	(89.941)			
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.075	0.079	-355.855***	-350.712***			
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(90.558)	(90.418)			
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.442***	0.445***	-138.466*	-134.074*			
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(78.347)	(78.311)			
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	-0.433***	-0.432***	-737.707***	-735.273***			
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(100.035)	(99.957)			
Constant	-3.080***	-3.074***	-1,484.071***	-1,476.917***			
	(0.407)	(0.407)	(325.716)	(325.245)			
IV Equation							
No. Children 6-14	-0.158		-0.078				
	(0.648)		(0.656)				
No. Males 15-29	1.281*		1.297*				
	(0.744)		(0.743)				
No. Females 15-29	-0.307		-0.285				
	(0.583)		(0.587)				
No. Elderly 64+	2.461		2.403				
	(1.562)		(1.548)				
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.861***		-0.863***				
	(0.150)		(0.151)				
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.470***		0.470***				
-	(0.149)		(0.149)				
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	1.008***		1.006***				
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.226)		(0.224)				
	, , ,						
Constant	-18.675***		-18.857***				
	(3.432)		(3.430)				

Table A2.12: continued

	Private To	utoring	Private Tutoring Spending			
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Tobit	Tobit		
lnsig_1			6.827***	921.597***		
			(0.060)	(55.568)		
Insig 2 / Sigma for Tobit	2.347***		2.347***			
	(0.094)		(0.094)			
atanhrho_12	0.119		0.146**			
_	(0.129)		(0.065)			
N	3241	3241	3241	3241		

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** private tutoring and annual private tutoring spending for the school-aged (6-17). Results for the binary private tutoring variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable (level of remittances unconditional on receiving remittances) and a binary outcome variable. Results for the left-censored private tutoring spending variable are from an IV estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittances level are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2. 13: The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Boys** 

		Market D	efinition			Inclusive Definition			
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Outcome Equation									
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.232	-0.623**	-0.285	-0.551**	-0.533	-0.371	-0.587	0.103	
-	(0.959)	(0.253)	(0.837)	(0.229)	(0.475)	(0.248)	(0.457)	(0.141)	
Interaction of M with age 15-17	0.467	0.066	0.285	0.009	0.056	0.226	-0.338	0.394**	
-	(0.903)	(0.199)	(0.819)	(0.201)	(0.525)	(0.185)	(0.525)	(0.156)	
Age	0.190	0.193	0.156	0.158	0.107	0.106	0.100**	0.100**	
-	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.049)	(0.050)	
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.140	-0.137	-0.156*	-0.155*	-0.027	-0.028	0.006	0.007	
_ , ,	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.052)	(0.053)	
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.053	-0.045	-0.067	-0.061	-0.005	-0.009	0.027	0.009	
×,	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.062)	
Father age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	
-	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003	
-	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.204	-0.201	-0.273	-0.270	-0.123	-0.126	0.034	0.026	
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.193)	(0.196)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.137)	(0.140)	
Father's years of schooling	-0.060***	-0.062***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.020***	-0.017***	
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	
Mother's years of schooling	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.011*	-0.012*	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.017	-0.016	-0.036	-0.035	0.051	0.051	0.478***	0.483***	
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.106)	(0.108)	
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.032	0.035	0.035	0.037	0.134	0.133	-0.028	-0.036	
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.112)	(0.114)	
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.096	0.099	0.081	0.083	0.094	0.093	0.097	0.096	
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.092)	(0.094)	
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.102	-0.096	-0.096	-0.092	0.050	0.048	0.094	0.087	
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.088)	(0.089)	

Table A2.13: continued

		Market l	Definition			Inclusive	usive Definition		
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.219	0.230*	0.277**	0.285**	0.330**	0.326**	0.276***	0.260***	
	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.091)	(0.092)	
Constant	-3.416***	-3.431***	-3.185***	-3.193***	-2.733***	-2.735***	-1.675***	-1.729***	
	(0.802)	(0.807)	(0.731)	(0.734)	(0.599)	(0.597)	(0.316)	(0.313)	
IV Equation			, , ,		, ,			, ,	
No. Children 6-14	0.012		0.010		0.007		0.013		
	(0.049)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.047)		
No. Males 15-29	0.109**		0.108**		0.105**		0.101**		
	(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.043)		
No. Females 15-29	0.033		0.032		0.033		0.037		
	(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.047)		
No. Elderly 64+	0.185*		0.188*		0.192**		0.208**		
•	(0.098)		(0.098)		(0.098)		(0.098)		
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.043***		-0.043***		-0.043***		-0.043***		
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.009)		
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.010		0.010		0.010		0.010		
	(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.009)		
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.110***		0.111***		0.112***		0.112***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.017)		
Constant	-1.735***		-1.731***		-1.729***		-1.744***		
	(0.160)		(0.159)		(0.159)		(0.155)		
atanhrho 12	-0.207		-0.142		0.088		0.383		
_	(0.440)		(0.390)		(0.248)		(0.277)		
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.14: The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Boys** 

			Definition			Inclusive Definition			
	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	-0.370	-0.459*	-0.282	-0.360	-0.013	-0.403	0.115	0.118	
	(0.822)	(0.274)	(0.766)	(0.251)	(1.020)	(0.249)	(0.891)	(0.171)	
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-0.071	-0.161	-0.141	-0.221	0.389	0.002	0.293	0.297*	
-	(0.807)	(0.221)	(0.761)	(0.222)	(0.980)	(0.206)	(0.908)	(0.180)	
Age	0.182	0.183	0.147	0.147	0.099	0.100	0.097*	0.097*	
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.050)	(0.050)	
Age squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.132	-0.131	-0.149*	-0.148*	-0.031	-0.026	0.006	0.006	
-	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.053)	(0.052)	
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.050	-0.049	-0.065	-0.064	-0.013	-0.009	0.012	0.012	
. ,	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.062)	
Father age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.001	
•	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Mother age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.002	
· ·	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.219	-0.219	-0.277	-0.277	-0.170	-0.169	0.010	0.010	
•	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.140)	(0.141)	
Father's years of schooling	-0.062***	-0.062***	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.017**	-0.017***	
, c	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	
Mother's years of schooling	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.012*	-0.012*	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.028	-0.027	0.057	0.059	0.484***	0.484***	
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.108)	(0.108)	
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.044	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.138	0.139	-0.036	-0.036	
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.114)	
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.100	0.100	0.084	0.084	0.096	0.096	0.099	0.099	
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.094)	(0.094)	
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.092	-0.091	-0.088	-0.087	0.049	0.050	0.086	0.086	
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.089)	(0.089)	
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.230	0.231*	0.286**	0.287**	0.320**	0.325**	0.260***	0.260***	
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.093)	(0.092)	
Constant	-3.396***	-3.396***	-3.164***	-3.164***	-2.704***	-2.702***	-1.706***	-1.706***	
	(0.808)	(0.808)	(0.733)	(0.734)	(0.598)	(0.600)	(0.315)	(0.313)	

Table A2.14: continued

		Market	Definition			<b>Inclusive Definition</b>			
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour (	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour (	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
IV Equation									
No. Children 6-14	-0.014		-0.015		-0.012		-0.016		
	(0.049)		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.047)		
No. Males 15-29	0.121**		0.121**		0.124**		0.120**		
	(0.053)		(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.051)		
No. Females 15-29	-0.010		-0.010		-0.011		-0.010		
	(0.055)		(0.055)		(0.055)		(0.055)		
No. Elderly 64+	0.137		0.137		0.134		0.139		
,	(0.124)		(0.124)		(0.122)		(0.128)		
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.062***		-0.062***		-0.062***		-0.062***		
č	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.010)		
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.018*		0.018*		0.018*		0.018*		
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.103***		0.103***		0.102***		0.103***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.020)		
Constant	-1.794***		-1.793***		-1.796***		-1.793***		
	(0.176)		(0.174)		(0.173)		(0.177)		
atanhrho 12	-0.043		-0.038		-0.186		0.002		
_	(0.358)		(0.337)		(0.455)		(0.416)		
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.15: The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Boys

			Definition				Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	-0.216	-0.197*	0.023	-0.019	-0.301**	-0.227**	0.005	0.024
	(0.144)	(0.103)	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.153)	(0.103)	(0.041)	(0.027)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.077	-0.064	-0.015	-0.067	-0.095	-0.046	0.010	0.030
-	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.026)
Age	0.185	0.185	0.141	0.143	0.104	0.102	0.095*	0.094*
_	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.129	-0.130	-0.149*	-0.146*	-0.021	-0.024	0.007	0.006
. ,	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.041	-0.043	-0.065	-0.060	0.001	-0.003	0.014	0.012
. ,	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Father age when child was 6	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	0.000
C	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.258	-0.261	-0.273	-0.248	-0.225	-0.241	0.013	-0.007
•	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.141)	(0.138)
Father's years of schooling	-0.062***	-0.062***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.018***	-0.017***
,	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.036***	-0.037***	-0.012*	-0.012*
,	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	-0.004	-0.004	-0.023	-0.022	0.064	0.063	0.484***	0.485***
. ,	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.047	0.047	0.046	0.046	0.143	0.144	-0.034	-0.033
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.099	0.099	0.084	0.081	0.095	0.097	0.099	0.101
11 631 ( )	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.093	-0.092	-0.088	-0.092	0.050	0.053	0.088	0.090
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.227	0.228	0.284**	0.281**	0.324**	0.327**	0.263***	0.264***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Constant	-3.405***	-3.402***	-3.153***	-3.179***	-2.703***	-2.694***	-1.694***	-1.685***
	(0.809)	(0.809)	(0.729)	(0.729)	(0.602)	(0.602)	(0.312)	(0.312)

Table A2.15: continued

		Market	Definition		Inclusive Definition			
	14-Hour (	Cutoff	1-Hour (	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour C	utoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
IV Equation								
No. Children 6-14	-0.130		-0.091		-0.150		-0.108	
	(0.496)		(0.484)		(0.494)		(0.487)	
No. Males 15-29	1.401**		1.447***		1.369**		1.395**	
	(0.569)		(0.560)		(0.570)		(0.561)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.120		-0.129		-0.106		-0.126	
	(0.547)		(0.549)		(0.548)		(0.545)	
No. Elderly 64+	1.478		1.419		1.485		1.495	
Ž	(1.224)		(1.217)		(1.232)		(1.234)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.628***		-0.633***		-0.625***		-0.627***	
	(0.116)		(0.116)		(0.116)		(0.116)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.229**		0.232**		0.228**		0.231**	
2	(0.113)		(0.113)		(0.113)		(0.113)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.955***		0.940***		0.958***		0.956***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.167)		(0.168)		(0.167)		(0.168)	
Constant	-18.581***		-18.631***		-18.556***		-18.633***	
	(2.670)		(2.656)		(2.673)		(2.659)	
atanhrho 12	0.034		-0.135		0.134		0.070	
_	(0.142)		(0.127)		(0.146)		(0.108)	
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204	4213	4204

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.16: The Impact of Migration on Child Work for Girls

		Market	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
International migrant in HH	2.189***	-0.418	2.389***	-0.145				
-	(0.096)	(0.327)	(0.083)	(0.229)				
Interaction of M with age 6-14					-0.238	-0.120	0.505	0.103
_					(0.915)	(0.178)	(0.877)	(0.136)
Interaction of M with age 15-17					-0.264	-0.137	0.488	0.079
_					(0.971)	(0.175)	(0.867)	(0.202)
Age	0.052	0.060	0.023	0.063	0.134*	0.135*	0.234***	0.235***
	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.109)	(0.122)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.022	0.013	0.082	0.111	0.031	0.031	0.044	0.044
- , ,	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.091)	(0.112)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.147	-0.131	-0.157	-0.116	0.042	0.039	0.033	0.041
. ,	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.100)	(0.138)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	-0.005**	0.003	0.000	0.005	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.003	-0.010*	-0.009**	-0.012**	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.008**	-0.008**
-	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.224	0.143	-0.022	0.224	-0.133	-0.136	-0.033	-0.028
	(0.236)	(0.281)	(0.216)	(0.263)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Father's years of schooling	-0.056***	-0.060***	-0.059***	-0.066***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.021***	-0.023***
, c	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.054**	-0.047*	-0.042***	-0.033	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.428*	0.122	0.312	-0.008	0.109	0.108	0.154	0.155
	(0.247)	(0.314)	(0.222)	(0.303)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.029	0.041	0.025	0.028	0.015	0.014	-0.098	-0.095
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.257)	(0.259)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.316	0.322	0.303	0.307	0.370***	0.370***	0.215**	0.216**
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.213)	(0.230)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.257	-0.250	-0.272	-0.254	0.122	0.121	0.018	0.021
	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.416*	0.480**	0.442**	0.503**	0.491***	0.488***	0.348***	0.359***
·· ·· - rr ·0)r ·(··)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.205)	(0.218)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.095)	(0.090)

Table A2.16: continued

	Market Definition				Inclusive Definition				
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Constant	-2.612***	-2.761***	-2.508***	-2.850***	-2.533***	-2.541***	-2.425***	-2.414***	
	(0.812)	(0.799)	(0.704)	(0.763)	(0.462)	(0.457)	(0.309)	(0.311)	
IV Equation	•		, , ,		, ,	, ,	, ,	,	
No. Children 6-14	-0.007		-0.013		-0.008		-0.015		
	(0.035)		(0.031)		(0.046)		(0.047)		
No. Males 15-29	0.038		0.029		0.028		0.034		
	(0.041)		(0.048)		(0.051)		(0.052)		
No. Females 15-29	0.045		0.044		0.052		0.036		
	(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.067)		(0.061)		
No. Elderly 64+	0.310***		0.289***		0.313***		0.322***		
•	(0.033)		(0.050)		(0.101)		(0.101)		
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.052***		-0.052***		-0.050***		-0.050***		
	(0.008)		(0.006)		(0.010)		(0.010)		
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.025***		0.024***		0.024**		0.022*		
	(0.007)		(0.003)		(0.010)		(0.011)		
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.088***		0.083***		0.095***		0.095***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.014)		(0.008)		(0.017)		(0.017)		
Constant	-1.646***		-1.601***		-1.668***		-1.631***		
	(0.100)		(0.086)		(0.184)		(0.180)		
atanhrho 12	-13.120		-13.467*		0.064		-0.208		
_	(16.286)		(8.003)		(0.468)		(0.449)		
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.17: The Impact of Remittances Receipt on Child Work for Girls** 

		Market	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
HH receives remittances	2.573***	-0.561	1.324	-0.613				
	(0.231)	(0.391)	(1.752)	(0.397)				
Interaction of RR with age 6-14					0.330	-0.166	0.589	0.225
_					(0.647)	(0.237)	(0.964)	(0.164)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17					0.026	-0.504**	0.553	0.165
-					(0.698)	(0.238)	(0.988)	(0.240)
Age	0.040	0.059	0.057	0.061	0.129*	0.132*	0.236***	0.237***
_	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	-0.004	0.012	0.097	0.106	0.025	0.027	0.045	0.046
. , ,	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.151	-0.131	-0.126	-0.117	0.032	0.035	0.041	0.044
` ′	(0.145)	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.010**	-0.011**	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.009***	-0.009***
C	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.014	0.161	0.128	0.168	-0.183	-0.176	0.004	0.008
1	(0.284)	(0.270)	(0.277)	(0.258)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.144)	(0.143)
Father's years of schooling	-0.055***	-0.060***	-0.063***	-0.066***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.021***	-0.023***
, c	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.055**	-0.047*	-0.035*	-0.033	-0.021***	-0.020**	-0.004	-0.003
, c	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.318	0.133	0.068	0.021	0.110	0.111	0.153	0.153
` ′	(0.249)	(0.309)	(0.361)	(0.298)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.039	0.045	0.029	0.031	0.014	0.018	-0.105	-0.101
	(0.279)	(0.279)	(0.257)	(0.259)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.302	0.320	0.305	0.309	0.371***	0.372***	0.215**	0.215**
	(0.238)	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.262	-0.252	-0.255	-0.251	0.122	0.124	0.017	0.018
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.434*	0.473**	0.492**	0.509**	0.489***	0.495***	0.350***	0.355***
	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.092)	(0.090)

Table A2.17: continued

		Market 1	Definition		Inclusive Definition				
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Constant	-2.590***	-2.760***	-2.801***	-2.822***	-2.520***	-2.520***	-2.450***	-2.440***	
	(0.787)	(0.801)	(0.778)	(0.768)	(0.451)	(0.453)	(0.309)	(0.310)	
IV Equation									
No. Children 6-14	-0.043		-0.043		-0.048		-0.047		
	(0.044)		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.050)		
No. Males 15-29	0.088		0.085		0.087		0.089		
	(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.056)		
No. Females 15-29	-0.031		-0.034		-0.048		-0.043		
	(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.058)		(0.062)		
No. Elderly 64+	0.246**		0.241**		0.254**		0.257**		
•	(0.110)		(0.122)		(0.119)		(0.126)		
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.075***		-0.076***		-0.075***		-0.075***		
	(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.012)		
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.040***		0.040***		0.039***		0.039***		
	(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.013)		
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.084***		0.089***		0.091***		0.092***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.019)		(0.019)		
Constant	-1.684***		-1.692***		-1.675***		-1.691***		
	(0.132)		(0.188)		(0.201)		(0.194)		
atanhrho_12	-16.602		-0.914		-0.244		-0.184		
_	(0.000)		(0.956)		(0.299)		(0.479)		
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.18: The Impact of Remittance Level on Child Work for Girls** 

		Market	Definition			Inclusive	Definition	
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit						
Remittance Level	0.204***	-0.007	0.200***	-0.013				
	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.035)	(0.074)				
Interaction of RL with age 6-14					0.052	-0.012	0.029	0.035*
C					(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17					0.027	-0.053	0.020	0.030
-					(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Age	0.061	0.061	0.063	0.063	0.129*	0.134*	0.238***	0.238***
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.007	0.018	0.100	0.112	0.026	0.031	0.045	0.045
- , ,	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	-0.140	-0.129	-0.126	-0.115	0.032	0.037	0.043	0.043
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.006	-0.004	-0.002	0.002	0.001
-	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.010*	-0.012**	-0.011**	-0.013**	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.009***	-0.008***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.156	0.249	0.161	0.254	-0.186	-0.127	0.007	-0.002
	(0.272)	(0.263)	(0.259)	(0.251)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.145)	(0.141)
Father's years of schooling	-0.057***	-0.059***	-0.063***	-0.065***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.049**	-0.047*	-0.035*	-0.033	-0.021***	-0.020**	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.138	0.103	0.028	-0.009	0.111	0.110	0.155	0.156
	(0.310)	(0.302)	(0.296)	(0.291)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.037	0.041	0.024	0.027	0.015	0.013	-0.100	-0.099
	(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.321	0.317	0.310	0.306	0.372***	0.368***	0.218**	0.219**
	(0.244)	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	-0.249	-0.256	-0.249	-0.256	0.124	0.118	0.022	0.023
	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.089)	(0.089)

Table A2.18: continued

		Market l	Definition		Inclusive Definition				
	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.465**	0.461*	0.501**	0.496**	0.488***	0.486***	0.359***	0.359***	
	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.090)	(0.090)	
Constant	-2.789***	-2.799***	-2.848***	-2.859***	-2.513***	-2.550***	-2.439***	-2.438***	
	(0.790)	(0.793)	(0.758)	(0.761)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.310)	(0.310)	
IV Equation		,	, , ,		, ,		, ,		
No. Children 6-14	-0.365		-0.354		-0.415		-0.357		
	(0.552)		(0.552)		(0.550)		(0.547)		
No. Males 15-29	1.052*		1.049*		1.077*		1.039*		
	(0.620)		(0.620)		(0.613)		(0.622)		
No. Females 15-29	-0.316		-0.313		-0.475		-0.302		
	(0.510)		(0.508)		(0.518)		(0.525)		
No. Elderly 64+	2.755**		2.717**		2.852**		2.782**		
•	(1.359)		(1.359)		(1.338)		(1.372)		
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.822***		-0.823***		-0.823***		-0.815***		
	(0.139)		(0.139)		(0.138)		(0.139)		
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.481***		0.480***		0.477***		0.486***		
	(0.134)		(0.134)		(0.136)		(0.136)		
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.915***		0.915***		0.935***		0.945***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.210)		(0.209)		(0.211)		(0.211)		
Constant	-18.539***		-18.539***		-18.353***		-18.709***		
	(2.972)		(2.982)		(2.981)		(2.983)		
atanhrho 12	-0.784***		-0.782***		-0.241**		0.030		
_	(0.200)		(0.163)		(0.111)		(0.100)		
N	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	4027	4022	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All child work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). The market definition includes only market work while the inclusive definition includes market, subsistence and domestic work. For both market and inclusive definitions, 14-hour and 1-hour cutoffs are used to denote the number of hours per week that such work is undertaken. Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable, carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.19: The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Boys** 

	14-Hour	r Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.818**	0.284	-0.587	0.103
C	(0.342)	(0.328)	(0.457)	(0.141)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.594	0.567*	-0.338	0.394**
S	(0.387)	(0.324)	(0.525)	(0.156)
Age	0.105	0.114	0.100**	0.100**
E	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Age squared	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.169	0.195	0.006	0.007
	(0.123)	(0.138)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.047	0.007	0.027	0.009
	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Father age when child was 6	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.001
Č	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.018***	-0.020***	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	0.012	-0.019	0.034	0.026
	(0.342)	(0.394)	(0.137)	(0.140)
Father's years of schooling	-0.016	-0.004	-0.020***	-0.017***
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.015	-0.020	-0.011*	-0.012*
5	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.237	0.255	0.478***	0.483***
	(0.283)	(0.320)	(0.106)	(0.108)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.324	0.341	-0.028	-0.036
<i>SJ</i> F · ( · · )	(0.291)	(0.328)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.262	-0.314	0.097	0.096
11 231 ( )	(0.323)	(0.369)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.246	0.242	0.094	0.087
	(0.247)	(0.279)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.122	0.075	0.276***	0.260***
	(0.254)	(0.290)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Constant	-2.544***	-2.807***	-1.675***	-1.729***
	(0.936)	(1.018)	(0.316)	(0.313)
IV Equation	(*** - *)	( )	()	()
No. Children 6-14	0.015		0.013	
	(0.047)		(0.047)	
No. Males 15-29	0.109**		0.101**	
	(0.043)		(0.043)	
No. Females 15-29	0.041		0.037	
	(0.048)		(0.047)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.188*		0.208**	
	(0.097)		(0.098)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.043***		-0.043***	
	(0.009)		(0.009)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.010		0.010	
	(0.009)		(0.009)	
	(0.00)		(0.00)	

Table A2.19: continued

	14-Hour	Cutoff	1-Hour Cutoff		
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.112***		0.112***		
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.016)		(0.017)		
Constant	-1.757***		-1.744***		
	(0.159)		(0.155)		
atanhrho 12	0.817***		0.383		
_	(0.280)		(0.277)		
N	4213	4204	4213	4204	

Reference category: Greater Cairo Region. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Note: Since there could be more than one child per household, we use the clustering option so that in computing the standard errors, it is taken into account that the observations are not necessarily independent within households.

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour cutoff binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.20: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Boys

	14-Hour	·Cutoff	1-Hour	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	-0.903*	0.013	0.115	0.118
	(0.539)	(0.404)	(0.891)	(0.171)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	-0.694	0.250	0.293	0.297*
	(0.607)	(0.434)	(0.908)	(0.180)
Age	0.098	0.102	0.097*	0.097*
	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age squared	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.179	0.182	0.006	0.006
	(0.130)	(0.136)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.030	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Father age when child was 6	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.002	-0.002
-	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.133	-0.157	0.010	0.010
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.374)	(0.397)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Father's years of schooling	-0.013	-0.004	-0.017**	-0.017***
,	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.017	-0.019	-0.012*	-0.012*
, E	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.259	0.277	0.484***	0.484***
· /	(0.304)	(0.321)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.327	0.350	-0.036	-0.036
8,1 (*)	(0.315)	(0.328)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.285	-0.289	0.099	0.099
-87F1(m)	(0.345)	(0.366)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.249	0.262	0.086	0.086
rtarar Eower Egypt(a)	(0.262)	(0.278)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.098	0.098	0.260***	0.260***
rear oppor Egypt(a)	(0.270)	(0.288)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Constant	-2.506**	-2.657***	-1.706***	-1.706***
Constant	(0.987)	(1.012)	(0.315)	(0.313)
IV Equation	(0.767)	(1.012)	(0.313)	(0.515)
No. Children 6-14	-0.012		-0.016	
No. Cilidren 0-14	(0.046)		(0.047)	
No. Males 15-29	0.121**		0.120**	
INO. IVIAICS 13-29				
No Famalas 15 20	(0.050)		(0.051)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.005		-0.010	
N. E11 1 (A)	(0.055)		(0.055)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.138		0.139	
	(0.122)		(0.128)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.061***		-0.062***	
	(0.010)		(0.010)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.018*		0.018*	
	(0.011)		(0.011)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.104***		0.103***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.019)		(0.020)	
Constant	-1.811***		-1.793***	
	(0.177)		(0.177)	
atanhrho 12	0.606		0.002	
	(0.393)		(0.416)	
	(0.575)	4204	4213	4204

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.21: The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Boys

	14-Hour		1-Hour	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	-0.537***	-0.246*	0.005	0.024
_	(0.175)	(0.145)	(0.041)	(0.027)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17	-0.079	0.028	0.010	0.030
· ·	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.026)
Age	0.109	0.105	0.095*	0.094*
8	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age squared	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.182	0.177	0.007	0.006
(u)	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.026	0.005	0.014	0.012
21, 6 m 66.maa 1111 (u)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Father age when child was 6	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.000
rather age when enna was o	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.017***	-0.018***	-0.002	-0.002
moner age when elling was o	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.174	-0.247	0.013	-0.007
i amoi aoseni permanentiy (u)	(0.381)	(0.398)	(0.141)	(0.138)
Father's years of schooling	-0.010	-0.005	-0.018***	-0.017***
rainers years or schooling				
Mother's years of sekeeling	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.017	-0.019	-0.012*	-0.012*
A1 1: 10 (1)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.262	0.278	0.484***	0.485***
T. 1	(0.311)	(0.322)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	0.332	0.360	-0.034	-0.033
	(0.319)	(0.329)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	-0.288	-0.276	0.099	0.101
	(0.349)	(0.366)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.244	0.274	0.088	0.090
	(0.267)	(0.280)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.094	0.117	0.263***	0.264***
	(0.277)	(0.285)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Constant	-2.590***	-2.610***	-1.694***	-1.685***
	(0.972)	(1.005)	(0.312)	(0.312)
IV Equation				
No. Children 6-14	-0.101		-0.108	
	(0.487)		(0.487)	
No. Males 15-29	1.412**		1.395**	
	(0.560)		(0.561)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.080		-0.126	
	(0.550)		(0.545)	
No. Elderly 64+	1.449		1.495	
	(1.224)		(1.234)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.627***		-0.627***	
11.5 Mare 10. Tears of sentoning	(0.115)		(0.116)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.234**		0.231**	
1115 1 chiaic 10 + 1 cars of schooling	(0.113)		(0.113)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.961***		0.956***	
_				
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.168)		(0.168)	
Constant	-18.714***		-18.633***	
	(2.674)		(2.659)	
atanhrho 12	0.479*		0.070	
	(0.290)		(0.108)	
	(U.2/U)		(0.100)	

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, 1-hour cutoff binary variable, and left-censored domestic hours.

Results are from IV/Tobit estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance level are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.22: The Impact of Migration on Domestic Work for Girls** 

	14-Hou	r Cutoff	1-Hour (	Cutoff
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of M with age 6-14	-0.287	-0.104	0.505	0.103
C	(0.804)	(0.185)	(0.877)	(0.136)
Interaction of M with age 15-17	-0.328	-0.132	0.488	0.079
-	(0.859)	(0.183)	(0.867)	(0.202)
Age	0.144*	0.145*	0.234***	0.235***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.008	0.007	0.044	0.044
-	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.044	0.039	0.033	0.041
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.001
-	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.008**	-0.008**
-	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.143	-0.149	-0.033	-0.028
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Father's years of schooling	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.023***
,	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.018**	-0.019**	-0.004	-0.003
,	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.118	0.118	0.154	0.155
( )	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.053	-0.055	-0.098	-0.095
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.355***	0.355***	0.215**	0.216**
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.089	0.087	0.018	0.021
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.436***	0.431***	0.348***	0.359***
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Constant	-2.804***	-2.818***	-2.425***	-2.414***
	(0.495)	(0.491)	(0.309)	(0.311)
IV Equation	,	,	,	,
No. Children 6-14	-0.007		-0.015	
	(0.047)		(0.047)	
No. Males 15-29	0.027		0.034	
	(0.052)		(0.052)	
No. Females 15-29	0.054		0.036	
	(0.062)		(0.061)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.312***		0.322***	
,	(0.102)		(0.101)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.050***		-0.050***	
Triginal to Tomo of Somooning	(0.010)		(0.010)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.024**		0.022*	
Trigit entire to the entire trigit.	(0.010)		(0.011)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.095***		0.095***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	0.070		0.000	
	(0.017)		(0.017)	
Constant	-1.671***		-1.631***	
	(0.174)		(0.180)	
atanhrho 12	0.099		-0.208	
<u></u>	(0.414)		(0.449)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022
Poblist standard arrors in parantheses			TU4 /	TU22

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of migration are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.23: The Impact of Remittance Receipt on Domestic Work for Girls

	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of RR with age 6-14	0.238	-0.234	0.589	0.225
Č	(0.614)	(0.261)	(0.964)	(0.164)
Interaction of RR with age 15-17	0.038	-0.462*	0.553	0.165
	(0.663)	(0.242)	(0.988)	(0.240)
Age	0.140*	0.142*	0.236***	0.237***
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	0.001	0.003	0.045	0.046
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.033	0.036	0.041	0.044
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	-0.004	-0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.009***
Father absent permanently (d)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
	-0.206	-0.199	0.004	0.008
D-4hd	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.143)
Father's years of schooling	-0.019**	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.020**	-0.019**	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Alexandria and Suez(d)	0.119	0.120	0.153	0.153
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	-0.053	-0.049	-0.105	-0.101
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	0.356***	0.357***	0.215**	0.215**
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.089	0.091	0.017	0.018
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.433***	0.438***	0.350***	0.355***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.092)	(0.090)
Constant	-2.794***	-2.790***	-2.450***	-2.440***
	(0.489)	(0.490)	(0.309)	(0.310)
IV Equation				
No. Children 6-14	-0.048		-0.047	
	(0.051)		(0.050)	
No. Males 15-29	0.088		0.089	
	(0.054)		(0.056)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.046		-0.043	
	(0.057)		(0.062)	
No. Elderly 64+	0.253**		0.257**	
	(0.120)		(0.126)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.075***		-0.075***	
	(0.012)		(0.012)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.012)		0.039***	
TN 0/ CITI 14 NC	(0.011)		(0.013)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.092***		0.092***	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.019)		(0.019)	
Constant	-1.681***		-1.691***	
	(0.196)		(0.194)	
atanhrho_12	-0.229		-0.184	
	(0.276)		(0.479)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a binary endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a binary endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A2.24: The Impact of Remittance Level on Domestic Work for Girls** 

	14-Hour Cutoff		1-Hour Cutoff	
	CMP Probit	Probit	CMP Probit	Probit
Interaction of RL with age 6-14	0.044	-0.017	0.029	0.035*
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Interaction of RL with age 15-17 Age	0.009	-0.069	0.020	0.030
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.049)
	0.141*	0.143*	0.238***	0.238***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Age squared	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Eldest son or daughter of head (d)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	0.002	0.006	0.045	0.045
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Live in extended HH (d)	0.033	0.039	0.043	0.043
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Father age when child was 6	-0.004	-0.003	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother age when child was 6	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.008***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Father absent permanently (d)	-0.210	-0.159	0.007	-0.002
	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.141)
Father's years of schooling	-0.020***	-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mother's years of schooling	-0.020**	-0.019**	-0.003	-0.003
Alexandria and Suez(d)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
	0.120	0.119	0.155	0.156
Urban Lower Egypt(d)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.111)	(0.111)
	-0.053	-0.055	-0.100	-0.099
Urban Upper Egypt(d)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.108)
	0.357***	0.353***	0.218**	0.219**
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Rural Lower Egypt(d)	0.090	0.084	0.022	0.023
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Rural Upper Egypt(d)	0.433***	0.430***	0.359***	0.359***
	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Constant	-2.796***	-2.816***	-2.439***	-2.438***
	(0.489)	(0.487)	(0.310)	(0.310)
IV Equation	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.510)	(0.510)
No. Children 6-14	-0.418		-0.357	
No. Children 6-14				
N. M.1. 15.20	(0.550)		(0.547)	
No. Males 15-29	1.087*		1.039*	
	(0.614)		(0.622)	
No. Females 15-29	-0.451		-0.302	
No. Elderly 64+	(0.518)		(0.525)	
	2.826**		2.782**	
	(1.349)		(1.372)	
Avg Male 18+ Years of schooling	-0.822***		-0.815***	
	(0.138)		(0.139)	
Avg Female 18+ Years of schooling	0.481***		0.486***	
	(0.135)		(0.136)	
IV: % of HH with Migrants in	0.133)		0.945***	
	0.340		U.7 <del>1</del> 3	
Shiakha/Village (Census 06)	(0.212)		(0.211)	
Constant	(0.212)		(0.211)	
	-18.409***		-18.709***	
	(2.971)		(2.983)	
atanhrho_12	-0.230**		0.030	
	(0.110)		(0.100)	
N	4027	4022	4027	4022

**Outcomes:** All domestic work outcomes are for the school-aged (6-17). Outcomes are: 14-hour cutoff binary variable, a 1-hour binary variable and left-censored domestic hours variable.

Results are from IV estimations with a left-censored endogenous variable and a binary outcome variable. Results for the impact on the domestic hours outcome are from an IV Tobit estimation with a left-censored endogenous variable and a left-censored outcome variable. All are carried out using the user-written program CMP (Roodman 2007). Alternative Probit/Tobit specifications assuming the exogeneity of remittance receipt are also provided. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.